Policies, Promoters, and Patterns of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese Marriages in Imperial Japan: Making a Case for Inclusive History by Baba, Ai
  
 
 
POLICIES, PROMOTERS, AND PATTERNS OF JAPANESE-KOREAN 
AND JAPANESE-TAIWANESE MARRIAGES IN IMPERIAL JAPAN: 
MAKING A CASE FOR INCLUSIVE HISTORY 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Ai Baba 
August 2019
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2019 Ai Baba
  
POLICIES, PROMOTERS, AND PATTERNS OF JAPANESE-KOREAN 
AND JAPANESE-TAIWANESE MARRIAGES IN IMPERIAL JAPAN: 
MAKING A CASE FOR INCLUSIVE HISTORY 
 
Ai Baba, Ph.D.  
Cornell University 2019 
 
This dissertation examines the policies, promoters, and patterns of Japanese-
Korean marriages (naisen kekkon) and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages (naitai kyōkon) 
in imperial Japan. It seeks to answer why the Japanese empire sanctioned 
intermarriage when the Euro-American empires condemned marriage between 
colonizers and colonized subjects in the twentieth century. It also questions who were 
the people that promoted intermarriage and why people intermarried in Japan, where 
the government legalized intermarriage but did not promote it at the national level. 
This research further investigates what happened to people who intermarried before 
1945 in postwar Japan, and why so little is known about the history of Japanese-
Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in contemporary Japan.  
With existing studies on the history of intermarriage in the Japanese empire 
focusing on colonial Korea and Taiwan, this project focuses on Japan. Through 
analysis of internal and external influences on the discourse of intermarriage in the 
metropole, it first argues that imperial Japan’s sanctioning of intermarriage was based 
on its population policies and observations of its contemporaneous empires, thus 
should not be equated with the absence of racism in Japan and its isolation from the 
  
world. It then reveals that intermarriage was promoted in Japan at the local level by 
the members of the Harmony Association (Kyōwakai), district commissioners 
(hōmen’iin), and Japanese women. By studying the history of Japanese-Korean and 
Japanese-Taiwanese marriages together rather than separately, this research 
demonstrates the limitation of relying on categories such as “colonizer” and 
“colonized” alone in understanding the promoters and patterns of intermarriage, and 
proposes consideration of a/sexuality and ability in addition to race/ethnicity, gender, 
and class when studying colonizer-colonized relationships in modern empires. Lastly, 
this research traces the history of intermarriage post-1945 to reveal the existence of 
Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples in postwar Japan and argues that it 
has been selectively remembered. 
Engaging with scholarship in modern Japanese history, imperial and colonial 
studies, and gender and sexuality studies, this dissertation ultimately makes a case for 
a more inclusive history that includes into history those who are marginalized in, 
excluded from, and/or forgotten in existing mainstream frameworks of history, to 
explain contemporary social issues of historical origin, such as disavowal of racism, in 
hopes of making a positive social change. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
 In Japan, before 1945, the numbers of Japanese-Korean marriages (naisen 
kekkon) and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages (naitai kyōkon) never exceeded more than 
one percent of the total number of endogamous marriages recorded between Japanese. 
Scholars who study intermarriages between Japanese and Koreans, or Japanese and 
Taiwanese, deduce that the numbers of common-law, unregistered marriages were 
most likely higher than the actual numbers recorded. Considering the general lack of 
awareness about its history and the limited studies on interethnic marriages in the 
Japanese empire, however, it was neither common nor a major phenomenon in history. 
Then why study the history of intermarriages in Japan?  
 This dissertation examines the policies, promoters, and patterns of Japanese-
Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in imperial Japan. I show that Japan’s 
government implemented and maintained policies to register interethnic marriages: 
there was never an outright ban against Japanese men and women marrying colonized 
subjects (as in other modern Euro-American empires) because the Japanese 
policymakers recognized the consequences of prohibiting intermarriage. 
Intermarriage, however, was not actively promoted by the government at the national 
level, and instead supported by groups at the local level. I examine this contradiction 
then analyze the patterns of intermarriage in prewar and wartime Japan to demonstrate 
how race, ethnicity, gender, class, sexuality, and ability intersected in determining 
people’s promotion of and engagement in Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese 
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marriages in Japan. Lastly, I trace the cases of intermarriage into the postwar period, 
to explain why the history of intermarriage is little known in the contemporary period.  
Through engagement with historiography and scholarship on modern Japanese 
history, imperial and colonial studies, and gender and sexuality studies, I make a case 
for a more inclusive history that includes into history those who are excluded from the 
existing frameworks of history. I argue that inclusive history can address present 
issues with historical origin, such as disavowal of racism in contemporary Japan, by 
revealing the existence of the past social structure still in place today with negative 
impact on both majority and minority groups in society. 
 
Main Questions and Objectives 
This project on Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages started 
from my interest in researching how Japanese people interacted with non-Japanese 
East Asians before the fall of the Japanese empire, after observing Japanese racism 
against them and refusal to acknowledge it as such by generations born after 1945.1 
To trace the history of racism in Japan, I chose to study the history of intermarriage—
marriage between two different groups—with a focus on marriages between Japanese 
colonizers and colonized Koreans and Taiwanese, because such sites of intimacy 
engendered racial categories and tensions.2  
 
1 I adopt Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s definition of racism as a social act that “preserves and 
inherits, or creates the unequal and unfair social structure,” in which the boundary between the 
group to which one belongs and the other is not determined by phenotypical differences alone. 
Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Gurōbaruka sareru reishizumu” [Globalizing racism], Reishizumu 
sutadīzu josetsu [Introduction to racism studies] (Tokyo: Ibunsha, 2012), 71–72.    
2 Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in 
Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).  
  3 
The conventional understanding appears to be that the Japanese empire ran 
counter to the global trends by encouraging and promoting marriage between the 
colonizers and the colonized, in contrast to the Euro-American empires in the 
twentieth century that condemned it.3 While existing scholarship on Japanese-Korean 
and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages agree that the intermarriage policy was 
theoretically inclusive but exclusive in practice, there is some disagreement regarding 
the degree and the extent of promotion of intermarriage in Japan. For example, 
feminist historian most cited in the works on Japanese-Korean marriages, Suzuki 
Yūko, claims that intermarriage, at least between Japanese and Koreans, was officially 
promoted.4 However, Kim Yŏngdal in his empirical research on Japanese-Korean 
marriages and Eika Tai in her research on the discourse of Japanese-Taiwanese 
marriages in colonial Taiwan argue that intermarriage was not actively promoted.5 
Did the Japanese empire promote intermarriage? And if so, why did they promote it 
when their counterparts elsewhere did not?  
One of my objectives is thus to examine Japanese policies on Japanese-Korean 
and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages, particularly in the metropole. I explain why the 
 
3 Interracial unions were condemned in the British, French and Dutch colonies. For example, 
see David M. Pomfret, “Raising Eurasia: Race, Class, and Age in French and British 
Colonies,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 51.2 (2009): 314–343. Yet there were 
exceptions: see Robert Hyam, Empire and Sexuality: the British Experience (Manchester, NY: 
Manchester University Press, 1990); Damon Ieremia Salesa, Racial Crossings: Race, 
Intermarriage, and the Victorian British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
4 Suzuki Yūko, Jūgun ianfu, naisen kekkon [Comfort women, Japanese-Korean marriage] 
(Tokyo: Miraisha, 1992). 
5 Kim Yŏngdal, “Nihon no Chōsen tōchi-ka ni okeru ‘tsūkon’ to ‘konketsu’—iwayuru ‘naisen 
kekkon’ no hōsei, tōkei, seisaku ni tsuite” [Japan’s “intermarriage” and “blood mixing” in 
colonial Korea: on laws, statistics, and policies of the so-called “Japanese-Korean marriage”], 
Kansai Daigaku Jinken Mondai Kenkyūshitsu Kiyō 39 (1999): 1–46; Eika Tai, “The Discourse 
of Intermarriage in Colonial Taiwan,” The Journal of Japanese Studies 40.1 (Winer 2014): 
87–116. 
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Japanese government chose to neither encourage nor discourage intermarriage in 
Japan after the initial legalization of intermarriage. By exploring the internal and 
external factors that influenced Japan’s decision to sanction colonizer-colonized 
marriages, I build on the existing literature on intermarriage in the Japanese empire 
and argue that sanctioning of intermarriage should not be equated with absence of 
racism and Japan’s isolation from the world (Chapters 2 and 3). 
Another objective is to explore the promoters and patterns of marriage between 
Japanese and Koreans, along with Japanese and Taiwanese in Japan. Who promoted 
intermarriage and why did people intermarry when the government did not actively 
promote it in Japan? Even though most of the marriages are perceived to have taken 
place in the metropole and not the colonies, existing studies discuss Japanese-Korean 
and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages separately with a focus on the colonies.6 I thus 
 
6 For studies on Japanese-Korean marriages in colonial Korea, see: Nam Bujin, “‘Naisen 
kekkon’ no bungaku: Jang Hyeokju no Nihongo sakuhin o chūshin ni” [Literature of 
“Japanese-Korean marriage”: Focus on Japanese works of Jang Hyeokju], Jinbun Ronshū: 
Shizuoka Daigaku Jinbungakubu Shakaigakka, Gengogakka Kenkyū Hōkoku 55.1 (2004): 
181–210; Kim Mee-young, “Ilchegangjŏmgi naesŏnyŏnae(kyŏrhon)sosŏre natanan 
ilbonyŏsŏnge kwanhan pyosang yŏngu” [A Study on the Representations about Japanese 
women as a Foreigner-lover or Wife for the Korean man in Korean Modern Novels in 
Japanese Imperial Period], Urimalgeul 41 (2007.12): 239–264; Chang Yong Gyong, “Ilche 
malgi naisen kekkonronkwa chosŏnin yukche” [Policy of Intermarriage, between people of the 
“Mainland” and Joseon, during the Japanese occupation period, and the Joseon people’s 
perception of “body”], Yŏksamunjeyŏn'gu 18 (2007.10): 195–214; Lee Young-Ah, “I Ŭn-
Nashimotomiya Masakoŭi kyŏrhon sŏsarŭl tonghan ‘naesŏngyŏrhon’ŭi nangmanjŏng 
chaehyŏn yangsang yŏngu” [A study on the romantic representation of the marriage of Lee-
Eun and Nashimotomiya-Masako], Taejungsŏsayŏngu 17.1 (2011): 229–258; Oh Tae-Young, 
“Naesŏnilcheŭi kyunyŏltŭl: Kim Sŏngminŭi 'Nokkiyŏnmaeng'ŭl chungshimŭro” [A Cracks of 
‘Naisen Ittai’ (Integration of Japan and Korea)—Focusing on Nokki Renmei (Green Flag 
League) by Kim, Sung-Min], Sanghŏhakpo 31 (2011.2): 89–122; Lee Jeong-Seon, 
“Chŏnshichejegi ilcheŭi chongdongwŏn jŏngchaekkwa 'naesŏnhonhyŏl' munje” [The Total 
Mobilization System during Wartime and the Policy for the Japanese-Korean Hybrid 
Population], Yŏksamunjeyŏngu 29 (2013.4): 217–255; Lee Jeong-Seon, “‘Naisen Kekkon’ ni 
miru teikoku Nihon no Chōsen tōchi to koseki” [Imperial Japan’s rule over Korea and 
household registration as see in “Japanese-Korean marriage”], Chōsenshi Kenkyūkai 
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focus on presenting the promoters and patterns of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-
Taiwanese marriages in the metropole together, and argue how race/ethnicity and 
categories such as “colonizer” and “colonized” alone cannot fully explain the 
promoters and patterns of intermarriage. I reveal shared factors beyond race/ethnicity 
and colonial status that influenced the promoters and patterns of Japanese-Korean and 
Japanese-Taiwanese marriages during Japan’s imperial period.  
My approach to study Japanese marriage to Koreans and Taiwanese together in 
“imperial Japan,” is to make these intimate relationships comparable to the 
intermarriages and studies of them between colonizers and colonized in other modern 
empires, to make Japan a site of knowledge production. Scholars writing about 
 
Ronbunshū 52 (2014): 69–97.  
For studies on Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in colonial Taiwan, see: Hoshina Hironobu, 
“Shokuminchi no ‘konketsuji’—naitai kekkon no seijigaku” [“Mixed blood children” of the 
colonies: Politics of Japanese-Taiwanese marriage], Taiwan no Daitōa Sensō [Taiwan’s 
Greater East Asia War], edited by Fujii Shōzō, Huang Yingzhe, and Tarumi Chie (Tokyo: 
Tokyo Daigaku Shuppansha, 2007); Wang Hsiao-Yun, “Shōji Sōichi no ‘Chen Fujin’ ni miru 
haiburiddo bunka no kattō” [Tension of hybrid culture as seen in Shōji Sōichi’s “Chen 
Fujin”], Ajia Shakai Bunka Kenkyū 8 (2007): 39–66; Miyazaki Seiko, “‘Naitai kyōkon’ to 
shokuminchi ni okeru Taiwan josei seinendan no ichizuke” [“Japanese-Taiwanese 
intermarriage” and the position of women’s organization in colonial Taiwan], Nantōshigaku 
70 (2007): 83–97; Huang Chiachi, “Nihon tōchi jidai ni okeru naitai kyōkon no kōzō to 
tenkai,” [The structure and development of marriage between Taiwanese and Japanese during 
the Japanese colonial rule period], Hikaku Kazoku Kenkyūshi 27 (2013): 128–155; Kirsten L. 
Ziomek, “The Possibility of Liminal Colonial Subjecthood: Yayutz Bleyh and the Search for 
Subaltern Histories in the Japanese Empire,” Critical Asian Studies 47.1 (2015): 123–150; 
Tokuda Yukie, “Rìběn tǒngzhì xià Táiwān de ‘nèitáigònghūn’—Rìběn yǔ Táiwān de ‘jiā’ 
zhìdù de chōngtú hé jiāoliú” [Taiwanese and Japanese interracial marriages: The familial 
challenges and culture conflicts during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan], Master’s Thesis, 
Tamkang University, 2007; Yang Peiwen, “Kuàyuè biānjiè de liúdòng yǔ rèntóng: Rìzhì shíqí 
`nèitáigònghūn’ yánjiū” [The study of interracial marriages between Taiwanese and Japanese 
during the colonial period], Master’s Thesis, National Chengchi University, 2009; Liao 
Yuanchun, “Yìzúhūnyīn de fǎzhì yǔ wénhuà tiáoshì: Yǐ Rìzhì shíqí 'nèitáigònghūn' ànlì fēnxī 
wéi zhōngxīn” [The Law and Culture Adjustment of Interracial Marriages: A Case Study of 
Interracial Marriages Between Taiwanese and Japanese During the Colonial Period], Master’s 
Thesis, National Cheng Kung University, 2012. 
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intermarriage in the Japanese empire rely on English-language scholarship on the 
modern Euro-American empires produced in “the West”: for example, Ann Stoler’s 
work is referenced in the study of Japanese marriages to indigenous Taiwanese by 
Paul Barclay and Su Yun Kim’s study of Japanese-Korean marriages in literature.7 
The reverse, however, is rarely the case. As a result, “the West” remains the site of 
knowledge production, while “the Rest” remains the object of study.8 In an effort to 
challenge this asymmetry, I analyze the motives of promoters of intermarriage as well 
as the patterns of intermarriages, to reveal the multiplex social hierarchies in Japan. By 
doing so, I attempt to propose consideration of factors beyond race, class, and 
gender—a/sexuality and ability—when studying the colonizer-colonized relationships 
in modern empires unlimited to Japan (Chapters 4 and 5).  
Lastly, this dissertation grapples with the question of how history can be more 
inclusive, beyond working to include the history of the Japanese empire in the West-
centric history of modern empires. A numerically insignificant historical phenomenon 
and groups of people, such as the history of intermarriage and people who 
intermarried, are overlooked, for example, in the national history framework that 
focuses on the larger events and the majority population of a given nation. While 
common cases can reveal the trends, particular cases can reveal the potentials in and of 
 
7 Paul D. Barclay, “Cultural Brokerage and Interethnic Marriage in Colonial Taiwan: 
Japanese Subalterns and Their Aborigine Wives, 1895–1930,” The Journal of Asian Studies 
64.2 (May 2005): 323–360; Su Yun Kim, “Romancing Race and Gender: Intermarriage and 
the Making of a ‘Modern Subjectivity’ in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945,” PhD Dissertation, 
University of California San Diego, 2009; Su Yun Kim, “Racialization and Colonial Space: 
Intermarriage in Yi Hyo-sŏk’s Works,” Journal of Korean Studies 18.1 (Spring 2013): 29–59. 
8 Naoki Sakai, “Theory and Asian Humanity: On the Question of Humanitas and Anthropos,” 
Postcolonial Studies 13.4 (2010): 441–464. 
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history: I advocate for the inclusion of minorities in mainstream histories, because 
their histories can become windows into examining what has been and remains 
overlooked or unchallenged, to expand the existing analytical frameworks to better 
understand history and explain contemporary society. Furthermore, colleges boast the 
increasing diversity of their incoming class, but how are they working on retention of 
the students? What messages are being sent when only the history of privileged and 
majority groups is taught in a classroom? Privileged individuals in majority groups 
who have not experienced discrimination and microaggressions may take them lightly 
or not at all, but they exist and negatively impact student success.9 When non–Euro-
American culture offers an alternative to white, cis-heteronormative culture in the 
United States for some minority students (hence the appeal of classes on Japan, Asia, 
etc.), while other students enroll in a history class to learn about their own identities 
not taught in primary and secondary schools (say a class on gender while identifying 
as nonbinary), I advocate doing inclusive history to acknowledge and accommodate 
diversity beyond race/ethnicity so that students feel included and can succeed. 
I therefore aim to make a case for a more inclusive history by engaging with 
the existing scholarship in two ways. First, I challenge the main narratives of 
Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages—the tragedy and the romance 
narratives. Were all the marriages forced? What about those who were not forced into 
 
9 Sylvia Hurtado, Josephine Gasiewski, and Cynthia Lua Alvarez, “The Climate for Diversity 
at Cornell University: Student Experiences,” Higher Education Research Institute, UCLA, 
March 2014, https://diversity.cornell.edu/sites/default/files/uploaded-files/Qualitative-Study-
of-Student-Climate-Full-Report.pdf. Articles on impact of marginalization and erasure in the 
curriculum and campus can also be found in The Chronicle of Higher Education and Inside 
Higher Ed. 
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marriage, yet did not marry out of love either? Second, I continue my study past 1945 
when most of the existing studies end with the fall of the Japanese empire.10 What 
happened to those who intermarried during the imperial period and remained in Japan 
in the postwar period? By challenging the conventional narrative and temporal 
frameworks to include into history those who did not marry out of force or romance 
pre-1945 and people who intermarried and remained in postwar Japan, I demonstrate 
how inclusive history can be written, why it is important, and what it can do (Chapters 
5 and 6).     
 
Situating the Project: Contributions to the Field  
 By contributing to the scholarship on Japanese-Korean and Japanese-
Taiwanese marriages, this project also aims to contribute to the following fields: 
modern Japanese history, imperial and colonial histories, and gender and sexuality 
studies.  
Modern Japanese History 
 Current studies on modern Japanese history agree that Japan is not a 
homogeneous nation, by demonstrating the presence of racialized minorities—most 
notably the Ainu, Okinawans, burakumin, zainichi Chinese and Koreans—and 
questioning the definition of “Japanese.”11 Studies of minorities in Japan are not 
 
10 One exception to this is Huang Chiachi’s “Dainiji Sekai Taisen zengo no Nihon ni okeru 
Taiwan shusshinsha no teijūka no ichikatei: Raifu kōsu no shiten kara” [A Process of the 
Taiwanese Resident’s settlement into Japan before and after the World War II from the 
viewpoint of their life courses], Kaikō Toshi Kenkyū 3 (March 2008): 129–141 
11 For example, see: John Lie, Multiethnic Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2004); Naoki Sakai, Brett de Bary, and Toshio Iyotani, eds., Deconstructing Nationality 
(Ithaca: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2005); Jane H. Yamashiro, Redefining 
  9 
limited to “invisible minorities,” who cannot be phenotypically distinguished from 
Japanese: there are “visible minorities,” such as white and black Americans, including 
Japanese of mixed heritage. When it comes to discussions of mixed Japanese in 
modern Japanese history, when included, the focus is on Amerasians in the postwar 
period.12 Interracial and interethnic encounters, however, were not limited to Japanese 
and Americans, as Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples and their 
children appear in studies of colonial Korea or colonial Taiwan.13 This project 
therefore challenges the myth of homogeneous Japan and questions the category of 
“Japanese,” instead of as a given. 
I use the term “Japanese” to refer to people who were registered in the 
Japanese household registry system (koseki)—created in 1871 and implemented since 
1872—with legal domicile/permanent register (honseki) in Japan. Likewise, “Korean” 
refers to those registered in Korea, and “Taiwanese” to those registered in the 
Taiwanese registry system (mostly the non-indigenous Taiwanese), although they 
were both theoretically “Japanese” once Japan colonized Korea and Taiwan. I 
 
Japaneseness (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2017). 
12 Mitzi Uehara Carter, “Mixed Race Okinawans and Their Obscure In-Betweenness,” 
Journal of Intercultural Studies 35.6 (2014): 646–661; Debito Arudou, Embedded Racism: 
Japan’s Visible Minorities and Racial Discrimination (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2016); Michael Weiner, ed., Japan’s Minorities: the Illusion of Homogeneity, second edition 
(London: Routledge, 2009). 
13 Mark Caprio introduces Tauchi Chizuko in Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial 
Korea, 1910–1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 169, 207. Barbara Brooks 
also discuss marriage between Japanese and Koreans that was promoted to speed up 
assimilation in “Reading the Japanese Colonial Archive: Gender and Bourgeois Civility in 
Korea and Manchuria before 1932,” Gendering Modern Japanese History, edited by Barbara 
Molony and Kathleen Uno (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 307. Mentions of 
Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages also appear in Cho Kyŏngdal’s 
Shokuminchi Chōsen to Nihon [Colonial Korea and Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013) 
and Takenaka Nobuko’s Shokuminchi Taiwan no Nihon Josei Seikatsushi [Japanese women’s 
life history in colonial Taiwan] (Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 1995–2001) respectively. 
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demonstrate the instability of “Japanese” as a category by revealing how intermarriage 
enabled/disabled transfers between the different registries that were never unified into 
one system, and the multiplex social hierarchy in which one’s position was determined 
by the intersection of multiple factors, unlimited to race/ethnicity.  
 This project aligns with the work of scholars who write against the “dark 
valley” narrative of modern Japanese history, in which the wartime is seen as an 
aberration and a time when “Japan lost sight of the overall trends in the world,” as the 
current Prime Minister Abe phrased it.14 To write against such a narrative, I will first 
demonstrate how male Japanese intellectuals who debated whether or not to promote 
intermarriage were paying attention to the state of affairs concerning race mixing in 
other empires. I will also trace the history of intermarriage into the postwar period to 
expose the impact of wartime history into the postwar and the contemporary period in 
Japan15—akin to those that look at the impact of Japanese imperialism and colonialism 
in post-1945 Japan16—to argue against the idea of wartime as an anomalous period by 
showing the continuities between the periods before and after 1945. I then propose 
that studying the history of intermarriage and the complex social hierarchies that were 
created during the imperial period could explain the connections between the different 
 
14 “Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” August 14, 2015, Speeches and 
Statements by the Prime Minister, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/1212349_9926.html. 
15 For example, see: Yasushi Yamanouchi, J. Victor Koschmann, and Ryūichi Narita, eds., 
Total War and Modernization (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University East Asia Program, 2001); 
Andrew Gordon, ed., Postwar Japan as History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2009).  
16 Janice Mimura, Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); Aaron Stephen Moore, Constructing East Asia: 
Technology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan’s Wartime Era, 1931–1945 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2013).  
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-isms (e.g., racism, sexism, and ableism) in Japan today.17 
Imperial and Colonial Histories 
Although the main focus of this project is on Japan, I frame it in the larger 
context as “imperial Japan,” in order to consider what was happening outside of the 
Japanese empire in this period. Speaking from a Japanese imperial perspective, I aim 
to contribute to the studies of imperial and colonial histories, in which the Western 
empires are often taken to be paradigmatic and the studies on the Japanese empire are 
often excluded or sidelined.18 I do not deny that there were differences between the 
Japanese and the modern Euro-American empires: most notably how the ruling race 
was closely linked to whiteness in the latter, while the boundary between the colonizer 
and the colonized was not based on color in the former. Japan was also geographically 
close to its colonies, which were closer than the distance between the metropole and 
the colonies of the other empires. There is also the difference in the pattern of 
colonizer-colonized marriages: more colonizing women married colonized men in the 
 
17 Inspired by studies that examine imperial and colonial legacies in the contemporary period, 
such as Haydie Gooder and Jane M. Jacobs, “Belonging and non-belonging: The apology in a 
reconciling nation” and Clair Dwyer, “‘Where are you from?’: Young British Muslim women 
and the making of ‘home’” in Postcolonial Geographies, edited by Alison Blunt and Cheryl 
McEwan (London: Continuum, 2002); Laurent Dubois, “La République Métissé: Citizenship, 
Colonialism, and the Borders of French History,” New Imperial Histories Reader, edited by 
Stephen Howe (New York: Routledge, 2009); Sarah C. Soh, The Comfort Women: Sexual 
Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2009).  
18 Examples of books and anthologies in which Japan is not included or hardly mentioned: 
Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a 
Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Ania Loomba, 
Colonialism/Postcolonialism, second edition (London: Routledge, 2005); Krishan Kumar, 
Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2017). More recent scholarship, however, is slightly more inclusive: Bonnie 
G. Smith, Modern Empires: A Reader (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018).  
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Japanese empire, contrary to the frequent pattern between colonizing men and 
colonized women elsewhere.  
 Yet despite the easily identifiable differences, there were many similarities 
between the Japanese and the Euro-American empires: studies on intimate colonizer-
colonized relationships in colonial Korea and Taiwan have demonstrated how racial 
boundaries were engendered in colonial settings in order to secure the racial 
superiority of the ruling race.19 Furthermore, although Japanese colonizers and 
colonized Koreans and Taiwanese were classified as being the same race, racism 
existed and played a role in determining imperial and colonial policies: Koreans and 
Taiwanese were racialized and discriminated within the Japanese empire, just as 
people of color were discriminated in the Western empires.20 Therefore building on 
the existing literature on imperial and colonial histories, particularly postcolonial 
studies that challenge the dichotomy between the colonizers and the colonized (e.g. 
Tensions of Empire [1997]), one of the things I aim to do is to connect the studies on 
the Japanese empire and the Euro-American empires, by identifying the similarities 
and parallels, such as the concern over race mixing, to demonstrate that just because 
intermarriage was sanctioned in the Japanese empire, it did not make them a non-
racist, as the works of John Dower (1986) and Takashi Fujitani (2011) have shown.21 
 
19 For example, Tai (2014) shows that racism developed overtime in shaping colonial policies, 
elaborating on Komagome Takeshi’s argument in Shokuminchi Teikoku Nihon no Bunka Tōgō 
[Cultural integration of colonial empire Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996) that racism 
impacted colonial policies. 
20 Takashi Fujitani, Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans 
during World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Rotem Kowner, ed., 
Race and Racism in Modern East Asia (Leiden: Brill, 2015).   
21 Fujitani (2011); John W. Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War 
(New York: Pantheon, 1986).  
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By avoiding reliance on Japanese culture as an explanation of Japan, its people, and its 
history, this project attempts to “dislocate the West (and the Rest).”22    
By situating Japan more centrally in imperial and colonial historiography, my 
project contributes particularly to the larger studies on intermarriage. In the existing 
scholarship on intermarriage in colonial context (e.g., Lora Wildenthal [1997], Durba 
Ghosh [2006], Gwenn A. Miller [2006], Damon Ieremia Salesa [2011]), there is an 
analysis of race, class, and gender, and to an extent, sexuality, that made some forms 
of intimate relationships more acceptable than others.23 Yet my research shows that in 
addition to race, class, gender, and sexuality, reproductive ability was also a factor in 
determining whether inter/marriage was acceptable or not. If race, determined by 
physical markers, was the only factor in limiting or allowing intermarriage, it does not 
fully explain why there was a debate on encouraging or discouraging intermarriage in 
the Japanese empire, where Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese could not be 
phenotypically distinguished apart. Through this study, I therefore interrogate the 
concepts of ability and a/sexuality, and argue that in addition to the complex social 
hierarchy based on race, class, and gender that was created through the colonizer-
colonized relationships, intermarriage also reinforced an ableist, as well as a cis-
hetero(sexually)normative structure in society, which excluded those who fell outside 
 
22 Gavin Walker and Naoki Sakai, “The End of Area,” positions 27.1 (February 2019): 1–31.  
23 Lora Wildenthal, “Race, Gender, and Citizenship in the German Colonial Empire,” 
Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997); Durba Ghosh, Sex and the Family in Colonial India: the Making of 
Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Gwenn A. Miller, “‘The Perfect 
Mistress of Russian Economy’: Sighting the Intimate on a Colonial Alaskan Terrain, 1784–
1821,” Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2006); Damon Ieremia Salesa, Racial Crossings: Race, Intermarriage, 
and the Victorian British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
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of these normative categories in historiography and history. 
Gender and Sexuality Studies 
 While I draw on scholarship in gender and sexuality studies, I challenge two 
assumptions about sexuality and marriage: an assumption that all individuals were 
heterosexual or homosexual, and another that assumes all people married, treating 
marriage as a given. Gender studies have questioned gender categories and 
demonstrated that there were women who did not follow traditional gender roles, but 
the sexuality of women is rarely questioned, with occasional references to the 
possibility of homosexual men. As a result, why people have complied and continues 
to comply with marriage as a normative social practice also remain unquestioned. 
Considering that sexuality is a constructed set of practices, I focus on those who fell 
outside of the heterosexual–homosexual spectrum, where marriage (and/or co-
habitation) could not be taken as a given. Partly driven by my long-term question 
regarding people’s fixation on the institution of marriage—why keep the 
institution?—this dissertation questions marriage as a focus of state and social policy. 
By challenging assumptions about sexuality and the institution of marriage through the 
history of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages, I seek to locate 
subjects who are still marginalized or unacknowledged in the mainstream histories.  
 To do so, this project builds on gender studies scholarship that questions 
gender binaries, and queer studies that questions heterosexuality as a given. Joan Scott 
and Judith Butler, who proposed using gender as a category of historical analysis and 
challenged the category of “women” as a given, led the way in excavating voices of 
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those gendered feminine in history dominated by men and the masculine,24 but it 
seems as though marriage is still considered the norm for women. Queer studies 
further opened up spaces for non-heterosexual/non-cisgender individuals in history by 
questioning heterosexuality as a given, but dominated by the main LGBT groups.25 
What about people who did not marry, and were neither heterosexual nor homosexual? 
In addition to bringing to light the marginalized history of intermarriage, I use it to 
find other sexual minorities and those denied marriage in history, because before 
debating whether those who are silenced can be talked about, their existence needs to 
be recognized first.26   
 Lastly, I aim to contribute to the works that are a combination of all three 
fields—studies on Japanese women in the metropole during the imperial period. 
Studies of women in the East Asian context have worked to oppose the stereotypical 
image of “Oriental” women as passive figures in history, as well as to challenge the 
idea that feminism is a Western product.27 Works by Louise Young (1999), Mariko 
 
24 Joan Scott, “Gender as a Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” American Historical 
Review 91.5 (December 1986): 1053–1075; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity (New York and London: Routledge, 1990). For application in 
imperial/colonial context, see Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: the ‘manly Englishman’ 
and the ‘effeminate Bengali’ in the late nineteenth century (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1995).  
25 For queer history of Japan, see Gregory M. Pflugfelder, Cartographies of Desire: Male-
Male Sexuality in Japanese Discourse, 1600–1950 (Berkeley: University of California, 1999) 
and Mark McLelland, Queer Japan from the Pacific War to the Internet Age (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).   
26 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Marxism and the Interpretation 
of Culture (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313. 
27 For example, see: Kumiko Fujimura-Fanselow and Atsuko Kameda, eds., Japanese 
Women: New Feminist Perspectives on the Past, Present, and Future (The Feminist Press at 
City University of New York, 1995); Anne Walthall, ed., The Human Tradition in Modern 
Japan (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Books, 2002); Hiroko Tomida and Gordon 
Daniels, eds., Japanese Women: Emerging from Subservience, 1868–1945 (Kent: Global 
Oriental, 2005); Barbara Molony, Janet Theiss, and Hyaewol Choi, eds., Gender in Modern 
  16 
Asano Tamanoi (2009), and Lori Watt (2009), for example, further revealed Japanese 
women’s connection to the empire, particularly through Manchukuo,28 similar to how 
British women were part of the imperial enterprise, as illustrated in At Home with the 
Empire (2006).29 Thus, following their works that portray Japanese women as agents 
of the empire, I show how one could be implicated in imperialism without direct 
interaction with people from the colonies in the metropole, to speak to the audience 
outlined below. 
 
Audience 
 The dissertation is based on text-based research, but simultaneously informed 
and shaped by oral interactions with miscellaneous individuals in and out of academia. 
Therefore while I write to make academic contributions in the above listed fields, I 
also write with non-academics in mind when I make a case for a more inclusive 
history, inspired by feminist and social justice-based scholarship that address ways to 
end oppression, beyond sex-based oppression against women.30 I seek to address 
 
East Asia: An Integrated History (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016); Ayako Kano, 
Japanese Feminist Debates: A Century of Contention on Sex, Love, and Labor (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2016). 
28 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Mariko Asano Tamanoi, Memory Maps: the 
State and Manchuria in Postwar Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009); Lori 
Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan (Harvard 
University Asia Center, 2009).  
29 Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose, eds., At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture 
and the Imperial World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Philippa Levine 
in Gender and Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) further goes beyond 
identifying women in the empire and examines their active role in the colonies and the 
metropole.  
30 bell hooks, Feminism is for Everybody: Passionate Politics (Cambridge, MA: South End 
Press, 2000); Sara Ahmed, Living a Feminist Life (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017). 
Lee Anne Bell defines social justice as “reconstructing society in accordance with principles 
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people both in and out of Japan, wherever it is difficult to ignore the existence of 
various forms of oppression, particularly racism, the subtle and the not-so-subtle 
(Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: An example of explicit racism in Japan: right-wing Gokoku Shishi no Kai 
demonstration making anti-Chinese and anti-Korean statements outside of Ikebukuro 
Station in Tokyo, supposedly fighting against “sabetsu” (discrimination) against 
Japanese by anti-Japanese forces (photo taken on July 9, 2017). 
 
One of the reasons why I write with people unaffiliated with academia in mind, 
is because I observe a gap between what is discussed in academia and those outside of 
it, where people without links to the academic world are unaware of what is happening 
 
of equity, recognition, and inclusion” in “Theoretical Foundations for Social Justice 
Education,” Readings for Diversity and Social Justice, edited by Maurianne Adams, et al., 
fourth edition (New York: Routledge, 2018), 34.  
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inside it. In addition, while I believe that it is important to write to the conservative, 
right-wing politicians and other vocal history deniers in mind, and I agree with the 
criticisms about/toward them, I also believe that it is just as important to write to the 
non-conservative, “ordinary people” who are not politicians. Of the “ordinary people,” 
I hope that this particularly reaches those in the majority/privileged/agent groups, 
because their actions and behaviors stemming from the lack of historical awareness, 
even if without evil intent, has negative impact on the minority/unprivileged/target 
groups, and to make a change in the status quo requires involvement of the former. 
Ideally it would reach both groups, because there is an irony in which one group that is 
oppressed do not necessary understand the struggles of another group that is also 
oppressed. 
Historian Hirota Masaki in his search for the source of discrimination in 
Sabetsu kara miru Nihon no rekishi (2008) argues the importance of learning from 
history to overcome it.31 Similarly, in “The Anatomy of Korea-Phobia in Japan” 
(2015), Itagaki Ryūta explains how racism against Koreans in contemporary Japan has 
historical origins, and how it is necessary to historicize the issue in order to address 
the problem.32 I likewise aim to trace the history of racism and illustrate its links to 
heterosexism and ableism (and needless to say, sexism and classism, too) through the 
study of policies, promoters, and patterns of intermarriage in imperial Japan. My 
objective in demonstrating the connections between the different -isms to the 
 
31 Hirota Masaki, Sabetsu kara miru Nihon no rekishi [Seeing history of Japan through 
discrimination] (Osaka: Kaihō Shuppansha, 2008).  
32 Itagaki Ryūta, “The Anatomy of Korea-Phobia in Japan,” Japanese Studies 35.1 (2015): 
49–66.  
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“ordinary people” is to convince them how one could be complicit in and affected by 
the structure that enables various oppressions to exist, even if one is oppressed. And 
instead of simply pointing out that the problems exist, I want to propose a solution: if 
existing problems are perpetuated in a negative cycle, as Bobbie Harro illustrates in 
the “Cycle of Socialization” (Figure 2), then I aim to make this project be the 
“direction for change,” by explaining how ending one form of oppression could 
benefit others who are oppressed.33  
Whether ordinary “Japanese” people would listen to someone who’s not 
considered “Japanese” in Japan aside, I also write for audience outside of Japan, 
because the phenomenon in which the privileged groups disavow their own privileges 
and oppressions of the underprivileged and unprivileged is not unique to Japan (e.g., 
responding to the Black Lives Matter and the #MeToo movement with “all lives 
matter” and “#NotAllMen”). Although there may be a pushback from the privileged 
groups, there are psychological, social, moral, spiritual, intellectual, material, and 
physical costs of oppression for them as well.34 In agreement with scholars who argue 
that it is the responsibility of the privileged to listen and how those who are privileged  
should not be in the position to decide when an apology, reparation, etc. is enough,35 I 
 
33 Bobbie Harro, “The Cycle of Socialization,” Readings for Diversity and Social Justice, 
edited by Maurianne Adams, et al., fourth edition (New York: Routledge, 2018), 27–34. 
34 Diane J. Goodman, “The Costs of Oppression to People from Privileged Groups,” 
Promoting Diversity and Social Justice: Educating People from Privileged Groups (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2001), 103–124.  
35 For example of scholars making this argument in the context of Japanese history, see: 
Naoki Sakai, “Nihonshi to kokuminteki sekinin” [Japanese history and national responsibility] 
Nashonaru hisutorī o manabisuteru [Unlearning national history] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku 
Shuppankai, 2006), 161–190; Lisa Yoneyama, Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of 
American Justice and Japanese War Crimes (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016). 
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hope that unfolding marginalized history and drawing connections with the 
contemporary period, could at least get people to listen and reflect on their own role in 
the negative cycle, and ideally, work to break the “Cycle of Socialization,” to enter the 
“Cycle of Liberation” (diagram in Chapter 6).36 
 
36 Bobbie Harro, “The Cycle of Liberation,” Readings for Diversity and Social Justice, edited 
by Maurianne Adams, et al., fourth edition (New York: Routledge, 2018), 627–634.  
Figure 2: Cycle of Socialization 
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Chapter Outlines 
Chapter 2 
 Titled “Discourse of Intermarriage in Imperial Japan: Internal Factors behind 
the Legalization and Lack of Promotion,” this chapter examines why intermarriage 
became legal in Japan, but was not promoted. Beginning with how intermarriage was 
legalized between the late 1910s and the early 1930s, I explore the discourse of 
intermarriage that appeared in public outlets, such as newspapers and magazines, as 
well as in the less-accessible sphere where male Japanese intellectuals discussed the 
topic of intermarriage from legal, diplomatic, and scientific perspectives, to first 
demonstrate that the topic of intermarriage was not censored, but not promoted at the 
national level either. Then, through the exploration of the discourse of intermarriage 
among Japanese men, I argue that Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese 
marriages were condoned yet not promoted, because they were aware of the 
consequences of banning and suppressing intermarriage in the other empires, and there 
was a lack of scientific evidence to outright condemn intermarriage. Another factor 
was the wartime population policy that valued both quality and quantity of the 
population: even though there were opponents against intermarriage, population 
quality and quantity could be monitored and maintained as long as people who 
intermarried registered their marriages. Here, I challenge viewing intermarriage policy 
solely as an assimilationist policy that failed, and aim to show Japan’s connection to 
its contemporaneous Euro-American powers to argue in favor of studying Japan’s 
imperial history in larger context.  
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Chapter 3 
 Since the previous chapter examined internal factors that led to sanctioning of 
intermarriage in imperial Japan, this chapter, “Discourse of Intermarriage in Imperial 
Japan: External Factors behind the Legalization and Lack of Promotion,” examines the 
impact of external factors on the Japanese government’s decision to neither encourage 
nor discourage intermarriage after its legalization, even in the 1940s when Koreans 
and Taiwanese were being conscripted into the Japanese military. I first introduce the 
Japanese government’s position on intermarriage in the 1940s, and aim to show that 
the anxiety of racial degeneration of the ruling race that led to condemnation of 
colonizer-colonized marriages in the modern Euro-American empires also existed in 
Japan. Through an analysis of documents that deliberated on intermarriage in planning 
the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, I argue that in the case 
of Japan, the fear of displaying explicit racism like the Euro-American powers and 
antagonizing non-Japanese Asians in areas to where Japan expanded, was greater than 
the fear of racial degeneration, hence the condoning of intermarriage in Japan and its 
empire. Japan’s move to legalize and sanction intermarriage may appear to have ran 
counter to the global trends, but this was a result of being aware of what was 
happening outside of its empire—neither because imperial Japan was ignorant of or 
isolated from other imperial powers nor because it was less racist than its Euro-
American counterparts.  
Chapter 4 
 Having examined the internal and external reasons behind the intermarriage 
policy in imperial Japan where the government neither encouraged nor discouraged 
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Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages even in the 1940s, this chapter, 
titled “Brokers of Empire at Home: Supporters of Intermarriage in Wartime Japan,” 
explores the promoters and supporters of intermarriage in the metropole: the Harmony 
Association (Kyōwakai), the district commissioners (hōmen’iin), and Japanese women. 
These groups, which members sometimes overlapped, participated in the promotion of 
and/or supported intermarriage at the local level when the government did not at the 
national level. By examining their activities in imperial Japan, I first argue that there 
were ideological and/or practical reasons behind their support and/or promotion of 
intermarriage, which was possible because it was an extension of government-backed 
activities. I particularly focus on Japanese women who worked in favor of 
intermarriage, to analyze why they supported intermarriage contrary to Japanese men 
and the government. I then argue that in addition to intermarriage providing a practical 
solution to social issues in wartime Japan, it enabled Japanese women to fulfill their 
own interests. By subsequently demonstrating how Japanese women’s support of 
intermarriage inadvertently reinforced and perpetuated the patriarchal system that 
placed minorities, including women, at a disadvantage, I further explain that one could 
be complicit in imperialism even at the metropole with good intentions. 
Chapter 5 
 This chapter, titled “Examining the Patterns of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-
Taiwanese Marriages in Imperial Japan and Making a Case for Inclusive History,” 
examines the “unique” patterns of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese 
marriages in imperial Japan, where more colonizing women married colonized men, 
contrary to the pattern between colonizing men and colonized women more common 
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in the Euro-American empires. I begin by challenging the three dominant narratives of 
intermarriage—intermarriage as a tragedy, a romance, and/or a form of hypergamy—
because existing narratives exclude cases that do not fit into the narratives and cannot 
be explained by the “colonizer” and “colonized” categories alone. To show how those 
who have been excluded can be included into history, I then compare the history of 
intermarriage alongside endogamous (Japanese-Japanese) marriages to reveal factors 
beyond gender, race/ethnicity, and class that influenced people’s decision to 
intermarry: I argue that inevitability, financial security, and/or interest in participating 
in patriotic activities were additional reasons besides force and love that led more 
Japanese women to intermarry than Japanese men. Furthermore, I make a case in favor 
of a comparative study between majority and minority histories that focuses on 
similarities instead of differences alone, because it can identify and challenge 
unquestioned assumptions in writing of history. I then propose inclusion of asexuality 
in historical analyses to address an assumption that emerged in comparing 
intermarriages and non-intermarriages, to locate individuals excluded and still 
unaccounted for in history, as well as challenge the history deniers, unlimited to those 
in Japan. Because this proposal was made possible by studying marginalized history 
along with mainstream history, I end with an explanation of why inclusive history is 
important. 
Chapter 6 
 Lastly, the final chapter addresses the history of Japanese-Korean and 
Japanese-Taiwanese marriage in Japan after 1945. Titled “Selective Remembering and 
Forgetting of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese Marriages in Postwar Japan,” 
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it traces the whereabouts of people who intermarried pre-1945 and how they were “re-
discovered” in postwar Japan. While the postwar attention has been on Japanese 
women who had married Korean men and were “found” in South Korea, I reveal 
through the American occupation documents and legal journals evidences of 
intermarried couples who remained in postwar Japan, to argue that the history of 
intermarriage has been selectively remembered. I subsequently argue that the selective 
remembering and forgetting of the history of intermarriage were made possible by a 
combination of the following factors in postwar Japan: shift in the population policy, 
change in the nationality and household registration laws, and the presence of the 
United States, which enabled fostering the “myth of Japanese homogeneity” and Japan 
as the victim of World War II.  
  At the end of this chapter, I conclude with a discussion on why it is important 
to learn about the history of minorities, such as the history of intermarriage, by 
illustrating how it could raise consciousness and contribute to forming alliances to 
allow for a positive change in society. If the previous chapter was aimed at convincing 
historians to write a more comprehensive, inclusive history, then this chapter’s 
objective is to convince non-historians why studying the history of minorities is 
important, in and out of Japan.
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Chapter 2 
 
Discourse of Intermarriage in Imperial Japan: 
Internal Factors behind the Legalization and Lack of Promotion 
 
 
 Intermarriage between Japanese and Koreans became legal in 1923, and 
marriages between Japanese and Taiwanese in 1933. There are discrepancies in 
existing scholarship regarding promotion of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese 
marriages, but there are agreements. One of the agreements, is that intermarriage 
policy was one of the assimilationist policies that aimed to assimilate Koreans and 
Taiwanese in and from the colonies. There is also an agreement about intermarriage 
policy being unsuccessful and/or a failure because of the small number recorded.1 
And lastly, there is an agreement that as an assimilationist policy, the legalization of 
intermarriage was inclusive in rhetoric but exclusive in practice. Through 
intermarriage, colonized Koreans and Taiwanese could enter the Japanese koseki 
(household registry), hence inclusive. Yet it was inherently exclusive, because the 
registration system remained separate and never unified between Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan: colonized people who did not intermarry or were not adopted into a Japanese 
household could never become “Japanese” in terms of one’s honseki (domicile, or 
 
1 For example, Paul Barclay describes the failure of “political-marriage” policy in Taiwan, in 
which marriage between Japanese men and Atayal women who intermarried “ended up 
divorced, abandoned, dead, or disgraced” (in “Cultural Brokerage and Interethnic Marriage in 
Colonial Taiwan: Japanese Subalterns and Their Aborigine Wives, 1895–1930,” The Journal 
of Asian Studies 64.2 [May 2005]: 325). This chapter will not address the success or failure of 
the policy, because as feminist scholar Ueno Chizuko argues, judging in history is heavily 
influenced by the postwar perspective (Nashonarizumu to jendā [Engendering nationalism] 
[Tokyo: Seidosha, 1998], 83). The failure of getting people to intermarry, could have been 
considered a success by those who wanted to suppress intermarriage when the government 
would not.  
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place of registry), which determined whether one was “Japanese” or not, even though 
Koreans and Taiwanese were technically Japanese subjects. And this exclusivity is 
attributed to the discrimination against colonized people in and from the colonies.  
 But was assimilation the only reason behind the legalization of intermarriage? 
Were there other reasons behind the legalization of intermarriage, when discrimination 
against Koreans and Taiwanese existed? Was discussion of intermarriage ever 
censored from the public, and is this the reason why little is known about the history 
of intermarriage in Japan? With the Japanese empire treated as a “copycat” of Euro-
American empires in the historiography of modern empires, why is it that Japan did 
not copy and follow the trends elsewhere that banned or discouraged marriage 
between colonizing and the colonized groups by the twentieth century? And did 
allowing intermarriage signal general support of intermarriage in imperial Japan?  
 I will first introduce how intermarriage came to be legalized in Japan, then 
examine how intermarriage has been discussed in mainland Japan from the late 
nineteenth century onwards to argue that although Japanese-Korean and Japanese-
Taiwanese marriages were not overtly promoted, they were not censored from the 
public either. I then examine the discourse of intermarriage in spheres less accessible 
to the public, to explore who were involved in the debate to encourage or discourage 
intermarriage. By examining male Japanese intellectuals who argued for or against 
intermarriage from legal, political, and scientific perspectives, I argue that the reason 
why intermarriage was not banned in imperial Japan, was not limited to assimilation. 
Marriage was legalized yet not promoted, because the intellectuals aware of the 
consequences of banning/suppressing intermarriage in other empires and were 
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concerned with both the quality and quantity of the Japanese population, even prior to 
the wartime. Even if there was an ambition to ban or suppress intermarriage, there was 
not enough scientific evidence, and intermarriage—although not ideal in terms of 
quality—could at least maintain and contribute to the increase of the Japanese 
population in terms of quantity. As long as people married and registered their 
marriages, quality could also be monitored. 
 
Legalization of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese Marriages 
 In Japan’s early modern period, society was divided into four classes, 
hierarchized in the order of samurai, peasants, artisans, and merchants. Among the 
ruling samurai class, marriages were arranged as a family affair and they could not 
marry members of other classes.2 The commoners who constituted the majority of the 
society, however, had more choice in choosing marriage partners with less familial 
control. During the Tokugawa era, marriage, as well as births and deaths, were 
recorded by local temples and privately by the families themselves.3 This changed, 
however, in the modern period, when the state came to intervene. The Meiji 
government eliminated the former class system, by gradually reducing the samurai 
ranks and reclassifying samurai and non-samurai as commoners in the early 1870s, so 
that the commoners could now marry each other as “fellow citizens.” And by 
removing the barriers to marriage between people of different statuses, “Japanese,” as 
 
2 There were exceptions to inter-class marriages toward the end of the Tokugawa period. 
Yoko Tokuhiro, Marriage in Contemporary Japan (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 
2010), 94. 
3 Barbara Molony, Janet Theiss, and Hyaewol Choi, eds., Gender in Modern East Asia: An 
Integrated History (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016), 75–76 
  29 
what Etienne Balibar calls the “fictive ethnicity” required in forming a nation, was 
formed.4  
 The Meiji government also intervened in registration of marriage. To officially 
and formally marry in Japan involves entering a koseki of one’s spouse—usually the 
husband’s. The modern koseki system was established by the Household Registration 
Law (koseki-hō) in 1871, effective since 1872. It “required that all families register 
their members and made family membership a requirement for legal rights”5 in order 
for the government to identify and control the population, as well as define who was 
“Japanese.”6 And since the promulgation of the Meiji Civil Code in 1896 (effective 
1898) that established the patriarchal family (ie) system and the Nationality Law 
(kokuseki-hō) of 1899 that stipulated patrilineal jus sanguinis as the basis of acquiring 
nationality, to be “Japanese” required one to have a father holding a koseki with 
honseki in the metropole and be registered as a member of the family.7  
Before Korea became a colony in 1910 and Taiwan in 1895, Japanese could 
marry Koreans and Taiwanese (who were considered foreigners) freely, as marriage 
between Japanese and non-Japanese foreigners became possible in 1873. Yet once 
 
4 Balibar defines “fictive ethnicity” as a “community instituted by the nation-state,” in “The 
Nation Form: History and Ideology,” Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, edited by 
Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 96, 100.  
5 Richard Ronald and Allison Alexy, “Continuity and change in Japanese homes and 
families,” Home and Family in Japan: Continuity and transformation, edited by Richard 
Ronald and Allison Alexy (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 3.  
6 For the history of household registration in Japan, see Kenji Mori’s “The development of the 
modern koseki,” translated by Karl Jakob Krogness, in Japan’s Household Registration 
System and Citizenship: Koseki, Identification, and Documentation, edited by David Chapman 
and Karl Jakob Krogness (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 59–75.  
7 Karl Jakob Krogness, “Jus Koseki: Household registration and Japanese Citizenship,” 
Japan’s Household Registration System and Citizenship: Koseki, Identification and 
Documentation, edited by David Chapman and Karl Jakob Krogness (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 147.  
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Korea and Taiwan became colonies, when Koreans and Taiwanese technically became 
“Japanese,”8 marriage could not be registered. This did not mean that people did not 
marry, as those who wished to marry but could not legally do so could enter into 
common-law relationship (naien kankei).9 The reason why Japanese, Koreans, and 
Taiwanese could not legally intermarry, that is, be entered into a household registry, 
was because Koreans and Taiwanese were separated from the metropolitan Japanese 
by the different household registration systems.10   
The different household registration systems in each territory caused several 
problems for the Japanese government. The problems included people in common-law 
relationships not registering their marriages, thus escaping government radar. There 
were also intermarried couples with more than one registry, and bigamy was an 
additional problem.11 Thus in 1918, the Common Law was established to address the 
issues caused by the different legal systems between the metropole and the colonies. 
However, Article 3 of the Common Law, which stipulated that one had to leave one’s 
registry if entering another, did not come into effect until 1921, and it was not until 
1922 (in effect from 1923) that Japanese-Korean marriages became fully legal with 
 
8 Endō Masataka, “Shokuminchi shihai no nakano kokuseki to koseki” [Nationality and 
family register in colonial rule], Waseda Seiji Kōhō Kenkyū 68 (2001), 282–284.  
9 Koreans and Taiwanese were excluded from the koseki-hō once Korea and Taiwan became 
colonies. See Eika Tai, “The Discourse of Intermarriage in Colonial Taiwan,” The Journal of 
Japanese Studies 40.1 (2014): 93–94.  
10 For more information, see Endō Masataka, Kindai Nihon no shokuminchi tōchi ni okeru 
kokuseki to koseki: Manshū, Chōsen, Taiwan [Nationality and family registration within 
modern Japan’s colonial territories: Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 
2010).  
11 Lee Jeong-Seon, “‘Naisen kekkon’ ni miru teikoku Nihon no Chōsen tōchi to koseki” 
[Imperial Japan’s rule over Korea and household registration as seen in “Japanese-Korean 
marriage”], Chōsenshi Kenkyūkai Ronbunshū 52 (2014): 72–73. 
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the promulgation of the Korean Household Registration Ordinance (Chōsen koseki-
rei), through which methods of transferring one’s household registry between Japan 
and Korea were established.12 
 The legalization of Japanese-Taiwanese marriages occurred later in 1932 (in 
effect from 1933), after mutual management of entering/leaving the registry between 
Japan and Taiwan became possible in the occurrences of marriage and adoption under 
the Taiwan Household Registration Ordinance (Taiwan koseki-rei).13 The reason why 
the Common Law did not apply to Taiwan and Taiwanese in the 1920s, and this 
change had to be implemented in the 1930s, was because Taiwan did not have the 
household registration system and instead had the alternative kokō system, which 
prevented transfers with the Japanese system. In addition, the Common Law only 
applied to the regions that did not have the Civil Code (minpō), which Taiwan was 
under, but not Korea. Hence the Common Law only applied to Korea, legalizing 
Japanese-Korean marriages in the 1920s, but not Japanese-Taiwanese marriages until 
its legalization in the 1930s.14  
 The legalization of intermarriage, however, only enabled Japanese women and 
Koreans and Taiwanese (both men and women) to transfer their registries. Japanese 
men’s transfers were limited, as were the cases in intermarriage between Japanese and 
 
12 Yoshioka Seiichi, “Kyū gaichi-hō kōgiroku 2” [Lecture transcripts on former colonial law 
2], Koseki Jihō 421 (1993): 57–63 and “Kyū gaichi-hō kōgiroku 3” [Lecture transcripts on 
former colonial law 3], Koseki Jihō 424 (1993): 72–77.  
13 Hozumi Shigeto’o, “Naitai kyōkon” [Japanese-Taiwanese marriage], Yūkan Hōgaku 
(Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1934), 183–184; Tai (2014): 99, 107.   
14 Seki Kōjirō, “Naitai kyōkon mondai no kaiketsu ni tsuite (2)” [On solving the Japanese-
Taiwanese marriage problem (2)], Hōsōkai Zasshi 11.7 (July 1933): 39–40; Yoshioka “Kyū 
gaichihō kōgiroku 3” [Lecture transcripts on former colonial law 3], 72–73. 
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non-Japanese foreigners. Under the Common Law, only Japanese men without 
conscription duties could enter a Korean or a Taiwanese household registry—Japanese 
men between the ages of 17 and 40 could not transfer their koseki when the Common 
Law came into full effect in 1921. The age of Japanese men who could not transfer 
their registry extended from 0 to 40 in 1942, then the age limit was removed once 
Korean and Taiwanese men also became subject to conscription.15 And once the bans 
on the transfers of household registration were lifted, Japanese men could enter the 
household registry of Korean and Taiwanese women. These changes in the registration 
practices reveal a concern with the Japanese population even before the wartime when 
human resources became crucial: to keep Japanese men who could be conscripted 
within Japan. 
 After the legalization of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages 
in 1923 and 1933 respectively, it was promoted to an extent in Korea and Taiwan. 
Secondary sources show those who intermarried being featured and awarded in the 
newspapers in the colonies.16 Yet despite the legalization of intermarriage, the same 
did not happen in Japan. Legalization appears to not have signaled the promotion of 
intermarriage in the metropole, despite claims in the secondary sources about 
intermarriage having been “promoted” as a national policy, although with little 
 
15 1938 for Korean men, 1942 for Taiwanese men. Endō (2001), 299.   
16 For example, in Korea, the Governor General of Korea awarded Japanese-Korean couples, 
who were featured in the press (Su Yun Kim, “Romancing Race and Gender: Intermarriage 
and the making of a ‘Modern Subjectivity’ in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945,” PhD Dissertation, 
University of California San Diego [2009], 71). In Taiwan, Japanese-Taiwanese couples were 
featured in newspapers for being model families that represented harmony between Japan and 
Taiwan (Yang Pei-Wen, “Kuàyuè biānjiè de liúdòng yǔ rèntóng: Rìzhì shíqí `nèitáigònghūn’ 
yánjiū” [The study of interracial marriages between Taiwanese and Japanese during the 
Japanese colonial period], Master’s Thesis, National Chengchi University [2009], 17).  
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evidence.17 The following section will thus examine how Japanese-Korean and 
Japanese-Taiwanese marriages were discussed in the metropole, first in the outlets that 
were available to the public, and then in the outlets that were less accessible to the 
non-intellectuals in the public. Were they promoted? How were they discussed? And 
who were involved in the discussion?  
 
Intermarriage Discourse in the Public in the Metropole  
Mentions of intermarriage appeared in the press soon after the Japanese 
colonization of Taiwan in 1895, and Korea in 1910. On May 28, 1986, the Tokyo 
Asahi Newspaper reported the issue with household registries and naturalization after 
colonization. Titled “Taiwanjin to kekkon” (Marriage to a Taiwanese), a Taiwanese 
man had married a Japanese woman in Nagasaki about twenty years prior, had two 
children, and moved to Taiwan. The wife, however, came to miss Japan, so the 
Taiwanese husband asked another Japanese man who was in Taiwan to marry her and 
 
17 Suzuki Yūko (in Jūgun ianfu, naisen kekkon [Comfort women, Japanese-Korean marriage] 
[Tokyo: Miraisha, 1992], 110) and Oguma Eiji (in Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen [The 
myth of the homogeneous nation] [Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1995], 241, 254–255) claim that 
intermarriage, at least between Japanese and Koreans, was promoted as a national policy by 
the government in Japan. Takeshita Shūko (in Kokusai kekkon no shakaigaku [Sociology of 
international marriage] [Tokyo: Gakubunsha, 2000], 55) also claims that intermarriage was 
promoted in both Japan and Korea. According to Hoshina Hironobu (in “Shokuminchi no 
‘konketsuji’—Naitaikekkon no seijigaku” [“Mixed blood children” of the colonies: Politics of 
Japanese-Taiwanese marriage], Taiwan no Daitōa Sensō [Taiwan’s Greater East Asia War] 
[Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppansha, 2002], 268) and Miyazaki Seiko (in “‘Naitai kyōkon’ to 
shokuminchi ni okeru Taiwan josei seinendan no ichizuke” [“Japanese-Taiwanese 
intermarriage” and the position of women’s organization in colonial Taiwan], Nantōshigaku 
70 [2007]: 84, 93), intermarriage was promoted in Taiwan. However, Kim Yŏngdal (in 
“Nihon no Chōsen tōchika ni okeru ‘tsūkon’ to ‘konketsu’—iwayuru ‘Naisen Kekkon’ no 
hōsei, tōkei, seisaku ni tsuite” [Japan’s “intermarriage” and “blood mixing” in colonial Korea: 
on laws, statistics, and policies of the so-called “Japanese-Korean marriage”], Kansai Daigaku 
Jinken Mondai Kenkyūshitsu Kiyō 39 [1999]: 43) and Eika Tai ([2014]: 114) argue that the 
call for intermarriage was more of a slogan, and not actually promoted. 
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bring her back to Japan. The Japanese man’s parents then opposed the marriage 
because the woman was “Chinese,” but the newspaper claimed that the woman, 
although married to a Taiwanese, was and should be Japanese because of her origin in 
Nagasaki. It concluded with the confusion surrounding an attempt to naturalize her as 
Japanese, because her record had been removed from the registry, which determined 
her Japanese status.18 This article did not encourage or discourage intermarriage, but 
what can be observed is the opposition to intermarriage from the people surrounding 
the couple considering intermarriage—in this case, the parents of the Japanese man 
who was asked by a Taiwanese man to marry his Japanese (“Chinese”) wife. The 
article additionally reported the importance of being recorded in the Japanese 
household registry to be considered Japanese.  
Soon after the annexation of Korea in 1910, too, an account of Japanese-
Korean marriage appeared. Titled “Nikkan gappei to kekkon” (Japan’s annexation of 
Korea and marriage), featured in a magazine Tokyo Shin Kokkei from 1910, it 
promoted marriage between Japanese and Koreans. Expecting the number of 
intermarriage to increase now that the Koreans were “new fellow beings” (shin dōhō), 
the article introduced benefits to both Japanese men and women if they married 
Korean men and women: if a Japanese man married a Korean woman, he will be 
treated well because in Korea, it was not the husband who loved the wife, but the wife 
who loved and took care of the husband. If a Japanese woman married a Korean man, 
she will be treated well and become happy, because Korean husbands cared for their 
 
18 “Taiwanjin to kekkon” [Marriage to a Taiwanese], Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, morning ed., 
28 May 1896: 4.  
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wives.19 Because the magazine appears to be a satirical magazine (translated title 
would be Tokyo New Humor), the genuineness of the message purporting the 
advantages for Japanese to marry Koreans is uncertain. Perhaps the article was 
pointing to people’s misunderstanding and fantasy of the colonization and failures of 
the Japanese-Korean marriages in reality. Yet this article, like the one that followed 
the colonization of Taiwan, neither banned nor tried to suppress intermarriage between 
Japanese and non-Japanese from the colonies.  
Also from the same magazine six years later, there was an article reporting 
from Seoul, on jiyū kekkon (free, or unmediated marriages) among Japanese men in 
Korea. It is critical of naichijin (Japanese) who went to Korea to make a fortune and 
took Korean wives there, but did not register their marriages. The article also observed 
the rising number of illegitimate children, due to the marriages being unregistered.20 
This critique of Japanese men’s irresponsible behavior may have arisen from the 
concern over rising discontent in Korea against Japanese colonization during the 
“military rule” (1910–1919) of colonial Korea, as well as to critique the Japanese men 
who were responsible for being the head of the family (ie), to function as the building 
blocks of the nation. Without further context, one could also speculate that it may have 
been pointing to the lack of a legal pathway to register intermarriages. And while the 
action of not registering marriages was critiqued, the intermarriage itself and having 
children with people from the colonies, again, were not.  
 
19 “Nikkan gappei to kekkon” [Japan’s annexation of Korea and marriage], Tokyo Shin Kokkei 
19 (1910): 3.  
20 “Zaisen naichijin to jiyū kekkon” [Japanese in Korea and free marriages], Tokyo Shin 
Kokkei 10.88 (1916): 6.  
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In 1910, a support of Japanese-Korean marriages was also found in an article 
written by Unno Yukinori, a eugenicist and a social theorist who has written about 
intermarriage between the white and the yellow race.21 In Taiyō, a magazine that 
featured social and political commentaries, Unno supported intermarriage between 
Japanese and Koreans, because he believed that mixing with Koreans could help 
eliminate the defects born from endogamous Japanese-Japanese marriages and 
improve the Japanese race. Unlike the “yellow-white” or Japanese-Westerner 
marriages that were debated as part of the jinshu kairyōron (race improvement theory) 
in the 1880s and the 1890s, there was no need to worry about Japanese becoming 
assimilated, because the Japanese were superior to Koreans.22 Here, we start to see the 
concern with the quality of the Japanese race impacted by intermarriage, as Lee Jeong-
Seon argues was the reason why there was a careful consideration regarding 
promotion of intermarriage in the metropole.23 
After these initial accounts of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese 
marriages following colonization, discussions of marriage between Japanese and 
Koreans re-emerged in the press with the engagement between the royal families in 
1916.24 Their marriage did not take place until 1920, due to the death of the father of 
 
21 Unno Yukinori, “Zakkon mondai” [Mixed marriage problem], Taiyō 1914 (1913.11): 138–
143.  
22 Unno Yukinori, “Nihonjinshu to Chōsenjinshu to no zakkon ni tsuite” [On mixed marriage 
between Japanese race and Korean race], Taiyō 16.16 (1910): 98–104; Lee Jeong-Seon, 
“Chŏnshichejegi ilcheŭi chongdongwŏn jŏngchaekkwa 'naesŏnhonhyŏl' munje” [The Total 
Mobilization System during Wartime and the Policy for the Japanese-Korean Hybrid 
Population], Yŏksamunjeyŏngu 29 (April 2013): 223–224.  
23 Lee (2014).  
24 “Nissen dōka no kiso” [The basics of Japan-Korea assimilation], Osaka Mainichi 
Newspaper, 4 August 1916.  
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Prince Yi Ŭn and the March First Independent Movement in 1919.25 The engagement 
and marriage between Korean prince Yi Ŭn and Japanese princess Nashimoto 
Masako, however, were celebrated and praised for being a model of harmony between 
Japan and Korea. The praise of this marriage from the Government General of Korea 
was also published in the Japanese press.26  
It was after the royal marriage that intermarriage became legal for commoners, 
and reports and updates of the legalization process were featured in Tokyo Asahi 
Newspaper in early 1921, the year when Article 3 of the Common Law came into 
effect.27 Once Japanese-Taiwanese marriages were legalized in 1932 and enforced 
from 1933, there was an announcement again in the newspaper, which reported that 
the push to legalize intermarriage between Japanese and Taiwanese came from the 
Government General of Taiwan.28  
 
25 For an autobiography and biography of Nashimoto Masako, see: Yi Bangja (Ri Masako), 
Dōran no naka no ōhi [Princess amidst the storm] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1973); Otabe Yūji, Ri 
Masako: Ichi Kankokujin to shite kuinaku [Ri Masako: Without regret as a Korean] (Kyoto: 
Mineruva Shobō, 2007).  
26 “Ouseishi denka no shingoten o gokenchiku” [Constructing the palatial home of his 
highness the prince] Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, morning ed., 20 April 1920: 9. 
27 “Kyōgaku kyōkon” [Mixed education, mixed marriage], Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, morning 
ed., 16 January 1921: 3; “Kyōkonhō teishutsu ni kessu” [To decide on submitting the mixed 
marriage law], Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, evening ed., 11 February 1921: 1; “Taiwan koseki 
jinjirei shingi” [Deliberation on Taiwan’s household registration and personnel ordinance], 
Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, evening ed., 10 May 1921: 1.   
28 “Harete mitomerareru, naitaijin no kyōkon” [Japanese-Taiwanese marriages to be lawfully 
permitted], Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, morning ed., 17 September 1932: 3; “Naitaijin kyōkon 
no houkisei teian” [Proposing legal regulation of Japanese-Taiwanese marriages], Tokyo Asahi 
Newspaper, morning ed., 20 October 1932: 2; “Taiwan kyōkon chokureian” [Plan on imperial 
ordinance concerning Japanese-Taiwanese marriages], Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, morning ed., 
17 November 1932: 2; “Naien kara honseki ni yorokobu Taiwan” [From de facto to de jure, 
Taiwan rejoices], Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, morning ed., 22 November 1932: 5; “Taiwan no 
kyōkon mondai kettei” [Decision on Taiwan’s intermarriage problem], Tokyo Asahi 
Newspaper, evening ed., 23 November 1932: 1; “Heieki kankeisha no mukoiri kinshi” 
[Prohibition on people involved in military service marrying into wife’s family], Tokyo Asahi 
Newspaper, morning ed., 26 November 1932: 3.   
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Since the initial legalization of Japanese-Korean marriages, discussions of 
intermarriage appeared occasionally in Japanese newspapers during the 1920s. For 
example, anarchists Pak Yŏl and Kaneko Fumiko’s plan to marry in prison was 
reported in the Tokyo Asahi Newspaper on November 25, 1925.29 Activities of the 
Sōaikai (Mutual Friendship Society) were further reported in 1928, which included 
promotion of Japanese-Korean marriages as a part of their larger objective to promote 
harmony between Japan and Korea.30  
In the 1930s, the topic of intermarriage appeared in an “Advice for Women” 
column of the Tokyo Asahi Newspaper. Yamada Waka responded to a Japanese 
woman who was considering marriage to a Korean man, and prompted her to do so 
even though people around her may disapprove.31 Yamada also responded to two 
other questions concerning interracial and interethnic relationships: one from a woman 
asking what do to about her daughter yearning for a Japanese-French youth, who 
declined the relationship because he was a konketsuji (literally “mixed blood child”).32 
The other was from a Japanese woman married to a Chinese man who wanted to 
naturalize, and in response, Yamada Waka wished her well to achieve the “beautiful 
result” of international marriage.33 From these articles, too, one could observe that the 
 
29 “Chikaku keimusho de seishiki no kekkonshiki” [Formal marriage ceremony to be held 
soon at prison], Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, evening ed., 25 November 1925: 1.  
30 “Naisenjin no kekkon shōkai” [Introducing Japanese-Korean marriage], Tokyo Asahi 
Newspaper, evening ed., 19 January 2918: 2.  
31 “Josei sōdan: Chōsenjin kara ai sareru” [Advice for women: To be loved by a Korean man], 
Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, morning ed., 8 August 1931: 10.  
32 “Josei sōdan: Konketsu no seinen o shibo” [Advice for women: Yearning a mixed blood 
youth], Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, morning ed., 14 August 1934: 7.  
33 “Josei sōdan: Museki yue kika ga konnan” [Advice for women: Difficulty naturalizing due 
to lack of registry], Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, morning ed., 13 October 1934: 7. “International 
marriage” was used to refer to marriage between Japanese and Chinese, because it was a 
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disapproval came from the people surrounding individuals considering intermarriage 
or were married to a non-Japanese person.34  
Since the report of legalization of Japanese-Taiwanese marriages, mentions of 
intermarriage hardly appeared in the Japanese newspapers, but appeared occasionally 
in women’s magazines. Similar to the “Advice for Women” column that featured 
“international marriages” in Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, women’s magazines tended to 
feature more marriages between Japanese and Westerners, particularly between 
Japanese men and Western women, many which suggest the idolization of Japanese-
Westerner marriages.35 There was also a debate over Japanese-Chinese marriages in 
1938,36 but not between Japanese and Taiwanese. There was one article from 1940 by 
Kim So-un, a Korean poet (1907–1981) who married a Japanese woman in Japan.37 
Titled “Japanese-Korean Marriage Problem” published in Fujin Kōron (Ladies’ 
Review), Kim raised the negative examples of marriages between Japanese and 
Koreans, which he attributed to Japanese-Korean marriages not being welcomed by 
the people surrounding the couples, frictions in the style of living, and language 
barriers.38 Noting that he was bringing up a “topic of considerable degree,” Kim 
 
marriage between people of two different countries (this term was not used for a marriage 
between Japanese and Koreans/Taiwanese. 
34 See Chapter 4 for more information on Yamada Waka.  
35 For examples in Fujin Kōron: “Ijinshu kekkon no hōmu” [Homes of interracial marriages] 
(1916): 10–13; Okakura Yoshizaburō, “Kokusai kekkon o yumemiru hitobito e” [To people 
who dream of international marriage] (1934): 264–265. 
36 Sugiyama Heisuke, “Shinajin to kekkon suruna” [Do not marry a Chinese], Shufu no Tomo 
(1938.3): 272–282; Ka Seiwa “Shinajin to kekkon suru koto o osoreruna” [Do not fear 
marrying a Chinese], Shufu no Tomo (1938.5): 250–254.  
37 He apparently divorced two years later, and their child was raised by the Japanese mother.  
38 Kim postulated that such frictions would be less between Japanese and Taiwanese, or 
Japanese and Manchurians. 
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observed that the society’s reactions toward Japanese-Korean marriages were “cold-
hearted,” with more hostile views denouncing such unions. Thus he argued that the 
Japanese-Korean marriages should be “caringly” instructed from above, just as the 
government was leading Greater East Asia, to dispel discriminations against Japanese-
Korean marriages.39 This was the first to show cases of unsuccessful cases of 
intermarriages, but Kim did not disapprove or tried to dissuade people from marrying, 
and instead, called for more support. This article also demonstrates that again, the 
denouncement and disapproval came from the surrounding people. 
In Kim’s article, he claimed that despite it being “such a large social 
phenomenon,” Japanese-Korean marriages were being ignored by society—even in 
1940, when the numbers of intermarriage were rising. The few mentions of 
intermarriage available to the public, perhaps reflected the lack of public interest on 
this issue, and this can explain the reason why the history of intermarriage between 
Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages are not very well known today, 
as opposed to marriages between Japanese and Westerners that gained more positive 
attention. Despite the sparsity of mentions, however, it was not framed in a negative 
way—if any disapproval existed, we can see it from the people surrounding those who 
intermarried. There was no dissuasion against intermarriage, with no outright denial or 
disapproval of intermarriage: this may be the reason why intermarriage is thought to 
have been “promoted,” because there was no negative promotion or anti-intermarriage 
discourse in the public. Yet with the exception of the articles praising the royal 
 
39 Kim So-Un, “Naisen kekkon no mondai” [Problems regarding Japanese-Korean marriages], 
Fujin Kōron 25.10 (1940): 196–199.  
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marriage, I argue that it is difficult to declare that intermarriage was actively promoted 
on a national scale in Japan. It is also difficult to state that there was a move to deter 
“Japanese women…from marrying men from the colonies.”40 Based on examining 
how intermarriage was discussed in outlets available to the public, it appears to not 
have been censored from the public, at least not in the initial phases pre- and post-
legalization of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages.   
 
Intermarriage Discourse among Japanese Male Intellectuals 
 Although intermarriage may not have appeared in the public frequently, with 
appearances in the newspapers and magazines for the public declining toward the 
1940s, the discourse did not stop or disappear from Japan—they appeared more in 
sources less accessible to the public. In this section, I explore who were involved in 
the discourse of intermarriage, to explore the reasons why intermarriage was legalized 
but not actively promoted, as the above section has shown. I argue that the reasons for 
legalization included awareness about the consequences of banning or suppressing 
intermarriage, lack of evidences to suppress intermarriage even if the government and 
policymakers wanted to, and interest in the quality and quantity of the Japanese 
population that could be secured by marriage and registration of it.  
 One of the places in which discussion of intermarriage occurred outside the 
popular press was in legal journals. Legal scholars were invested in the legalization of 
intermarriage, particularly to allow transfers between the different household 
 
40 Mark McLelland, Queer Japan from the Pacific War to the Internet Age (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 40. 
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registration systems in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. For example, Nihon Hōsei Shinshi 
(Japanese Journal of Law and Politics), a journal published by the Japan Law School, 
featured a short observation on assimilation of Taiwanese in Taiwan through marriage 
with Japanese people by Kubota Toyozō. Introducing the numbers of Japanese and 
Taiwanese who intermarried, Kubota reported that there were relatively few poor 
Taiwanese spouses despite the variety in occupation of Taiwanese married to 
Japanese. He then sought to congratulate and encourage more Japanese-Taiwanese 
marriages in the future, which could not be legally and officially registered at the time 
of publication in 1920.41  
 Another example of intermarriage discussed from a legal standpoint, is an 
article by Hozumi Shigeto’o, a law scholar, featured in a compilation of articles from 
Hōritsu Jihō (Law Journal) in 1934. Originally written when Japanese-Taiwanese was 
finally being legalized, Hozumi lamented “how slow” the legalization of Japanese-
Taiwanese marriages was, taking more than thirty-five years after colonization. 
Ending with an anecdote on giving a speech at a marriage ceremony of his Taiwanese 
friend who married a Japanese woman in 1932, he was hopeful for the Taiwan 
Household Registration Ordinance, which would finally enable transfers between 
Japanese and Taiwanese registries and thus legalize intermarriages.42  
 Seki Kōjirō, a judicial secretary, further commented on Japanese-Taiwanese 
marriages in Hōsōkai Zasshi (Lawyers’ Association Journal) in 1933. Seki did not 
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particularly endorse Japanese-Taiwanese marriages like Kubota and Hozumi, but he 
observed an unfair situation, in which Taiwanese were treated as less than the 
foreigners, even though they were also imperial subjects (teikoku shinmin) as the 
Japanese. He also noted that the Taiwan Household Registration Ordinance that 
enabled Japanese-Taiwanese marriages was only a temporary solution, and argued for 
the implementation of the same household registration system in Japan and Taiwan as 
a permanent solution to the unfavorable treatment of Taiwanese people.43  
 The reason why legal discussions of intermarriage were focused on Japanese-
Taiwanese marriages, is most likely due to the belated legalization compared to 
Japanese-Korean marriages, raising concerns for Japanese-Taiwanese couples, for 
example, in determining the legitimacy of the children—one of the concerns Hozumi 
raised. These articles demonstrate that one, there was a more favorable evaluation of 
Taiwanese over Koreans, possibly attributed to Taiwanese in Japan being of upper 
class and more assimilated. Two, the legal interest also reveals that in Japan, the 
concern over intermarriage was with the separate household registration systems, as 
much as, if not more so, than assimilating people in and from the colonies.  
 The legal scholars supported legalization of intermarriage, but the support was 
not unanimous among Japanese male intellectuals, as there were people who showed a 
greater interest in the negative impact of intermarriage on the Japanese population, not 
Koreans or Taiwanese. One of the places where opposing voices against intermarriage 
appeared was in Gaikō Jihō (Revue Diplomatique), a journal on diplomacy.  
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 With the onset of the Sino-Japanese War, there was one person who supported 
interethnic marriage: Nanba Monkichi, a sociologist and a professor at Dōshisha 
University, expressed his support of marriage between Japanese and Chinese to 
achieve “ethnic fusion” (minzokuteki yūgō) in 1937, in the process of critiquing how 
the United States and Germany were discriminating Jews and black and yellow races, 
because of their belief in white superiority.44 Nanba, however, was an exception in 
promoting marriage between Japanese and non-Japanese, as other contributors in 
Gaikō Jihō opposed intermarriage.  
 In the following year, Chiba Ryō, a politician turned researcher at Tōyō Kyōkai 
(Oriental Society),45 adamantly opposed intermarriage between Japanese and 
Taiwanese. Chiba distrusted leaving the household to Taiwanese women, whom he 
identified as being the world’s least familial women of the Han minzoku. This is one 
article that negatively portrayed Taiwanese people, claiming that Japanese women 
strongly disliked Taiwanese men. Despite the potential for furthering assimilation, 
which the legal scholars who supported intermarriage viewed as an asset, Chiba 
worried that intermarriage would result in retrogressing of the Japanese “pedigree.”46 
 Another opponent to intermarriage in Gaikō Jihō, was a eugenicist Koya 
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Yoshio. In his article, Koya pointed out that the policies surrounding minzoku had 
been centrifugal, concerned with what was happening outside of Japan because the 
colonial policies had been focused on removing excess population from Japan. He 
then argued that the policy concerning minzoku needed to change, to become more 
centripetal with a focus on development of the Japanese minzoku, so that Japan will 
not be weakened. In the process of making a case for a change in the minzoku and the 
larger population policy, Koya introduced the problem of “blood mixing” with 
gaichijin (people of colonial origin), using an example of intermarriage with 
Malayans. Koya understood the potential of “blood mixing” to produce positive 
results, such as improved adaptability. Yet he argued against mixing, not only because 
of the potential to also produce negative outcomes in terms of physique, but also 
because of the social and political problems that might occur, as demonstrated in 
Koya’s examples from French-controlled Haiti and the Dutch East Indies, which saw 
an uprising by the mixed population against the white rulers.47 From this and the 
previous articles, we see opposition to intermarriage connected with the interest in the 
quality of the Japanese population. Moreover, opinion on intermarriage was based on 
observations that the intellectuals made about what was happening outside of Japan, 
and the consequences of intermarriage and race mixing in other empires.  
 Tōgō Minoru, with experience in Taiwan’s colonial affairs, opposed with 
similar reasons. In an article from June 1943, Tōgō argued against assimilation of 
different minzoku, because forced assimilation would lead to problems, such as 
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rebellions. But because “minzoku problem” could not be avoided with the construction 
of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Tōgō instead promoted 
“differentiation” (bunka, instead of dōka), to connect to other people by heart and 
respect of different groups.48 Although Tōgō did not openly oppose intermarriage in 
the article from June, in November of the same year, Tōgō clearly argued against 
intermarriage and race mixing, based on his observation of the Philippines. He 
recognized that mixing between similar groups, such as intermarriage between 
Japanese and Koreans, or Japanese and Taiwanese within the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere, would not produce detrimental results, compared to the results 
between white and black people since the differences were fewer. However, Tōgō 
expressed his worry over losing Japaneseness, especially when only men were 
employed in the expansion. Japanese men’s marriage to local indigenous women, 
Tōgō feared, would subsequently lead to the loss of “purity of the Japanese minzoku.” 
Therefore he proposed transferring the entire Japanese household (katei) as a whole in 
the process of expansion, to prevent intermarriage, so that the position of Japanese as 
the “leading minzoku” (shidō minzoku) can be upheld.49 His position was also the 
same in another article on colonial policies, which argued against intermarriage 
because Japaneseness would be lost through mixing with other minzoku.50 
 These opposing voices in Gaikō Jihō reveal the concern over the social and 
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political effects of “blood mixing” based on observations of race mixing in other 
empires, as well as the concern over losing Japaneseness, not assimilation of Koreans, 
Taiwanese, or other non-Japanese people. And while the discussions of intermarriage 
and “blood mixing” in Gaikō Jihō turned increasingly against intermarriage, 
discussion among scientists, particularly those involved in eugenics and population 
policies, were mixed, due to the conflict between wanting to oppose intermarriage on 
the one hand, but not having concrete scientific evidence to ban or suppress 
intermarriage on the other. 
For example, the journal Yūseigaku (Eugenics) featured opinions on 
intermarriage and “blood mixing” between different ethnic groups from the 1920s, 
after the legalization of Japanese-Korean marriages. In 1924, Watanabe Yoshizō, a 
medical doctor, voiced his opposition against mixed marriages in Yūseigaku. He 
recognized that the Japanese people were of mixed heritage, but argued against both 
interracial and interethnic marriages by relying on results of mixing between different 
types of animals, which showed negative physical impacts of mixing on the 
descendants.51 In the same year, the journal also reported an increase in the number of 
Japanese-Korean marriages, specifically in Osaka, which was one of the prefectures 
with the largest Korean population in Japan. The data was compiled by Osaka’s police 
after the Great Kantō Earthquake, which led to an increase in activity of Koreans 
residing in Osaka, then numbered 23,635. According to the survey completed, there 
were eighty-seven Korean men with Japanese wives, and thirty-six Korean women 
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with Japanese husbands. The report acknowledged that this increase in number was 
seen by some as a positive move toward achieving naisen yūwa (harmony between 
Japan and Korea), but ended with a statement on how difficult it was to judge the 
actual value without examining the quality of these intermarriages in detail.52 
In 1927, biologist and geneticist Komai Taku also wrote an article that did not 
outright oppose intermarriage, but hinted his opposition to intermarriage. By exploring 
the results of mixing in plants and animals, and mixed marriages between people in 
North America and Africa, Komai argued that interracial and interethnic mixing could 
result in “disharmony” (fuchōwa) of personality. An example of the consequence of 
mixing that Komai used, was a high rate of suicide among the Japanese, declaring that 
“there is no other human race that commits as many suicides as the Japanese.”53 
Similar to Watanabe, Komai also acknowledged that the Japanese were of mixed 
origin, constituted of Malays, Koreans, Chinese, and the Ainu, but unlike Watanabe, 
Komai gave human examples, and also referenced cases from other empires in 
warning about the consequences of mixing between different racialized groups.  
Using observations of intermarriage cases from other imperial countries and 
their colonies, is also the approach taken by Koya Yoshio, the same individual who 
published in Gaikō Jihō, to oppose intermarriage in Yūseigaku. Over two articles in 
Yūseigaku, Koya wrote about “minzoku kokusaku” (national policy on minzoku), a 
term that he claimed to have used first, to argue for a need of a policy that aimed to 
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improve the quality, as well as the quantity, of the Japanese population. Koya was 
concerned that the weak Japanese population—both in terms of quality and quantity—
would result in weakening of Japanese diplomacy, similar to what he observed was 
happening in England and France. He thus warned the importing of Western culture, 
such as the birth control movement that he was personally against, if Japan wanted to 
avoid the fate of adverse selection, which brought on the decline and fall of ancient 
Greece and Rome. And based on his concern over the decline of the quality and 
quantity of the Japanese population, Koya warned against assimilation through 
intermarriage and race mixing. According to Koya in the first article, even if the 
Japanese were of mixed origin, it took a long time for the Japanese minzoku to be 
superior as they were today.54 In the second article continuing from the first, Koya 
continued to warn against intermarriage, by giving examples of “disharmony.” While 
Komai gave examples of “disharmony” in personality as a consequence of 
intermarriage and mixing, Koya gave examples of mixed individuals’ “disharmony” 
with the environment, as well as “disharmony” in physical characteristics. For 
example, this included bad vision, resulting from different body structures. If Koya’s 
opinion on “blood mixing” between different races and ethnicities was not clear in the 
first article, it became clearer in the second, as he claimed that Japan “cannot allow 
blood mixing to occur inadvertently,” and to blunder so would be very troubling, as 
was the case in the United States, England, and France. Koya further extended his 
sympathy and praise to German policy of Jewish exclusion, yet he did not call for 
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action to ban intermarriage in Japan—just warnings and calls for more research, 
because it was lacking and inadequate in Japan to make a decision.55 
Such a strong opposition to “blood mixing” as Koya’s, however, appeared less 
in the journal Yūseigaku overtime: there were calls for more research on “blood 
mixing” between different minzoku beginning in the late 1920s, as well as articles 
featuring research on mixed children from outside of Japan.56 For example, Tanimoto 
Tomeri, one of the editors of the journal, introduced the research on interracial 
children in the United States.57 Occasional updates and announcements on policies 
banning intermarriage in Germany in the early 1930s also suggest that there were 
interests and possibly other supporters of the German policy like Koya.58 From the 
1930s onward, however, most articles on intermarriage were ambivalent, in that the 
position of men who were writing on whether to promote or not promote intermarriage 
was not clearly stated.59 
This ambivalence of wanting to stop intermarriage but not stating explicitly so, 
appeared in the writings of researchers of “blood mixing” who did not find any 
particular problems with intermarriage, as well as those who articulated the 
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consequences of intermarriage. For example, Mizushima Haruo, in his study of the 
Japanese minzoku and the “blood mixing problem,” saw the benefits of mixed 
marriages between Japanese and Koreans, with Japanese-Korean children having a 
better physique and intelligence than Japanese and Korean children.60 Mizushima 
further critiqued white people’s baseless opposition to race mixing. He concluded that 
there was no biological problem with race mixing, yet he still warned the readers to 
not jump to conclusions and promote intermarriage, because of the potential 
emergence of social and political problems, as well as the lack of Japanese spirit 
among mixed Japanese children.61 Therefore although opposition to intermarriage 
may have appeared in the 1920s and the 1930s among intellectuals writing in the 
Yūseigaku journal, by the 1940s, scholars appeared to agree that there at least were no 
biological issues with “blood mixing” as Mizushima claimed, although concerns over 
non-biological issues remained. 62 
The growing ambivalence of the scholars’ stance, however, did not mean that 
the disapproval of intermarriage ended. Outside of Yūseigaku, there were just as many 
ambivalent and vague opinions on intermarriage, but rarely were their opinions in 
favor of promoting or encouraging intermarriage after its legalization.63 Discussions 
of intermarriage outside of the legal journals, Gaikō Jihō, and Yūseigaku, were found 
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in documents concerning the population policy, such as the Jinkō Mondai Shiryō 
(Population Problem Documents), compiled by the Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūjo 
(Population Problem Research Center, or the Institute of Population Problems), which 
was established in 1939 within the Ministry of Welfare to address Japan’s population 
problem following Japan’s entry into the war.  
Zenshō Eisuke, who has done anthropological studies on Korea and 
Manchuria, was one figure who neither supported nor opposed intermarriage, claiming 
that Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages were neither “good nor bad,” 
even though he was also concerned with the consequences of intermarriage. He was 
worried about Koreanization and Taiwanization of the Japanese in intermarriages, 
leading to a potential loss of Japaneseness.64 Journalist and economist Takagi 
Tomosaburō in his article on Japanese-Chinese marriages, also in the Jinkō Mondai 
Shiryō, shared this unease concerning the quality of the Japanese population. Takagi 
argued against Japanese marriage to non-Japanese—Chinese in particular—even if the 
two groups were similar and shared the goal to create an East Asian community, 
because of the historical precedents of Chinese people with stronger physical 
assimilation prowess.65 Although the former’s position concerning intermarriage was 
not as clear as the latter who clearly argued against intermarriage, both shared the 
concern with the Japanese population, which characterized the reactions of the 
intellectuals involved in population policies.  
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Similar to Zenshō, the same ambivalent stance was also in a book on 
population policy by Kitaoka Juitsu, a member of the Population Problem Research 
Center. Kitaoka acknowledged that the “blood mixing” policy was the most important 
to consider among the population policies. And observing the anti-miscegenation 
policies in Nazi Germany and the American West Coast, which he identified as being 
discriminatory and contradictory to the assimilationist policies, Kitaoka believed that 
as long as the numbers of mixed marriages were limited, insignificant, and of excellent 
quality, then it could be beneficial and acceptable. Simultaneously, however, he was 
also cautious, because the Japanese people have not favored inter-minzoku marriages 
in the past.66 
Another former member of the Population Policy Research Center turned 
researcher in the Ministry of Education’s Minzoku Kenkyūjo (Ethnic Research Center, 
or the Institute for Research on the Ethnic Nation),67 Koyama Eizō, was someone who 
was ambivalent but turned into a staunch opponent of intermarriage. In the late 1930s, 
his stance leaned against race mixing, based on his observations of race mixing among 
Westerners. Instead of stating his position against intermarriage, however, he simply 
called for more research on “blood mixing” at the time, because he anticipated that 
this would be an important problem as Japan expanded.68 But he became a strong 
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opponent against intermarriage in the 1940s, because of the negative biological and 
social consequences of mixing, in addition to having a critical view of those who 
intermarried. Koyama described Westerners who intermarried as “animalistic,” for 
“lay[ing] their hands on anything, even the Hottentot.” He was also critical of those 
who intermarried in Japan.69 His research was concerned with mixing between 
Japanese and other minzoku outside of Japan as the empire expanded in the 1940s, and 
while he acknowledged both opponents and supporters of intermarriage and the 
reasons behind their positions, Koyama opposed because of the potential for the 
quality of the Yamato (Japanese) minzoku to decrease, instead of assimilating and 
improving the quality of other minzoku with whom Japanese minzoku intermarried.70 
Thus similar to other researchers, Koyama’s concern was with the quality of the 
Japanese population. 
Discussion of intermarriage also appeared in advice and readers on marriage, 
which was an important facet of the population policy because marriage was one of 
the important components for increasing the quantity of the Japanese population 
during the wartime.71 For example, in Kokumin kekkon dokuhon (National marriage 
reader), which was published to “instill correct understanding about marriage” for 
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Japanese citizens, intermarriage and “blood mixing” were mentioned, although briefly. 
Introducing how intermarriage between Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese was legal, 
it abridged in-depth discussion of “blood mixing” and did not argue for or against 
intermarriage. However, it did emphasize the need to think about one’s blood(lines) 
first.72 Likewise, Aoki Nobuharu, a medical officer at the Ministry of Welfare, was 
another figure who neither promoted nor opposed intermarriage in his book, Yūsei 
kekkon no hanashi (Stories about eugenic marriage) in 1942. Aoki was an advocate of 
“eugenic marriage” to improve the Japanese race in order for Japan to win the Greater 
East Asia War, and shared the views of other researchers, such as Komai Taku and 
Koya Yoshio, that “blood mixing” caused “disharmony.” Aoki did not adamantly 
oppose “blood mixing,” but the then contemporaneous research that demonstrated no 
biological consequences of mixing was not enough for him to encourage intermarriage 
either.73  
Speaking of Koya, his opinion on intermarriage also appeared in this genre of 
marriage advice, nor surprisingly since the same people who commented on 
intermarriage and “blood mixing” also gave advice on (eugenic) marriage. For 
example, in Kekkon shintaisei danwashū (Conversations on new marriage system), 
featuring opinions from specialists in government, academia, etc., on marriage for the 
“prosperity of Japan and the Japanese people,” Koya again expressed his disapproval 
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of intermarriage. This particular article discussed intermarriage between Japanese and 
Chinese, through which case Koya voiced his concern of losing Japaneseness when 
bloods of two different groups were mixed: not losing Japaneseness was important for 
Japan to avoid the fate of countries like the United States, England, and France.74 In 
another book of marriage advice, Yasui Hiroshi, who published extensively on 
eugenic marriage and also ran a eugenic marriage consultation center, claimed that he 
could not easily agree to support intermarriage, because of the potential biological 
“disharmony” and the psychological consequences of mixing that were not researched 
well enough.75 These discussions of intermarriage among male Japanese intellectuals 
reveal that just because intermarriage was legal did not necessarily mean that it was 
unanimously supported, with more opposing voices that were based on observations of 
the consequences of intermarriage in other empires. Even if there was an ambition to 
prevent intermarriage out of concern for the quality of the Japanese population, it was 
not possible due to lack of research.  
Existing studies argue that intermarriage became legal to assimilate Koreans 
and Taiwanese, as well as to address the discontent of Koreans and Taiwanese.76 If 
the legalization was to show the benevolence of the Japanese, then banning or 
preventing intermarriage would have undermined Japanese efforts to be benevolent. 
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Lee Jeong-seon, in her analysis of studies done on mixed children born to Japanese 
and Korean couples during the colonial period, adds that there was a carefulness 
surrounding promotion of intermarriage in Japan but promoted in Korea, because 
Japanese-Korean mixed children were considered to be better in quality than Koreans, 
but inferior to pure-blooded Japanese.77 Eika Tai, in her examination of the discourse 
of intermarriage in colonial Taiwan, further adds that the reason why intermarriage 
was legalized, but no additional steps were taken to implement the same household 
registration system across the empire, was to uphold the distinction between Japanese 
and non-Japanese through the koseki system.78 Discussions I have examined in 
political and scientific journals support Lee’s argument, as the intellectuals expressed 
their concern with the quality of the Japanese population and consequences of 
intermarriage, based on their observations of intermarriage and mixed children outside 
of Japan. The lack of mention to unify the household registration system after 
legalization in discussions of intermarriage in Japan also supports Tai’s argument, 
regarding Japanese interest in keeping the systems separate. I do not disagree that 
assimilationist motive was behind legalization of intermarriage, as legal scholars 
revealed in their support of intermarriage. However, I argue that there were additional 
reasons behind legalization of intermarriage without promotion in imperial Japan: in 
the remainder of this chapter, I more closely examine Koya Yoshio, who was involved 
in the population policymaking process during the wartime, to argue that concern over 
quality of the Japanese population and its quantity, which intermarriage could help 
 
77 Lee (2014).  
78 Tai (2014). 
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maintain as long as it was registered, were additional reasons why intermarriage was 
legalized yet neither promoted nor banned. 
 
Intermarriage and Population Policy 
Koya Yoshio was a medical doctor born in 1890, who became a professor of 
medicine at Chiba University in 1925 and at Kanazawa University from 1932. In 
between, he studied abroad in Germany from 1927 to 1928, which influenced his 
decision to study eugenics.79 As a member of the Ministry of Welfare and the 
Population Problem Research Center, Koya contributed to the Guidelines for 
Establishing Population Policy (Jinkō Seisaku Kakuritsu Yōkō), which outlined 
Japan’s population policy goals, released to the public in 1941. One can see evidences 
of Koya’s influence in the drafts of the Guidelines: the earlier draft included a 
proposal to “suppress intermarriage between the imperial minzoku and another 
minzoku as much as possible,”80 which was Koya’s stance on marriage found in his 
articles and books. Yet in the final draft of the Guidelines that became public, the 
proposal to suppress intermarriage disappeared. 
Why did the attempt to prevent Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese 
marriages disappear from the national population policy? I attribute the concern over 
quality and quantity of the Japanese population, which required marriage. Koya’s 
writings show that even before the late 1930s when intermarriage and “blood mixing” 
 
79 Matsumura Hiroyuki, “‘Kokubō kokka’ no yūseigaku” [Eugenics in a “defense state”], 
Shirin 83.2 (2000): 102–103.   
80 “Jinkō seisaku kakuritsu yōkō (an)” [Guidelines for establishing population policy (draft)], 
October 24, 1940, Minobe Yōji Bunsho G:32:6 <000-0006695>. 
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gained increasing attention from Japanese male intellectuals out of concern for the 
quality of the Japanese population, he expressed interest in the quantity of the 
Japanese population.81 Since the beginning of the 1930s, Koya called for more 
research on “blood mixing” between different races and ethnicities, based on his 
observations of what had happened and was happening in the Western countries, 
outside of Japan.82 He was also interested in the future prosperity of Japan and the 
Japanese minzoku, which required valuing family. According to Koya, it was 
important to achieve happiness of the family through (eugenic) marriage and 
elimination of the defects, so that Japan and Japanese people can continue to prosper 
in terms of quality and quantity. He disclaimed that eugenics was a method of birth 
control, and suggested following government policies like the ones in Germany, where 
steps to promote marriage between pure-blooded Germans and encourage people to 
have more children were already being taken.83 While quality was important, quantity 
was just as important, as Koya tied the quantity of population to the diplomatic 
strength of a country. For this reason, he disapproved Western individualism and 
liberalism that the members of the upper class in Japan were adopting, which led to 
their use of birth control and late marriages, threatening the future supply of human 
resources in Japan. He worried that people in the upper class who were concerned only 
 
81 The primary concern with the population in the prewar period was overpopulation. Koya 
Yoshio, “Minzoku yūseigaku ni kansuru shuju no gainenteki shiben” [Various conceptual 
speculations pertaining to minzoku eugenics], Tokyo Iji Shinshi 2710 (1931): 31–38.  
82 Koya Yoshio, Minzoku seibutsugaku gairon [Introduction to minzoku biology] (Tokyo: 
Yūzankaku, 1933).  
83 Koya Yoshio, “Kekkon to iden” [Marriage and heredity], Fujin Kōron 18.12 (1933): 204–
210. An article of the same name is again published in 1938 in the same magazine. See Fujin 
Kōron 23.1 (1938): 226–234. Also, see Koya Yoshio, “Nihon minzoku no seibutsugakuteki 
hijōji” [Japanese minzoku’s biological crisis], Seikai Ōrai 6.7 (1937): 39–44.  
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about themselves and did not value the family, thus avoiding and/or delaying marriage 
and reproduction, may lead to the eventual decline and downfall of the Japanese 
minzoku.84  
Koya was not alone in valuing marriage to secure the quality and quantity of 
the Japanese population. For example, was Nagai Hisomu, a biologist and one of the 
leaders of Japanese eugenics who chaired the Nihon Minzoku Eisei Kyōkai (Japan 
Racial Hygiene Association), which goals included sterilizing people deemed inferior, 
promoting eugenic marriages, opposing birth control, and increasing the Japanese 
population.85 Nagai also opposed intermarriage and called for avoidance, because it 
would lead to a decline in the quality of the Japanese minzoku: although “blood 
mixing” could be beneficial for the inferior minzoku, it would not bring any benefits to 
the Japanese that were already superior. Therefore Nagai was in favor of race hygiene 
to eliminate defects and improve the quality of the Japanese population.86 At the same 
time, Nagai was also concerned with the quantity of the Japanese minzoku and its 
prosperity in the future as early as 1917. Nagai argued that marriage was necessary for 
the Japanese minzoku to prosper, since children followed marriage. He further vilified 
single women who avoided motherhood and had no children, identifying such 
behavior as a “bad custom” that needed to be eliminated because the nation will 
 
84 Koya Yoshio, “Minzoku kokusaku no shomondai (1).”  
85 Nagai was involved in establishing the Nihon Minzoku Eisei Gakkai (Japan Racial Hygiene 
Academy) in 1930, which became the Nihon Minzoku Eisei Kyōkai (Japan Racial Hygiene 
Association) in 1935. Koya was the vice-chair. Matsumura (2000): 103; Oguma (1995), 249–
250. 
86 Nagai Hisomu, “Minzoku no konketsu ni tsuite” [On blood mixing among minzoku], 
Minzoku Eisei 2.4 (1933): 55–56.  
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otherwise “perish.”87 Quality of the Japanese population was important, but it was just 
as important for people to value family, get married, and reproduce to secure the 
quantity of the Japanese population.  
I therefore propose that despite oppositions to intermarriage, the domestic 
reasons why intermarriage was legalized yet neither promoted nor banned in Japan, 
were concerns over population quality and quantity. There were concerns about the 
decline in the quality of the Japanese population through intermarriage, yet the quality 
could be monitored as long as people registered their marriages, made possible by the 
legalization of intermarriage. Moreover, although the number of Japanese-Korean and 
Japanese-Taiwanese marriages may have been insignificant, a ban on intermarriage 
would have caused discontent in and people from the colonies as existing studies note, 
in addition to less people marrying and/or not registering their marriage. This would 
have intervened in the government attempt to track the population and also reduced 
the number of potential human resources for it to exploit. When Japanese men were 
fighting at the warfront and Japanese women were experiencing difficulties finding a 
partner, particularly in wartime Japan, intermarriage would have been able to at least 
contribute to the wartime population goal of increasing the quantity of the population, 
as long as people married, registered, and reproduced (to be examined more in Chapter 
4). Intermarriage was preferable to no marriage and common-law marriages. 
 
 
 
87 Nagai Hisomu, “Minzoku eisei yori mitaru kekkon no kairyō” [Improvement of marriage 
from the view of racial hygiene], Fujin Kōron (1917): 50–61 and “Jinrui no saisei to minzoku 
no seisui” [Regeneration of the human race and rise and fall of the minzoku], Fujin Eisei 
Zasshi (1919): 1–37.  
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Conclusion 
 This chapter began with the timeline of how Japanese-Korean and Japanese-
Taiwanese marriages became legal in Japan, then examined how they have been 
discussed in the public from the late nineteenth century to the 1940s. Although the 
history of intermarriage may not be well-known in modern Japanese history, 
discussion of intermarriage in newspapers, non-academic journals, and magazines 
existed and appear to not have been censored from the public. Yet at the same time, 
legalization of intermarriage did not signal an increase in the support of intermarriage 
or large-scale explicit encouragement of marriage between Japanese, Koreans, and 
Taiwanese. I thus explored the discourse of intermarriage in professional and 
academic journals that were dominated by Japanese men who expressed ambivalence 
toward and/or opposition to intermarriage, demonstrating their awareness about the 
consequences of banning and suppressing intermarriage in other empires. Even if they 
wanted to stop intermarriage, there was also not enough scientific evidence. I argued 
that besides assimilating and appeasing Koreans and Taiwanese, reasons why 
intermarriage became legal but not promoted in Japan, included Japanese male 
intellectuals’ concerns, especially among those involved in eugenics and the 
population policymaking process, with the quality and quantity of the Japanese 
population, which could be secured through marriage. Intermarriage could lead to a 
decrease in the quality of the Japanese population, according to the opponents of 
intermarriage, but as long as people married and registered their marriages, then 
quality can be monitored and quantity maintained (and ideally increase). 
 Because this chapter focused on internal factors to explain the lack of 
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promotion since legalization, as well as the lack of open condemnation of 
intermarriage despite the opposing voices, the next chapter turns to external factors 
outside of imperial Japan that influenced intermarriage policy in Japan and its empire. 
With particular attention to international affairs in the 1940s, Chapter 3 will continue 
to demonstrate that Japan’s intermarriage policy was not a result of Japan’s isolation 
from and ignorance of the world, but rather the opposite, to propose inclusion of the 
Japanese empire in the West-centric history of modern empires. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Discourse of Intermarriage in Imperial Japan: 
External Factors behind the Legalization and Lack of Promotion 
 
 
In the late 1930s and the early 1940s, there were opposing voices against 
intermarriage among Japanese men who were involved in the discourse of 
intermarriage in Japan. Despite the presence of vocal opponents and individuals with 
ambivalent stance warning about the potential consequences of intermarriage, the 
Japanese government never condemned interracial and interethnic marriages.  
The Japanese government’s sanctioning of intermarriage “ran counter to the 
global trends,” in which intermarriage between people of different race and colonial 
status has been condemned.1 If modern Japan was a “copycat” in its development as 
an empire,2 then why did it not copy the Western empires’ policies on intermarriage? 
Is this a case of Japan having fallen into the “dark valley,” in which wartime Japan is 
seen to have been isolated from the rest of the world and blind to what was happening 
outside of Japan in modern Japanese historiography?  
 Previous chapter argued that although there were opponents against 
intermarriage in Japan, intermarriage was never banned nor actively promoted after its 
legalization, because the consequences of intermarriage in the other empires were 
known, and there was not enough scientific evidence to suppress intermarriage. I also 
argued that the interest in both the quantity and quality of the Japanese population, 
 
1 Takashi Fujitani, Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans 
During World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 371–372. 
2 Alexis Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 35.  
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which could be maintained by marriage and registration of marriage, were additional 
reasons behind why intermarriage was permitted in Japan.  
 This chapter will place the discourse of intermarriage among Japanese men in 
the metropole in larger historical context to explore the external reasons why the 
Japanese government did not openly condemn intermarriage despite the oppositions. I 
will begin by introducing the Japanese government’s stance on intermarriage in the 
1940s, then examine the presence of fear, which played a role in discouragement of 
and/or bans on miscegenation in the Western empires. My first argument is that the 
same fear―fear of racial degeneration through race mixing―also existed in the 
Japanese empire, found in the documents that planned to construct the Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The fear of racial degeneration, however, did not lead to 
any condemnation of intermarriage in the Japanese empire, because there was another 
fear of displaying explicit racism and antagonizing non-Japanese Asians, who could 
obstruct the building the new world order, also found in the same documents: there 
was a risk in condemning intermarriage in the Japanese empire like its Euro-American 
counterparts. I thus further argue that sanctioning of intermarriage was not a result of 
Japan being non-racist, unaware and ignoring what was happening outside of Japan, 
but a form of “polite racism” that was rather a result of being well aware of global 
trends, to challenge those who treat wartime Japan as an anomalous period in modern 
Japanese history, in which Japan became isolated from the world.3 
 
3 I adopt Fujitani’s definition of “polite racism”: “inclusionary, more but not exclusively 
universalist, humane, relativist and more culturalist in its understanding of difference, 
historicist in its affirmation of the possibility of assimilation (that is, the racialized were inside 
history, but lagging or culturally pathological), at least minimally concerned about fostering 
the health and well-being of marginalized peoples, and collectivist like vulgar racism in 
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Japanese Government’s Stance on Intermarriage 
There are three documents from 1943, 1944, and 1945 that expressed the 
Japanese government’s stance on intermarriage. First is from a reference material that 
the Ministry of Welfare prepared in 1943 for the 84th Imperial Diet’s discussion of 
“harmony work” (kyōwa jigyō), which goal was to assimilate gaichijin (people of 
colonial origin): in this document, the primary target of assimilation among the 
colonized peoples was Koreans residing in Japan.4 There is a section outlining the 
situation of Japanese-Korean marriages and their increasing numbers in Japan, and 
according to this reference, the “conventional attitude” of the Japanese government, 
suggesting that the Japanese government had this attitude even before 1943, has been 
to neither “ban nor promote” intermarriage, and “letting it be.”5  
The second document containing the Japanese government’s stance on 
intermarriage is a report of the meetings held by Shisō Taisaku Kenkyūkai (Thought 
Measures Research Group) which was established in May 1943 and consisted of 
participants from the government, police, and industries.6 One of the reports, titled 
“Korean Problem,” from 1944, discussed solutions to prevent Koreans from running 
 
racializing subpopulations, but different in its close attention to the systematic subjectification 
of individuals making up the aggregated population sets.” Fujitani (2011), 25.  
4 Although documents regarding “harmony work” claim to assimilate gaichijin without 
specifying Koreans, the contents of the documents are almost always concern Koreans only. 
Chapter 4 will discuss “harmony work” in detail.  
5 Kōseishō [Ministry of Welfare], “Shriyō: Zainichi Chōsenjin ni taisuru dōka seisaku no 
‘kyōwa jigyō’ (1943)” [Document: ‘Harmony work,’ an assimilation policy for zainichi 
Koreans (1943)], Zainichi Chōsenjinshi Kenkyū 17 (1987): 139. 
6 It is not clear as to in which organization Shisō Taisaku Kenkyūkai belonged, but Korea 
scholar Mizuno Naoki, who edited the archival collection including this document, deduces 
that the research group was part of Kyōchōkai, which was established in 1919 by the 
government and the financial world to foster conciliatory relationships between employers and 
workers. Mizuno Naoki, “Kaisetsu” [Commentary], Senjiki shokuminchi tōchi shiryō 
[Wartime colonial rule documents] (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1998), 7–29.  
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away from work and causing troubles in Japan. In this context of viewing Koreans as 
trouble-causing figures in Japanese society, the report included the Japanese 
government’s stance on intermarriage along with a brief summary of the situation of 
Japanese-Korean marriages in Japan: the government was still in the midst of 
researching whether to promote or ban intermarriage, and the government’s position 
on intermarriage was unclear. However, “for the time being,” the government was 
letting Japanese-Korean marriage “run its course.”7 
 Although the previous documents have only referred to the Japanese 
government’s stance on intermarriage between Japanese and Koreans, the government 
had the same stance toward intermarriage between Japanese and Taiwanese. The third 
document is “Q&A Concerning Political Treatments of Korean and Taiwanese 
Residents (unfinished manuscript),” dated March 6, 1945. Below is an excerpt from 
the document addressing both Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages:  
Japanese-Korean marriages have been recognized as a policy 
since Taishō 7 (1918), and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages 
since Shōwa 8 (1933), but the government has been taking 
the stance to neither particularly encourage nor discourage 
such marriages. Up until now, the numbers of both marriages 
have been extremely low, and it is not expected that the 
numbers will suddenly increase. The government thus intends 
to continue to maintain the existing policies as before.8 
[emphasis added] 
 
 
7 Shisō Taisaku Kakari, “Hantōjin Mondai (1944)” [Korean Problem (1944)], in vol. 7 of 
Senjiki shokuminchi tōchi shiryō [Wartime colonial rule documents], ed. Mizuno Naoki 
(Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1998), 320.  
8 Naimushō Kanrikyoku [Ministry of Internal Affairs Administrative Bureau], “Chōsen oyobi 
Taiwan zaijūmin seiji shogū ni kansuru shitsugi ōtō (miteikō)” [Q&A Concerning political 
treatment of Korean and Taiwanese residents (unfinished manuscript)], 6 March 1945, Japan 
Center for Asian Historical Records, A15060169000, 
http://www.digital.archives.go.jp/das/image/M0000000000000324990. 
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The above document was created by the Investigating Committee on Political 
Treatment of Korean and Taiwanese Residents (Chōsen oyobi Taiwan Zaijūmin Seiji 
Shogū Chōsakai), established on December 26, 1944 to investigate and deliberate the 
political treatment of Koreans and Taiwanese.9 The Committee addressed issues, such 
as the voting rights of Koreans and Taiwanese, in an attempt to be more inclusive and 
ensure that no discrimination existed between the treatments of people inside the 
metropole (referring to Japanese) and outside the metropole in the colonies, because 
Koreans and Taiwanese together constituted one-quarter of imperial subjects in the 
Japanese empire, seen as a crucial source of power to win the war.10 There is no 
detailed record of discussions concerning intermarriage within the Committee, but the 
final decision on what to do with intermarriage appears to have been based on the 
numbers of intermarriage recorded in the reference documents, also compiled by the 
Committee: the numbers remained small even after more than a decade has passed 
since the legalization of both Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages.11 
 
9 The Committee, headed by prime minister Koiso Kuniaki, was part of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs Administrative Bureau, which was established when the Ministry of Greater East Asia 
replaced the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, resulting in Korea and Taiwan becoming under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Ministry of Home Affairs was formerly only 
in charge of the metropolitan (Japanese) affairs, but Korea and Taiwan were placed here and 
not under the newly established Ministry of Greater East Asia, which became responsible for 
matters in occupied territories falling under the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.  
10 “Chōsen oyobi Taiwan Zaijūmin Seiji Shogū Chōsakai dai ikkai sōkai ni okeru Koiso 
kaichō no aisatsu” [Greetings from committee chair Koiso at the first general meeting of the 
Investigating Committee on Political Treatment of Korean and Taiwanese Residents], in 
Chōsen oyobi Taiwan Zaijūmin Seiji Shogū Chōsakai (1), Japan Center for Asian Historical 
Records, A15060167700, 
http://www.digital.archives.go.jp/das/image/M0000000000000324976. 
11 “Sankō shiryō” [Reference documents], in Chōsen oyobi Taiwan Zaijūmin Seiji Shogū 
Chōsakai (1), Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, A15060169100, 
http://www.digital.archives.go.jp/das/image/M0000000000000324991. When calculated in 
comparison to the total number of marriages recorded in Japan, Japanese-Korean and 
Japanese-Taiwanese marriages combined constituted less than one percent. 
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By deciding to “maintain the existing policies as before,” the Japanese government 
continued to sanction Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages, but did not 
promote or suppress them. And this lack of action reflected the discourse of 
intermarriage in Japan among male Japanese intellectuals who wanted to oppose or 
were ambivalent about intermarriage and race mixing because of mixed results. 
The above documents all show that the Japanese government’s stance―neither 
encouraging nor discouraging intermarriage―remained unchanged in the 1940s. This 
stands in contrast to the Euro-American empires, which condemned intermarriage 
between the colonizing and the colonized groups, at least in the colonies, and in the 
metropole (depending on the empire).12 Why the difference? The following sections 
will explore why the Japanese empire took this position and sanctioned intermarriage 
unlike the West, by examining the role of fear.   
 
Fear of Racial Degeneration  
 Fear played an important role in influencing intermarriage policies in the 
Western empires. For example, fear of “pollution” of the white race, especially when 
Aryan/white women produced children who were not racially pure with “racial 
degenerates” (non-Aryan/non-white men) through race mixing, became the basis of 
anti-miscegenation laws in Germany and the United States.13 Fears of white racial 
degeneration and contamination were especially heightened in the Western colonies, 
 
12 See Taihoku Hikakuhōgakkai, ed., Hikaku kon’inhō dai ichibu [Comparative marriage 
laws, part one] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1937). 
13 Judy Scales-Trent, “Racial Purity Laws in the United States and Nazi Germany: The 
Targeting Process,” Human Rights Quarterly 23.2 (2001): 263, 289, 294. 
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as mixed race children blurred the racial categories and posed a threat to the 
hegemonic status of the white race in the colonial hierarchy. As a result, although 
intermarriage between the colonizing and the colonized peoples were not illegal in the 
metropoles of the British, French, and the Dutch empires unlike Germany and the 
United States, intimate interracial relationships were banned or discouraged in the 
Western colonies in Asia and Africa.14 
It was not only in intermarriage policies that fear played a role: fear also 
influenced other colonial policies. For example, in Anxieties, Fear, and Panic in 
Colonial Settings: Empires on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown (2016), edited by 
historian Harald Fischer-Tiné, scholars demonstrate the influences of “negative 
emotions,” such as anxiety, fear, and embarrassment, on the actions of the colonizing 
and the colonized peoples in the colonies of the British, French, Dutch, and German 
 
14 Ann Stoler, who studied interracial intimacy in the Dutch East Indies and French 
Indochina, is the leading figure in the study of intimate relationships between the colonizer 
and the colonized [see “Making Empire Respectable: The Politics of Race and Sexual 
Morality in 20th Century Colonial Cultures,” American Ethnologist 16.4 (1989): 634–660 and 
Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002)]. For discussions of race mixing in the Western colonies, 
see, for example, Lora Wildenthal, “Race, Gender, and Citizenship in the German Colonial 
Empire,” Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, edited by Frederick 
Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Durba Ghosh, 
Sex and the Family in Colonial India: the Making of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); David Pomfret, “Raising Eurasia: Race, Class, and Age in French and 
British Colonies,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 51.2 (2009): 313–343; and 
Damon Ieremia Salesa, Racial Crossings: Race, Intermarriage, and the Victorian British 
Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Discussions of Western attitudes toward 
race mixing in the metropole can be found, for example, in Catherine Hall, ed., Cultures of 
Empire: A Reader (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); Elisa Camiscioli, 
Reproducing the French Race: Immigration, Intimacy, and Embodiment in the Early 
Twentieth Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); and Martin Thomas, Fight or 
Flight: Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014). For exceptions, see Robert Hyam, Empire and Sexuality: the British Experience 
(Manchester, NY: Manchester University Press, 1990). 
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empires in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.15 Similar to the existing studies 
on intermarriage in imperial and colonial contexts centered on the Western empires, 
existing studies on fear in imperial and colonial settings are also West-centric.16 The 
isolation and exclusion of imperial Japan can be attributed to, among others, the 
colonizer/colonized dichotomy that was not marked by color, since both the colonizers 
and the colonized were of the same Asian race, and instead differentiated by ethnicity 
(Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, etc.) in Western sense. However, although Japan saw 
itself as one of the “colored” races that also included Koreans and Taiwanese, it 
differentiated itself from other minzoku, word translated as “ethnicity” or “ethnic 
group,” or as “(culturally-defined) race.” Thus the Japanese differentiated between 
Japanese minzoku and Korean or Taiwanese minzoku (the latter sometimes conflated 
with the Han minzoku), and saw itself more superior, similar to how the Western 
empires viewed and differentiated the white race from the colonized non-white race.  
I therefore object to the isolation of the Japanese empire from the larger 
imperial and colonial studies just because the colonizer/colonized dichotomy does not 
match in terms of race, and instead seek its inclusion by demonstrating connections 
between the Japanese and the Western empires. In the remainder of this section, using 
“race” in quotation marks to denote Japanese concept of minzoku, I aim to reveal that 
Japan, too, had the same fear—fear of “racial” degeneration through “race” mixing—
 
15 Harald Fischer-Tiné, Anxieties, Fear, and Panic in Colonial Settings: Empires on the Verge 
of a Nervous Breakdown (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016).  
16 E.g., Maurus Reinkowski and Gregor Thum, eds., Helpless Imperialists: Imperial Failure, 
Fear, and Radicalization (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013) and Robert Peckham, 
ed., Empires of Panic: Epidemics and Colonial Anxieties (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 2015). 
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by introducing two plans for constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
from the 1940s, which included discussions on the topic of intermarriage. 
Meeting Records of the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia 
 One of the documents in which the fear of Japanese “racial” degeneration 
through “race” mixing appeared is the meeting records of the Council for the 
Construction of Greater East Asia (Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai). This was a group that 
the government organized in February 1942, in response to the beginning of the 
“Greater East Asia War,” named so in December 1941, to discuss the construction of 
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Council held the first of its secretive 
meetings attended by leaders and influential figures in the government, military, 
politics, and business circles on February 27, 1942, and made the following four 
inquiries:  
1. Basic requirements concerning the construction of 
Greater East Asia. 
2. Cultural and educational policies dealing with the 
construction of Greater East Asia. 
3. Population and policies on “race” accompanying the 
construction of Greater East Asia. 
4. Basic policies on construction of the Greater East Asian 
economy.17  
 
To address the above inquiries, there existed four separate committees to address each. 
Of the four, the Third Committee became responsible for finding solutions on ways to 
increase and strengthen the population of the Japanese “race,” who were to constitute 
 
17 Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai [Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia], “Daiōa 
Kensetsu Shingikai sōkai giji sokkiroku, dai ikkai sōkai giji sokkiroku” [Proceeding records of 
the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia, proceedings from the first general 
meeting], 27 February 1942, in vol. 1 of Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai Kankei Shiryō 
[Documents concerning the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia] (Tokyo: 
Ryūkei Shosha, 1995), 12–13.  
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the core and be the driving force behind the creation of the new Greater East Asian 
world order. It also became responsible for policies concerning the management of 
other East Asian “races” to be included in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Meeting records 
from this committee included discussions of “race” mixing, or konketsu (literally 
“mixing blood”). 
The Third Committee met five times between March and May 1942, and raised 
the issue of blood mixing since the first meeting held on March 11, 1942, when each 
member presented and shared topics they believed must be addressed to successfully 
construct the Co-Prosperity Sphere. One of the members who raised the issue of blood 
mixing was Fujiyama Ai’ichirō, who was then the head of the Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. Based on his observations of konketsuji (“mixed blood 
children”) in the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines, he viewed blood mixing 
unfavorably, because he believed that konketsuji were “quite different” from the “pure 
blood,” with tendency to pass on “bad” genes to the offspring.18 He acknowledged 
that there were scientific opinions that did not find any problem in Japanese blood 
mixing with the “natives” (who were of the same Eastern race as the Japanese), but 
Fujiyama subjectively opposed race mixing. He anticipated that the race mixing will 
be a major problem and therefore called for a more careful research on the problem of 
“mixed blood children,” who Fujiyama expected to increasingly emerge with Japan’s 
southern expansion. Once the results were found, Fujiyama then proposed, appropriate 
 
18 Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai [Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia], “Dai 
sanbukai giji sokkiroku, dai ikkai giji sokkiroku [Proceeding records of the Third Committee, 
proceeding records from the first meeting],” 11 March 1942, in vol. 2 of Daitōa Kensetsu 
Shingikai kankei shiryō [Documents concerning the Council for the Construction of Greater 
East Asia] (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 1995), 3. 
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measures should be taken to address the problem. Fujiyama’s suggestions of possible 
measures included prompting Japanese men going abroad to take their families, 
because there would then be no need to find a spouse outside of Japan when Japanese 
men were accompanied by their family members.19 By proposing to take 
precautionary measures to prevent race mixing from occurring before it became a 
problem, Fujiyama appeared to anticipate negative results from research on race 
mixing and impact on the Japanese “race.”  
 Shimada Toshio, a politician, was another one of the eleven members who 
were part of the Third Committee to comment on race mixing. Compared to Fujiyama, 
Shimada was less subjective and less critical of “race” mixing, because he believed 
that the different “races” in the East were already mixed, including the Japanese.20 
While Fujiyama called for more research and Shimada did, too, Shimada suggested 
working to create measures to address “race” mixing in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, with 
the presupposition that mixed marriage and blood mixing will happen regardless of 
any attempts to prevent it. In Shimada’s opinion, banning “race” mixing was 
impossible.21 However, in raising the issue and advocating for research to address the 
issue, Shimada noticeably shared the concern with Fujiyama. 
 A Buddhist monk Ōtani Kōzui did not deny that “race” mixing was an issue of 
“extreme concern.” Based on opinions of unnamed eugenicists, Ōtani, like Shimada, 
recognized that the Japanese were also of mixed heritage, including himself. However 
in the meeting records, Ōtani tried to convince other members who were concerned 
 
19 Ibid., 4–5. 
20 Ibid., 26. 
21 Ibid., 27. 
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about blood mixing that it should not be too grave a concern. He argued the 
impossibility of Japanese to maintain purity of the blood, because one would need to 
marry within family and between siblings, which were illegal in Japan.22 He also gave 
examples from India, which became weaker after the upper class limited intercaste 
marriages, in comparison to the “Arab race,” who were able to develop quickly and 
expand from Asia to Europe because they kidnapped women from other “races.” By 
explaining the consequences and possible benefits of mixing, Ōtani, too, called for 
more scientific and medical research, but stressed that, “mixed marriage is something 
not to be feared that much.”23  
 Ōtani’s stance on intermarriage was a mix of Fujiyama and Shimada: on the 
one hand, he advocated for more scientific and medical research on intermarriage, and 
on the other hand, he also viewed race mixing as inevitable and uncontrollable, likely 
to occur regardless of any attempts to stop it. Just because Ōtani tried to assuage other 
members about their concerns of “race” mixing in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, however, 
it did not necessary mean that he supported or encouraged intermarriage. It also did 
not mean that he viewed other “races” in Asia any differently from other members, 
who considered the non-Japanese to be inferior. In the second meeting of the Third 
Committee held on March 18, 1942, in which members discussed policies concerning 
other East Asian “races” and distribution of the Japanese “race” within the Co-
Prosperity Sphere, Ōtani insisted on the need for the Japanese “race” to maintain its 
leadership position and make sure that the Japanese “race” did not lose its 
 
22 Ibid., 42. 
23 Ibid., 43. 
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superiority.24 This concern of losing Japanese superiority by mixing with other 
“races” in the Co-Prosperity Sphere ran as an undercurrent in the subsequent 
discussions of what to do about intermarriage and “race” mixing, which resurfaced in 
the fourth meeting held on April 10, 1942.  
 Maintaining Japanese superiority was also important for Takahashi Sankichi, 
then the deputy manager of Manchurian Bureau of Affairs and a former navy admiral. 
He argued that it was better not to “do mixed marriage,” despite claiming to not know 
much about mixed marriage. Takahashi wanted to maintain the “special 
characteristics” of the Japanese “race,” and worried that the average quality of the 
Japanese will decline if intermarriage was allowed. While Takahashi, like Ōtani and 
Shimada, recognized the mixed origin of the Japanese, he still argued against 
intermarriage like Fujiyama, because the “admirable” Japanese “race” emerged only 
after long years of discipline, education, and training without mixing with other 
“races.”25 Thus to maintain the current purity of Japanese blood, Takahashi also 
proposed that Japanese going abroad be married, to prevent intermarriage with another 
non-Japanese “race.”26 
 Although the members of the Third Committee differed in their positions on 
 
24 Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai [Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia], “Dai 
sanbukai giji sokkiroku, dai nikai giji sokkiroku [Proceeding records of the Third Committee, 
proceedings from the second meeting],” 18 March 1942, in vol. 2 of Daitōa Kensetsu 
Shingikai kankei shiryō [Documents concerning the Council for the Construction of Greater 
East Asia] (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 1995), 98. 
25 Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai [Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia], “Dai 
sanbukai giji sokkiroku, dai yonkai giji sokkiroku [Proceeding records of the Third 
Committee, proceedings from the fourth meeting],” 10 April 1942, in vol. 2 of Daitōa 
Kensetsu Shingikai kankei shiryō [Documents concerning the Council for the Construction of 
Greater East Asia] (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 1995), 158. 
26 Ibid., 160. 
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intermarriage—Fujiyama and Takahashi opposing intermarriage, while Shimada and 
Ōtani neither opposing nor promoting intermarriage—they were all concerned about 
the possible consequences of leaving the issue of “race” mixing and intermarriage 
unaddressed. Shimada did not specify his reason for advocating more research on 
“race” mixing in the meeting records, but Fujiyama, Ōtani, and Takahashi were 
concerned about the decline of Japanese “racial” superiority by marrying other “races” 
in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, in which Japan was to be at the center and the leader of 
the people within it. 
Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
The second document in which the fear of losing Japanese “racial” superiority 
via “race” mixing and intermarriage appeared, is an unfinished manuscript titled, 
“Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (Daitōa 
kyōeiken kensetsu taisaku). Dated February and March 1943, it was produced roughly 
a year after the above-examined meetings. This was a summary plan for constructing 
the Co-Prosperity Sphere produced by the Investigating Committee on Greater East 
Asia Problems (Daitōa Mondai Chōsakai), which formed in 1942 and located within 
the Research Institute of National Policy (Kokusaku Kenkyūkai). The group was not 
established by the government, but had affiliations with government institutions, such 
as the Population Problem Research Center (Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūjo), and constituted 
by bureaucrats, scholars, as well as individuals from the military involved in 
policymaking—in particular, the planning for the Co-Prosperity Sphere.27 
 
27 “Daitōa Mondai Chōsakai” [Investigating Committee on Greater East Asia Problems], 
Kokusaku Kenkyūkai (11 July 1942): 1–4. Goals of the study group on page 3. 
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Composed of three volumes, this document also laid out the plans for building 
the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The first volume outlined the basic principles of 
constructing the Co-Prosperity Sphere, the second on policies to build and maintain 
Japan’s position as the leading country within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the third 
on the relationship between the war and the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The underlying 
message found continuously throughout the document, was the justification of creating 
the Co-Prosperity Sphere, which would create a new world order to overthrow the old 
world order dominated by the white race—Anglo-Saxons in the US and the UK in 
particular—and to liberate the people of East Asia. Of the three volumes, the first and 
the second included discussions on the issue of intermarriage―not only interethnic 
marriages between Japanese and non-Japanese Asian “race,” but also interracial 
marriages between East Asian and white races. 
In explaining why the Co-Prosperity Sphere must be built, the “Measures” 
included several grievances against the Euro-American powers—generally the British 
and the Americans, but occasionally the French and the Dutch. These grievances 
included: the enslavement of the people of East Asia by the Euro-Americans; their 
discriminatory attitudes toward East Asians; and depriving East Asians the opportunity 
to develop economically, politically, as well as intellectually due to Euro-American 
control.28 Based on this disdain toward the white race, the document then called for a 
 
28 Daitōa Mondai Chōsakai [Investigating Committee on Greater East Asia Problems], 
“Daitōa kyōeiken kensetsu taisaku, jōhen (miteikō)” [Measures for the construction of Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, volume 1 (unfinished manuscript)], 25 February and 11 
March 1943, Minobe Yōji Bunsho, E:25:1 <000-0004445>: 6-2, 7-3; and Daitōa Mondai 
Chōsakai [Investigating Committee on Greater East Asia Problems], Investigating Committee 
on Greater East Asia Problems, “Daitōa kyōeiken kensetsu taisaku, chūhen (miteikō)” 
[Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, volume 2 
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ban on mixed marriage between the (East) Asian race and the white race in the 
discussion of policies concerning “race” within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, found in the 
last chapter of the first volume.29 In this chapter, titled, “Basic Measures on ‘Race’ 
and Culture of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” the basic policies 
concerning “race” within the Co-Prosperity Sphere were outlined as follows: 
1. To take measures so that the “races” within the Co-
Prosperity Sphere will unite as one East Asian “race,” 
counter to those outside of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.  
2. To form a tenacious, organic organization within the 
sphere, in which the Japanese “race” will be at the core 
and all “races” will harmonize and trust each other. 
3. To take measures so that both the quality and quantity of 
the East Asian “race” will improve, especially working to 
develop the meritorious characteristics of each “race” in 
the Co-Prosperity Sphere.30 
 
Of the above three interrelated policies concerning “race,” the second policy on 
“harmony and unification” of all the East Asian “races,” with the Japanese “race” at 
the core, was considered to be the most important policy requiring thoughtful and 
thorough consideration, although the other two were not less important.31 In order to 
achieve the formation of this one East Asian unit, the plan insisted on the need for the 
first and the third policies to also work toward achieving “harmony and unification.”32 
According to the document, the first policy was important to prepare for the possibility 
of a racial war, and prevent the possible obstruction that would interfere with the 
 
(unfinished manuscript)], 25 February and 11 March 1943, Minobe Yōji Bunsho, E:25:2 <000-
0004446>: 36. 
29 Volume 1, 7-3. Some of the contents from Volume 1 and Volume 2 overlap. The seventh 
chapter of Volume 1 and the third chapter of Volume 2 are the same. 
30 Ibid., 1, 7-1; Volume 2, 39. 
31 Volume 1, 7-2. 
32 Ibid., 7-5. 
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construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.33 The third policy was important as well, 
because the superiority or inferiority of the Co-Prosperity Sphere was dependent on 
the quality and quantity of the people within it.34 Both of these policies were to then 
work together toward achieving the second policy on uniting the East Asian “races,” 
and developing the one, East Asian “race.”35  
 It was within the above context in which the “Measures” used the words yūwa 
(“harmony”) and ittaika (“unification,” “integration,” or literally, “becoming one”) to 
call for the uniting of various “races” in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, where the measure 
to ban mixed marriage between East Asian “race” and the white race “as much as 
possible” was proposed. The purpose of the ban was to maintain the purity of the East 
Asian “race,” as well as to protect the confidence and pride of the East Asian “race,” 
because mixed marriage and blood mixing were thought to weaken the bond between 
the different “races” in East Asia.36 Suspicion toward people of mixed parentage, 
unlimited to children, emerged in the second volume, as they were identified as one of 
the groups of “obstructive elements” for having close connections to the British and 
the American powers, and not welcoming the construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere 
in Asia.37 Therefore along with the bans on intermarriage to prevent future emergence 
of mixed people, the plan also proposed that the people of mixed race, who took up a 
privileged position under Western colonial rule, be deprived of their old privileges. 
Then, a system based on merit, rather than race, could be established, which, when 
 
33 Ibid., 7-2. 
34 Ibid., 7-4. 
35 Ibid., 7-6. 
36 Ibid., 7-2, 7-3. 
37 Volume 2, 21–22, 27. 
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combined with assimilation of the mixed people, particularly the superior ones, into 
the ways of East Asia, could then eliminate their attempts at opposing and preventing 
the unification of East Asian “race.”38 Thus the proposed ban on interracial 
relationships between East Asian and white races aimed to prevent any obstruction 
against Japan’s attempts to construct the Co-Prosperity Sphere from the mixed 
population, who were viewed with suspicion. 
In addition to trying to remove obstacles from the construction of the Co-
Prosperity Sphere, the bans on interracial mixing and marriage aimed to uphold the 
unity of the East Asian “race.” However, the “Measures” also proposed a ban on 
intermarriage between the different “races” within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, even 
though they were to be united as one. Expecting the number of intermarriages between 
the Japanese “race” and another “race” in the Co-Prosperity Sphere to increase with 
the Japanese expansion into Asia, the plan proposed the following with regard to 
mixed marriage between Japanese and the Asian “races” in the Co-Prosperity Sphere: 
1. To conduct a thorough research on which patterns of mixed marriage will 
improve or deteriorate the Japanese “race,” by doing a historical survey on the 
results of mixed marriages. 
2. Based on the above results, the “race” which would cause degeneration [of the 
Japanese “race”] are to be prevented from coming to the metropole as much as 
possible, and measures must be taken to suppress mixed marriage with them. If 
mixed marriage with that “race” [which would cause degeneration] was 
committed, punishments must be implemented [onto the Japanese], such as 
depriving the Japanese registry of the person who intermarried, who will then 
be deemed a “race” of another registry.39 
 
The grave concern about the superiority of the Japanese (blood) becoming lost by 
“race” mixing, was based on historical precedents: unspecified superior “races” of the 
 
38 Ibid., 28. 
39 Ibid., 56. 
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past, which successfully controlled larger territories, lost their superior “racial” 
qualities and degenerated after mixing with the inferior “race” who came under its 
control.40 Seeing Japan in the same situation and wanting to prevent the same fate, the 
plan thus proposed banning mixed marriage between Japanese and another Asian 
“race,” to prevent the deterioration of the quality of the Japanese “race.” 
 Similar to the members of the Third Committee in the Council for the 
Construction of Greater East Asia, this document by the Investigating Committee on 
Greater East Asia Problems also urged for the need to do more research. Yet what was 
different, was that it had a harsher stance against intermarriage and “race” mixing, by 
proposing to take away the Japanese registry of Japanese individuals who broke the 
ban on mixed marriage. This meant that the Japanese deprived of their registry would 
then also be deprived of privileges given to the Japanese and be excluded from the 
Japanese national community. Also, this document was created in 1943, when the 
Guidelines for Establishing Population Policy (Jinkō Seisaku Kakuritsu Yōkō) that 
aimed to increase the Japanese population was already implemented. Considering the 
value that was placed on the quantity of the Japanese population, willing to reduce the 
quantity for the sake of quality suggests how serious of a concern “race” mixing 
through intermarriage was considered among Japanese men involved in policymaking.  
 Regardless of the differences, both plans to construct the Greater East Asia Co-
 
40 Although superior “races” of the past were unspecified, they most likely referred to ancient 
Rome and Greek, which intellectuals studying the consequences of race mixing used as 
negative examples to argue why intermarriage must not be permitted in Japan. For examples, 
see Nagai Hisomu, “Jinrui no saisei to minzoku no seisui” [Regeneration of the human race 
and rise and fall of the minzoku], Fujin Eisei Zasshi (1939): 1–37 and Komai Taku, Nihonjin 
o shu to shita ningen no iden [Human genetics principally involving the Japanese] (Osaka: 
Sōgensha, 1942).  
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Prosperity Sphere anticipated intermarriage becoming a major issue, and contained 
evidences of fear that the Japanese “race” will lose its superiority by “race” mixing 
and intermarriage. The Japanese empire was therefore not different from the Western 
empires, in that the fear of racial degeneration was also present. Yet despite these 
explicit suggestions to prohibit intermarriage in these drafts outlining the plans for 
building the Co-Prosperity Sphere, such proposals disappear in the final and 
publicized versions of the Co-Prosperity Sphere’s construction plans. The following 
section will address why attempts to condemn intermarriage disappeared.  
 
Disappearance of the Fear?  
The plans for constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere have 
revealed that the fear of racial degeneration through mixing with the less superior 
“race” was a concern in the Japanese empire among Japanese men as it was in the 
Western empires. Attempts to prohibit intermarriage and “race” mixing, however, 
disappeared in the final versions of the plans, and ultimately, intermarriage was never 
condemned within the Japanese empire.  
For example, the “Basic Plan for the Construction of Greater East Asia,” based 
on the findings from the meetings of the Council for the Construction of Greater East 
Asia, sought to “to retain the unity of the Japanese ‘race’.”41 Although this attempt to 
“retain the unity of the Japanese ‘race’” hints the desire to prevent “race” mixing from 
 
41 Kikakuin [Planning Board], “Daitōa kensetsu kihon sōsaku” [Basic plan for the 
construction of Greater East Asia], July 1942, in vol. 1 of Daitōa Kensetsu Shingikai kankei 
shiryō [Documents concerning the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia] (Tokyo: 
Ryūkei Shosha, 1995), 13. 
  84 
occurring out of fear of Japanese “racial” degeneration, there is no direct mention or 
proposal about stopping mixing as was discussed by the Third Committee. The closest 
phrase that suggest an attempt to limit intermarriage, is the proposal to prevent co-
habitation of the Japanese with the non-Japanese “as much as possible,” by prompting 
Japanese [male] settlers to be accompanied by their families.42 Thus the “Basic Plan” 
indirectly attempted to limit mixing between difference “races” within the Co-
Prosperity Sphere, but without openly and crudely condemning intermarriage.  
Likewise, suggestions to take a harsher stance against mixed marriage that 
appeared in “Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia-Co-Prosperity 
Sphere” by the Daitōa Mondai Chōsakai also disappeared in subsequent plans on the 
construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. One of such plans is the Joint Declaration 
of the Greater East Asia (Daitōa kyōdō sengen) published in 1944, based on the Joint 
Declaration of Greater East Asia adopted at the Greater East Asia Conference in 1943. 
In this book, there is also no word on condemning “race” mixing and mixed 
marriage.43  
To explore why any condemnation of intermarriage disappeared in the final 
and publicized versions of the plans to construct the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, this section will revisit the two documents discussed above, and additionally 
examine the Joint Declaration of Greater East Asia. In the process, I will reveal the 
presence of another fear, besides the fear of racial degeneration, and how the other fear 
influenced the metropolitan government’s policies to neither encourage nor discourage 
 
42 Ibid., 16. 
43 Jōhōkyoku [Cabinet Information Bureau], Daitōa kyōdō sengen [Joint declaration of 
Greater East Asia] (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 1944). 
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intermarriage in the 1940s.  
Meeting Records of the Council for the Construction of Greater East Asia, Revisited 
 In the meeting records from the Third Committee of the Council for the 
Construction of Greater East Asia, there was another fear besides losing Japanese 
“racial” superiority through “race” mixing. This other fear appeared in the suggestions 
made by Koiso Kuniaki, then the Minister of Colonial Affairs and later the Governor 
General of Korea and prime minister of Japan, who raised the issue of race mixing 
during the fourth meeting.44 Unlike Fujiyama and Takahashi who strongly opposed 
intermarriage out of concerns that the superior qualities of the Japanese “race” will 
deteriorate, Koiso was a proponent of mixed marriage. Recognizing, like Ōtani and 
Shimada, that intermarriage could not be controlled and will happen regardless of the 
ban, Koiso proposed taking more concrete measures to address the issue of race 
mixing. Rather than leaving it left unsupervised, Koiso recommended two ways to 
take control of mixed marriage.  
One of Koiso’s suggestions, was to treat mixed children as “racially” Japanese. 
Acknowledging that mixed children were already born to Japanese, he gave an 
example of how mixed children in the United States were considered “negro,” even if 
they only had twenty percent “negro blood.” The treatment of mixed people in the 
United States as inferior to white Americans, Koiso pointed out, contributed to the 
fragility of America’s “racial unity.” To prevent the same from happening in Japan, 
Japan needed to treat mixed children as “racially” Japanese, especially in areas that 
 
44 Koiso was absent in the first through the third meeting, then joined the Third Committee 
from the fourth meeting.  
  86 
Japan allowed self-rule (i.e., Burma and the Philippines) within the Co-Prosperity 
Sphere.45 In the territories ruled directly by the Japanese, Koiso then advocated for 
race mixing instead of deterring it. He introduced the following view that was 
“recently being recited”: based on the success of blood mixing in colonial Korea, the 
blood of the people in Japanese territories should be mixed with the blood of the 
superior Japanese “race.” Although Koiso confessed that this was a “childish plan,” 
unlikely to actually be implemented, he further explained how this would work: race 
mixing would be limited to women of considerable class, who would then be housed 
and trained at a special institution to encourage the birth of mixed blood children. 
Then, these children will be specially treated from the beginning, and will be educated 
to become “superior” like the Japanese.46  
Both of Koiso’s suggestions that offered to treat mixed children as Japanese 
and thus superior, in contrast to the American treatment of mixed children as inferior 
to the white Americans, stemmed from his concern about the consequences of 
prohibiting intermarriage. Koiso was especially anxious about possible revenge from 
the people who Japanese had intimate relationships with. To argue against the 
intermarriage ban in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, Koiso further shared a story he heard 
from a person returning from the Southern Seas: a Japanese man impregnated a 
woman in the Dutch Indies and left her there with the child when the man returned to 
Japan. Fortunately, she was happy about “receiving Japanese blood,” because she 
would no longer need to worry about securing food—thus this case did not involve 
 
45 “Dai sanbukai giji sokkiroku, dai yonkai giji sokkiroku” [Proceeding records of the Third 
Committee, proceedings from the fourth meeting], 148. 
46 Ibid., 149. 
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any actual revenge. Yet Koiso critiqued such “morally destructive behavior” of the 
Japanese, because local women and their children may grow to espouse grievances 
and plan to retaliate against the Japanese.47 Koiso also mentioned the possibility of 
antagonizing additional figures lest intermarriage remained uncontrolled, such as 
business owners employing local women: if Japanese men impregnated local women, 
who then may stop working due to pregnancy or not finding the need to work, 
employers would lose labor power and may harbor animosity against the Japanese for 
the loss of their employees. In such situations, Koiso worried that businesses may then 
be carried in a “bad direction” for Japan, but Japan would not know the reason why if 
intermarriage was not acknowledged and left uncontrolled.48  
Therefore Koiso, too, feared losing Japanese superiority, and his support did 
not necessarily indicate a lack of concern about the Japanese quality: he advocated 
“race” mixing only to women of the upper class, and called for education of mixed 
children to become superior. He also critiqued immoral behavior of Japanese men, and 
voiced his worry about the declining quality of the Japanese living in areas unsuited to 
the Japanese, like Taiwan, when calling for separate living arrangements.49 Yet what 
was different from those who opposed intermarriage out of fear of Japanese “racial 
degeneration,” was that Koiso was more concerned about what would happen if 
intermarriage was prohibited or left unacknowledged in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. If 
intermarriage was banned and mixed children were treated poorly, then non-Japanese 
Asian women who Japanese men had intimate relationships with, children born in 
 
47 Ibid., 156. 
48 Ibid., 157 
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those relationships, and people surrounding them, may obstruct Japanese expansion 
into Asia out of discontent with the Japanese. This fear of acting similarly to the 
Western imperial powers and subsequently antagonizing people in the Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, was what led Koiso to propose permitting intermarriage and even proactively 
mixing, as well as treating mixed children as superior like the Japanese in contrast to 
the Americans.  
The presence of Asians in the Co-Prosperity Sphere played an important role in 
shaping intermarriage policies, observable in the Third Committee’s discussion of how 
to phrase mixed marriage policies after initially raising the issue. Tsuda Shingo, an 
entrepreneur and another member of the Third Committee, was especially worried 
about how mixed marriage policies will be received by the non-Japanese. During the 
fourth meeting, he proposed eliminating the phrase, “suppress blood mixing” in plans 
to build the Co-Prosperity Sphere, because he considered the wording “vulgar.”50 His 
alternative suggestion, was to say something along the lines of, “based on objective to 
secure the unity of the Japanese ‘race’.”51 Tsuda opposed openly mentioning 
suppression of “race mixing,” but it did not mean that Tsuda did not possess the fear of 
“racial” degeneration either, as he also opposed promotion of blood mixing.52 
Tsuda’s attention to the wording was supported by another participant, 
Shimada, who had earlier proposed creating measures to address “race” mixing. 
According to Shimada, the Council meetings were secretive: however, if someone on 
the “outside” happens to see the details of what have been discussed, then they faced 
 
50 Ibid., 163.  
51 Ibid., 164. 
52 Ibid., 163.  
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potential criticisms.53 Therefore Shimada also supported Tsuda and suggested 
removing “suppress blood mixing,” and instead using phrases such as “based on 
objective to secure the unity of the Japanese ‘race’” when discussing ways to protect 
the quality of the Japanese “race” in the final report.   
Tsuda’s suggestion to remove “suppress blood mixing” appears to have 
influenced the final draft of the policies on constructing the Co-Prosperity Sphere 
produced by the Third Committee, which was responsible for the population and 
policies on “race.” The basic policy on mixed marriage was rewritten in the final 
version of the plan as follows: the Japanese “race” were to be the driving force in 
constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and this requires maintaining 
the unity of the Japanese “race” to uphold the quality of the Japanese “race.”54 The 
fear of “racial” degeneration by “race” mixing remained in the proposal as seen in the 
attempt to maintain “unity of the Japanese ‘race’,” and there is no word on promoting 
intermarriages. However, the lack of what Tsuda identified as “vulgar” expression in 
the Third Committee’s final draft of the proposal, as well as in the “Basic Plan for the 
Construction of Greater East Asia,” which included findings of the Third Committee 
and which goals included eliminating the notion of Euro-American superiority and 
Anglo-American world view,55 suggest the existence of fear besides degeneration of 
the Japanese “race”—the anxiety of being explicitly racist like the Western imperial 
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powers and consequently antagonizing non-Japanese Asians in the Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. 
Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Revisited 
The attempt to differentiate Japanese rule from Euro-American rules to appeal 
to the people in the Co-Prosperity Sphere is also noticeable in “Measures for the 
Construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” In addition to arguing 
against intermarriage and attempting to ban it to secure and maintain Japanese “racial” 
superiority, it also argued for the need of Japan to be at the center and a leader of all 
the “races” in (East) Asia. To achieve that position required:  
1. Taking necessary steps to protect the superior characteristics of the Japanese 
“race.”  
2. Taking special measures to determine which occupations the Japanese “race” 
take outside of Japan. 
3. Increasing the number of Japanese in certain occupations. 
4. Decreasing the number of Japanese in certain occupations.56 
 
If prohibiting mixed marriage was to address the first goal, then controlling which 
occupations that the Japanese can take in the Co-Prosperity Sphere was to address the 
other goals. According to the Measures, prescribing certain occupations to the 
Japanese within the Co-Prosperity Sphere was an attempt to make sure that the other 
“races” will not see Japanese engaging in activities, such as prostitution, gambling, 
and opium dens, which would contradict with the Japanese goal to become “friends, 
consultants, and leaders” of the local people.57 There was a concern that if the 
Japanese were seen engaging in inferior occupations and activities, they would lose 
the respect from non-Japanese Asians.    
 
56 “Daitōa kyōeiken kensetsu taisaku, chūhen (miteikō),” 52–54. 
57 Ibid., 57–59. 
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 It was important for the Japanese to be respected and deemed superior by the 
people in the Co-Prosperity Sphere, because the goal of constructing it required 
support from people within the Co-Prosperity Sphere. And the way in which Japan 
tried to garner support from Asians after gaining respect, and preventing any possible 
obstructions in the construction process, was by establishing systems and customs 
based on principles of racial equality.58 This involved elimination of all former 
policies, systems, and customs, and any discriminatory treatments imposed by the US, 
UK, Netherlands, and France that treated Asians poorly while privileging the white 
race.59 By doing so, it enabled Japan to justify its expansion into Asia, while 
distinguishing itself different from the exploitative and discriminatory Western 
powers.     
 Yet in the “Measures for the Construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere,” there was also an attempt to suppress intermarriage, not only between East 
Asians and whites, but also between Japanese and non-Japanese Asians as introduced 
in the previous section. If this was condemned, however, it would be difficult for 
Japan to claim itself different from the Western powers that condemned colonizer-
colonized relationships. I thus deduce that between this incompatibility of wanting to 
stop intermarriage to prevent Japanese “racial” degeneration on the one hand, and 
desire to differentiate itself from the Western powers to gain Asian support on the 
other, the latter was of greater importance, hence the disappearance of any 
intermarriage ban in the final versions of the plans to construct the Co-Prosperity 
 
58 Ibid., 36; “Daitōa kyōeiken kensetsu taisaku, jōhen (miteikō),” 6-2, 7-3. 
59 Volume 1, 7-3, Volume 2, 28. 
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Sphere, not only in the “Basic Plan for the Construction of Greater East Asia” 
analyzed above, but also in the Joint Declaration of Greater East Asia to be examined 
below. 
Joint Declaration of Greater East Asia 
Joint Declaration of Greater East Asia was a book published by the Japanese 
government’s Cabinet Information Bureau, which controlled information made 
available to the public in Japan during the war. Made for the Japanese masses, the 
book contained contents and analysis of the details from the Greater East Asia 
Conference that convened in November 1943 that representatives from Japan, China, 
Thailand, Manchukuo, the Philippines, Burma, and India attended in Tokyo. 
This document outlined the plans of building a new world order for Asians 
liberated from British and American domination, which were similar to those found in 
the meeting records of the Third Committee and the plan by the Investigating 
Committee on Greater East Asia Problems. However, in the Joint Declaration, signs 
of fear concerning Japanese “racial” degeneration via race mixing were absent. For 
example, instead of treating the presence of diverse “races” as a threat within the Co-
Prosperity Sphere that posed a challenge to maintaining the unity and superiority of 
the Japanese “race,” diversity was rather welcomed in the Joint Declaration.60 In 
another example, the Asian countries and the people of each country were likened to 
siblings sharing the same blood.61 Although it was evident in the earlier plans that the 
planners considered non-Japanese Asians be inferior and separate from the Japanese, 
 
60 Jōhōkyoku, 153.  
61 Ibid., 141. 
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hence the need to prevent mixed marriages, there is no word about suppressing “race” 
mixing or intermarriage, with a pretense that the Japanese and non-Japanese Asians 
were alike and equal.   
However, what remained from the plans to build the Co-Prosperity Sphere, 
were the criticisms against the Euro-American powers and the attempt to garner 
support from the people viewed inferior. In justifying the war against the West to 
liberate Asia, the Conference adopted the “Joint Declaration of Greater East Asia,” to 
actualize a world liberated from British and American rule.62 It consisted of five 
principles, and of the five, I want to direct attention to the last principle:  
“The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate friendly 
relations with all the countries of the world, and work for the 
abolition of racial discriminations, the promotion of cultural 
intercourse and the opening of resources throughout the 
world, and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind.”63 
 
The “racial discrimination” here is referring to the exclusive, racist behavior 
and policies of the West, primarily the British and the Americans. This included 
exploiting resources in Asia, which they viewed as inferior to the West, placing limits 
on immigration from Asia, as well as discriminating other people of color, such as 
black Americans in the United States, despite claiming to stand for “freedom and 
equality.”64  
This rhetoric, of painting the British and the Americans as “racists” for its 
discriminatory attitudes and policies, was used by Japan as part of its wartime 
 
62 Ibid., 2–3. 
63 Ibid., 3. 
64 Ibid., 150, 152–154. 
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propaganda.65 By claiming that Japan was also one of the victims of Western 
injustices, it was able to claim solidarity with Asians who were exploited and 
discriminated by the Western powers. To further gain support from Asians in its war 
efforts, Japan had to simultaneously portray itself as anti-racist and different from the 
racist British and American powers, to justify its qualification to lead the new world 
order. In this context, had Japan copied the West and condemned race mixing and 
intermarriage, then Japan’s wartime propagandistic efforts to gain Asian support 
would have been undermined, as condemnation of interracial relationships in the 
Western empires was based on fear of white racial degeneration and losing its 
superiority by mixing with the non-white people, thought to be inferior. If Japan, too, 
openly suppressed intermarriage in its empire, it would have revealed Japanese view 
of other Asians as inferior, and not any different from the Western powers. And if 
Japan failed to distinguish itself different from their white counterparts, then it may 
have provoked antipathy from Asians in countries where Japan invaded, resulting in 
failure of constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, with an increased 
likelihood of facing obstructions from people within it in the process of its creation. 
Failure to construct the Co-Prosperity Sphere, would then ultimately have prevented 
Japan from achieving its own actual exploitative interests in Asia. 
The disappearance of attempts to ban intermarriage, and lack of any 
condemnation of intermarriage in the Japanese empire, thus did not signify the lack or 
 
65 For discussions of how Japan (as well as the United States) portrayed the other using racial 
rhetoric during World War II and faced a dilemma to not appear racist, see John Dower, War 
Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986). 
Fujitani also discusses how Japan and US were engaged in competition to portray themselves 
as non-racists that disavowed racism in Race for Empire (2011). 
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the disappearance of the fear of Japanese “racial” degeneration through “race” mixing. 
The fear of losing Japanese “racial” superiority, just as it existed in the Western 
empires, also existed in Japan. Yet Japan also had the fear of antagonizing people in 
the territories it was taking over by behaving similarly to the Euro-American imperial 
powers—particularly Britain and the United States—which I argue outweighed the 
former fear, and this was why attempts to prohibit “race” mixing appeared in the 
earlier plans to expand into Asia, but disappeared in the finalized and publicized plans. 
And because intermarriage between Japanese and non-Japanese Asians was not, or 
could not be banned in Greater East Asia, the Japanese government could not but 
sanction intermarriage between Japanese and Koreans, and Japanese and Taiwanese, 
even though Koreans and Taiwanese were considered inferior to the Japanese and 
there were plenty of oppositions to intermarriage among Japanese men who debated 
about intermarriage. This was a result of imperial Japan observing the global trends, 
not ignoring them.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have first shown that intermarriage was neither encouraged 
nor discouraged in imperial Japan. Although this may have ran counter to the Western 
trend of condemning mixed marriage out of fear of racial degeneration of the white, 
ruling race, I first argued that Japan also had the same anxiety of losing Japanese 
“racial” superiority, found in the plans that discussed how to construct the Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the 1940s. Then why did Japan not ban and discourage 
intermarriage in its empire? Based on the observations of how the attempts to ban 
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intermarriage disappeared in the final plans of building the Co-Prosperity Sphere and 
the presence of concerns over Asian discontent, I moreover argued that the reason 
behind imperial Japan’s sanctioning of intermarriage, despite the oppositions, was due 
to the fear of displaying racist behaviors and consequently losing Asian support having 
been greater than the fear of racial degeneration. One of the ways in which Japan 
justified its expansion was criticizing the West for exploiting Asia and discriminating 
Asians. Had Japan copied the West by condemning intermarriage, however, this 
justification would have been untenable, and the plan to construct the Co-Prosperity 
Sphere would also have failed.  
 What I hope to have shown in this chapter, is that in addition to the domestic 
wartime population policies discussed in the previous chapter, there were additional 
contexts outside of Japan that influenced Japan’s decision to sanction intermarriage. I 
also hope to have shown that Japan was not isolated from the world during the 
wartime. The previous chapter introduced Japanese men who relied on intermarriage 
and race mixing cases from the other empires to argue against intermarriage. This 
chapter, too, introduced Japanese men involved in the construction of the Co-
Prosperity Sphere, who were aware of what was happening outside of Japan and its 
empire, such as the participants of the Third Committee of the Council for the 
Construction of Greater East Asia. Sanctioning intermarriage was a result not of 
wartime Japan turning its back to the West, but rather working strategically based on 
its observations of the West for its own exploitative interests in Asia. 
 By demonstrating Japan’s similarities to and observations of the Euro-
American imperial powers in its decision to sanction intermarriage, this chapter was 
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also an attempt to “dislocate the West (and the Rest).”66 With the categorization of 
Japan in “the Rest,” the Japanese empire in the historiography of modern imperialism 
and colonialism focused on the Euro-American empires categorized as “the West,” is 
excluded or sidelined, leading to “the West” remaining the site of knowledge 
production.67 I thus used the term “race” in quotation marks, instead of minzoku, to 
draw attention to the parallels between Japan and its Euro-American counterparts in 
the twentieth century (i.e., the fear of racial degeneration of the ruling race) as a way 
to challenge the binary of “the West” and “the Rest.” Yet the drawback in continuing 
to use the word “race,” besides conforming to and perpetuating “the West” as the site 
of knowledge production, is that it is a social construct. While this does not mean that 
race is irrelevant, it is also not a sole basis of other discriminations, such as 
discrimination against religious minorities. Therefore as an alternative to talk about 
race (as well as ethnicity and nationality, such as “Japanese” that is not a given), one 
could rely on and adopt terms used in social justice scholarship, such as “agents,” 
“dominant” or “advantaged” to talk about social groups with power and resources, 
ranked above those who are “targets,” “subordinated” or “disadvantaged.”68  
 The remainder of this dissertation will continue to question and challenge the 
binary of “the West” and “the Rest” in an attempt to de-marginalize Japan in the West-
 
66 Gavin Walker and Naoki Sakai, “The End of Area,” positions 27.1 (February 2019): 1–31.  
67 Naoki Sakai, “Theory and Asian Humanity: On the Question of Humanitas and 
Anthropos,” Postcolonial Studies 13.4 (2010): 441–464.  
68 Lee Anne Bell, “Theoretical Foundations for Social Justice Education,” Readings for 
Diversity and Social Justice, edited by Maurianne Adams, et al., fourth edition (New York: 
Routledge, 2018), 34–41; Bobbi Harro, “The Cycle of Socialization,” Readings for Diversity 
and Social Justice, edited by Maurianne Adams, et al., fourth edition (New York: Routledge, 
2018), 27–34. 
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centric historiography of modern empires, and find ways in which studies on Japan 
could be applicable in studies of and contribute to understanding “the West.” Having 
examined internal and external factors that led to legalization of intermarriage without 
promotion, the next chapter will explore who was promoting intermarriage in Japan, 
with a particular focus on Japanese women, and propose consideration of factors 
beyond race, class, and gender when studying colonizer-colonized relationships in 
modern empires, unlimited to Japan. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Brokers of Empire at Home: Supporters of Intermarriage in Wartime Japan 
 
  The previous two chapters introduced Japanese men who were the primary 
participants in the discussion of intermarriage in imperial Japan, debating whether to 
encourage or discourage it. These two chapters also showed that despite oppositions 
against intermarriage, it could not ultimately be condemned in Japan due to a 
combination of internal and external factors, which led the government to take a 
neutral stance to neither encourage nor discourage intermarriage even in the 1940s, 
after more than a decade since the legalization of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-
Taiwanese marriages. 
  This leads to the question of who was promoting intermarriage in Japan, 
because there are records claiming that intermarriage was promoted in Japan. One 
example is from a collection of testimonies from 1972 in a magazine Ushio, which 
featured testimonies mostly from Japanese women who married Korean men in Japan 
before the fall of the empire in 1945, and were “found” in South Korea in the postwar 
period. According to one woman named Sakai Kiyoi, she was forced to marry a 
Korean man against her will in 1940, at a time when “naisen kekkon (Japanese-Korean 
marriage) was being called for.”1 Kim Bongsu, in another testimony, recalled his 
marriage to a Japanese woman in 1943: people around him congratulated and praised 
him when they coaxed him into naisen kekkon.2 Based on such statements, Suzuki 
 
1 “‘Kimin’ ni sareta Kankoku no Nihonjinzuma no shōgen” [Testimonies of Japanese wives 
abandoned in Korea], Ushio 153 (1972.5): 254. 
2 Ibid., 270. 
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Yūko, one of the first historians to publish a monograph on Japanese-Korean 
marriages in 1992, concluded that Japanese-Korean marriages were promoted as a 
“national policy,” not only in colonial Korea but also in Japan.3 Oguma Eiji, too, 
claims that the Japanese government “promoted” intermarriage, at least superficially.4 
Non-scholarly, popular reporting on Japanese women who intermarried Korean men 
before 1945 also write about intermarriage as though it has been officially promoted in 
Japan.5 However, subsequent research, such as Kim Yŏngdal’s and Eika Tai’s, has 
argued that it was not promoted although condoned.6 But who, then was doing the 
promotion in Japan? 
 This chapter will address the following questions: if the Japanese government 
did not encourage or discourage intermarriage in Japan, then who was promoting it 
and why? Was promotion of intermarriage a form of resistance against the government 
that was hesitant to promote it? Why was it possible, when there were opposing voices 
arguing against intermarriage? To answer these questions, this chapter surveys three 
different, but sometimes overlapping and interconnected groups of people in Japan 
who participated in the promotion and/or support of intermarriage: Harmony 
 
3 Suzuki Yūko, Jūgun ianfu, naisen kekkon [Comfort women, Japanese-Korean marriage] 
(Tokyo: Miraisha, 1992), 110, 191–193.  
4 Oguma Eiji, Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen [The myth of the homogeneous nation] 
(Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1995), 241, 254–255. 
5 See Yamazaki Tomoko, “Okisarareta Nihon josei tachi (jō) ‘naisen kekkon’ to ‘tairiku 
hanayome’” [Japanese women left forgotten (part one) “Japanese-Korean marriage” and 
“continental brides”], Sekai 762 (2007.3): 277–291. Why there are more records of Japanese-
Korean marriages compared to Japanese-Taiwanese marriages will be addressed in the 
following chapter. 
6 Kim Yŏngdal, “Nihon no Chōsen tōchi-ka ni okeru ‘tsūkon’ to ‘konketsu’—iwayuru ‘naisen 
kekkon’ no hōsei, tōkei, seisaku ni tsuite” [Japan’s “intermarriage” and “blood mixing” in 
colonial Korea: on laws, statistics, and policies of the so-called “Japanese-Korean marriage”], 
Kansai Daigaku Jinken Mondai Kenkyūshitsu Kiyō 39 (1999): 43; Eika Tai, “The Discourse of 
Intermarriage in Colonial Taiwan,” The Journal of Japanese Studies 40.1 (Winer 2014): 31. 
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Association, district commissioners, and Japanese women. I first argue that promotion 
of intermarriage occurred at the local level, by supporters who had ideological and/or 
practical reasons for supporting intermarriage. It was possible to support intermarriage 
despite the lack of promotion at the national level, because support of intermarriage 
was an extension of government sanctioned activities. I particularly focus on Japanese 
women who supported intermarriage and examine what led them to support 
intermarriage contrary to the government’s let-it-be attitude and Japanese men who 
opposed intermarriage introduced in the previous chapters. I argue that Japanese 
women’s support of intermarriage was part of the larger effort to promote marriage 
and to help other Japanese women in need, based on their interests in advancing 
Japanese women’s rights. Lastly, I argue that Japanese women at home in the 
metropole working in and for the interest of themselves and other Japanese women 
were inadvertently complicit in imperialism, by showing how their support of 
inter/marriage—although well-intentioned and seemingly contradictory to the imperial 
government—reinforced and perpetuated the patriarchal system that discriminated 
people who could not be citizens.  
 
Supporters of Intermarriage in Japan  
  There were at least three groups that supported intermarriage in Japan before 
1945—members of the Harmony Association (Kyōwakai), the district commissioners 
(hōmen’iin), and Japanese women. I argue that these groups supported intermarriage 
not only for ideological reasons, such as assimilation of people from the colonies, but 
also for practical reasons, where enabling interethnic marriage was an extension of 
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their ordinary activities that involved helping people in need. In addition, promotion of 
intermarriage, although limited, did exist in Japan, but it was at a local level, not at the 
national level.7 The position on intermarriage of these groups may have differed from 
the government, but their promotion and support of intermarriage was not necessarily 
a resistance. They were able to support intermarriage because it was an extension of 
government sanctioned activities. 
Harmony Association 
 One of the groups that supported intermarriage (at least between Japanese and 
Koreans), was the Harmony Association (Kyōwakai).8 The first Harmony Association 
emerged in Osaka in 1924, with a goal of promoting naisen yūwa, or harmony 
between Japan(ese) and Korea(ns), living in Osaka (numbering over 20,000 in 1924) 
in the aftermath of the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake.9 The initial motive was to 
protect and rescue Koreans living in Osaka, and the Kyōwakai activities included 
 
7 One group not discussed in this chapter, but which name appears in secondary sources, is 
Sōaikai (Mutual Friendship Society), formed under the guidance of the Government General 
of Korea in 1921, with the aim of acting as a labor broker as well as an enforcer of 
Japanization programs in Japan. However, such effort was not supported by all Koreans, as 
there appears to have been a conflict between Sōaikai and those from Jeju Island (see Osaka-
fu Shakaika [Osaka Prefecture Society Department], Osaka-fu hōmen’iin jigyō nenpō shōwa 
ninen [Osaka prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1927] [Osaka: Osaka-fu 
Shakaika, 1928]). Also see Edward W. Wagner, The Korean Minority in Japan, 1904–1950 
(New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), 22. According to 
Wagner, the Society maintained close and unofficial relationship with the police, thus 
functioning as a “control organ” that aimed to Japanize Koreans by coercion. They appear to 
have existed in both Japan and Korea, but their activities in Japan that involved promotion of 
Japanese-Korean marriages beyond the 1920s when they appeared in newspapers, are unclear.   
8 This is separate from the Kyōwakai in Manchukuo, known as the Concordia Society, 
Harmony Society, and/or Harmony Association. Ozawa Yūsaku, “‘Kyōwa’ o bōkyaku no 
fuchikara sukuidasu tameni” [To bail ‘harmony’ from the verge of oblivion], Kyōwa jigyō 
nenkan (fukkokuban) [Harmony work yearbook (reprinted edition)] (Tokyo: Shakai 
Hyōronsha, 1990), 8. 
9 Osaka-fu Shakaika, Osaka-fu hōmen’iin jigyō nenpō taishō jūsannen [Osaka prefecture 
district commissioner work yearbook 1924] (Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1925), 281, 295.  
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providing housing, job referral services, Japanese language education, access to 
medical services, and other welfare services, which were funded through public 
donations and financial support from the Osaka prefectural government and the 
Government General of Korea.10  
 Following the establishment of the first Harmony Association in Osaka, 
Harmony Associations also soon emerged in Hyōgo and Kanagawa in 1925, both 
prefectures with a large Korean population. Yet it was in the 1930s that the Harmony 
Associations emerged Japan-wide with the establishment of the Central Harmony 
Association (Chūō Kyōwakai): sources differ in the establishment date, but it appears 
that the creation of the Central Harmony Association began in 1934, and started to 
spread across the metropole from 1936, which was also the year when Kyōwakai 
emerged in Tokyo and Kyoto, beyond Osaka, Hyōgo, and Kanagawa prefectures.11 
 The Central Harmony Association was then formally established under the 
 
10 “Naisen kyōwakai hakkaishiki” [Japan-Korea Harmony Association opening ceremony], 
Shakai Jigyō Kenkyū 12.6 (1924): 100–102. 
11 1934 is the year dated on Central Harmony Association’s “Prospectus of Establishing the 
Central Harmony Association” (Chūō Kyōwakai setsuritsu shuisho), outlining the need to 
create a centralized system to facilitate communication between different Harmony 
Associations around Japan (Tachi Collection [Tokyo: National Institute of Population and 
Social Security Research Library], PDFY100916008). 
According to Higuchi Yūichi, 1936 was the year that the planning began, and 1939 was the 
official year of establishment (“Kaidai” [Bibliographical information], Kyōwa jigyō nenkan 
(fukkokuban) [Harmony work yearbook (reprinted edition)] [Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 1990], 
6). The formal year of establishment as 1939 is also supported by Tsukazaki Masayuki (in 
“Ajia Taiheiyō Sensōka no Osaka-fu Kyōwakai, Kyōwa Kyōryokukai, Kōseikai no katsudō to 
Chōsenjin” [Activities of Osaka prefecture’s Kyōwakai, Kyōwa Kyōryokukai, and Kōseikai 
during the Asia Pacific War and Koreans], Higashi Ajia Kenkyū 54 [2010]: 20) and Chūō 
Shakai Jigyō Kyōkai [Central Social Work Association] (in Nihon shakai jigyō nenkan shōwa 
jūyon, jūgonenban [Japan social work yearbook 1939/1940 edition] [Tokyo: Bunsei Shoin, 
1941], 539). Chimoto Hideki wrote that the Central Harmony Association was established in 
1936 (“Kyoto-fu Kyōwakai to Uji no zainichi Chōsenjin” [Kyōwakai of Kyoto prefecture and 
Koreans in Uji], Rekishi Jinrui 16 [1988]: 185), supported by Wagner ([1951], 22, 50–51).  
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Ministry of Welfare in 1939, leading to the establishment of Harmony Associations in 
all prefectures except Okinawa by 1940 and facilitation of communications between 
various Harmony Associations across Japan to achieve its more unified goals.12 By 
this time, the initial work of the Harmony Association, or harmony work (kyōwa 
jigyō), shifted from providing aid to Koreans to assimilation of Koreans, due to the 
impact of the Sino-Japanese War and also due to the greater involvement of the police 
within the Central Harmony Association.  
 According to the bylaws of the Central Harmony Association, the objective of 
the organization was to “promote assimilation of compatriots from gaichi (outer lands, 
or colonies) living in Japan and achieve harmony among all citizens.”13 Because 
gaichi encompassed Taiwan, those from Taiwan would theoretically also have been 
subject to assimilation efforts of the Harmony Association. However, there is no 
evidence of the Taiwanese colonial government being involved, similar to how the 
Korean colonial government and businesses were involved as the trustees of the 
Harmony Association.14 Also, according to the Harmony Work Yearbook (Kyōwa 
jigyō nenkan), the goal of the Harmony Association was to aim for isshi dōjin 
(“universal benevolence”) under which everyone from both naichi (metropole) and 
gaichi (colonies) were all under the equal gaze of the emperor, yet because Koreans 
were more numerous—around 900,000 compared to around 8,000 Taiwanese in Japan 
 
12 Higuchi (1990), 6. 
13 Chūō Kyōwakai [Central Harmony Association], “Chūō Kyōwakai jigyō keikaku” [Central 
Harmony Association work plan], 1938, Tachi Collection (Tokyo: National Institute of 
Population and Social Security Research Library), PDFY100916009. 
14 See Takeda Yukio, ed., Chūō Kyōwakai yōran [Central Harmony Association Directory] 
(Tokyo: Chūō Kyōwakai, 1940).  
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as of 1939—“compatriots from gaichi” (gaichi dōhō) were largely equated with 
Koreans.15  
 Thus the Harmony Association, which upper positions were filled by the 
Japanese and the police, mainly targeted Koreans as subjects of assimilation efforts.16 
It required Koreans to become a member of the organization, through which their 
activities and movements were policed and could be mobilized during the wartime.17 
Koreans from the “intellectual occupation” class also participated in actualizing the 
goals of the Harmony Association, for example, by providing guidance to other 
Koreans living in Japan.18 Other activities to assimilate Koreans included: researching 
about Koreans residing in Japan; providing instructions on improving their living 
situations; enforcing Japanese language education; and offering housing and 
employment.19  
 
15 Chūō Kyōwakai, Kyōwa jigyō nenkan shōwa jūrokunenban [Harmony work yearbook 1941 
edition] (Tokyo: Chūō Kyōwakai, 1942), 3.  
16 Higuchi (1990), 4; Tsukazaki (2010): 19–20. 
17 Kyoto City International Foundation, Kyoto ni ikiru zainichi Kankokujin, Chōsenjin 
[Zainichi Koreans living in Kyoto] (Kyoto: Kyoto City International Foundation, 1994), 71–
72. 
18 Tsukazaki Masayuki, “Senkyūhyakunijūnendai Osaka ni okeru ‘naisen yūwa’ jidai no 
kaishi to naiyō no saikentō” [Re-examination of “Japan-Korea harmony” era’s beginning and 
contents in 1920s Osaka],” Zainichi Chōsenjinshi Kenkyū 37 (2007): 23–52; Zainichi Chōsen 
Kagaku Gijutsu Kyōkai [Zainichi Korean Science and Technology Association], “Zainichi 
Chōsenjin no seikatsu jittai” [Zainichi Koreans’ living conditions], 1951, in Kindai minshū no 
kiroku: Zainichi Chōsenjin [Modern people’s memory: Zainichi Koreans], edited by Ozawa 
Yūsaku (Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 1978), 272–311; Chōsen Ginkō Keijō Sōsaiseki 
Chōsaka [Bank of Korea Keijō President-chaired Investigation Division], “Naichi, Shina 
kakuchi zaijū no Hantōjin no katsudō jyōkyō ni kansuru chōsa” [Investigation on activities of 
Koreans living in Japan and China], vol. 24 of Shokuminchi shakai jigyō kankei shiryōshū, 
Chōsenhen [Colonial social work related documents collection, Korea edition] (Tokyo: 
Kingendai Shiryō Kankōkai, 1999), 112–113. 
19 Tsukazaki (2007); Tamura Yoshio, “Honfu shakaika kankei shodantai no tōsei to nōritsu 
zōshin o mezashite [Aiming for control and increase in efficiency of the head office’s different 
organizations related to the society department],” Shakai Jihō (1937.4): 10.  
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 In addition to Korean men, Korean women were also the targets of the 
Harmony Association’s assimilation efforts. There were special lessons for Korean 
women to teach Japanese manners and how to wear Japanese clothes as a way to 
improve their lives and promote Japanization.20 Furthermore in the 1940s, Japanese 
citizens, too, became targets of harmony work, as the Harmony Association held 
symposiums and lectures for Japanese homeowners and factory owners who interacted 
with Koreans on a daily basis. The goal was to foster a deeper understanding of 
Koreans in their everyday interactions to eliminate discriminations that impeded the 
Harmony Association’s goal to achieve harmony between Japan(ese) and Korea(ns).21 
 As part of the larger assimilation efforts of the Harmony Association, some 
evidences show that Japanese-Korean marriages were promoted at the prefectural, or 
the local level. For example, in the Harmony Work Yearbook from 1941, one of the 
activities of the Harmony Association in Kōchi prefecture listed promotion of naisen 
kekkon.22 In another example, Kanagawa prefecture’s list of activities included 
promoting naisen ittai, meaning “Japan and Korea as one body,” a slogan that was 
used during assimilation campaigns. Whether Kanagawa prefecture’s Harmony 
Association promoted Japanese-Korean marriage is unclear, but one of the ways to 
achieve naisen ittai was intermarriage. Considering the case of Kim Bongsu from the 
 
20 The efforts of assimilating Korean women, however, was not always successful, as 
documents record their oppositions and rejections to such efforts. Ozawa (1978), 4–29; 
Imanishi Yoneshirō, “Kokumin seishin sōdōin to Kyoto-fu Kyōwakai no katsudō” [National 
Spiritual Mobilization movement and Activities of Kyoto Prefecture’s Harmony Association], 
Shakai Jihō (1938.3): 29–31.  
21 For example, see Tsukazaki (2010): 36; “Kyoto-fu Kyōwakai” [Kyoto prefecture’s 
Harmony Association], Shakai Jihō (1938.4): 46–52. 
22 Chūō Kyōwakai (1942), 260. 
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introduction of this chapter, who was coaxed into marriage with a Japanese woman 
when naisen ittai was being called for by the people around him, Kanagawa’s 
Harmony Association may also have promoted intermarriage.23 Observations of 
harmony work from the outside confirms the connection between assimilation efforts 
and intermarriage: Igarashi Tasuku, in his comparison of harmony work that aimed at 
eliminating discriminations against Koreans versus “reconciliation work” (yūwa jigyō) 
that aimed to eliminate discriminations against burakumin, recorded that more 
Japanese were increasingly marrying Koreans due to the efforts of harmony work, 
compared to the non-burakumin avoiding marriage with burakumin.24  
  Although intermarriage may not have been promoted nationwide, the presence 
of members of the Harmony Association who intermarried recorded in Central 
Harmony Association’s documents suggests that intermarriage was not discouraged. 
For example, there were at least two Korean members who were married to Japanese 
women.25 One of the two was a Korean member of the Harmony Association in 
Tokyo, called Kobayashi, who was praised for demonstrating the spirit of the harmony 
between Japanese and Koreans. Featured as one of the “heartwarming stories” 
published by the Central Harmony Association, the story also praised Kobayashi of his 
good character, which led him to be well taken care of by the people around him, 
including his Japanese wife, when he fell ill.26  
 
23 Ibid., 102–103, 194. 
24 Igarashi Tasuku, “Kyōwa jigyō to yūwa jigyō” [Harmony work and reconciliation work], 
Niigata Shakai Jigyō 13.4 (1941), in vol. 3 of Kyōwakai kankei shiryōshū [Harmony 
Association related documents collection], edited by Higuchi Yūichi (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 
1991), 59–60.  
25 Zainichi Chōsen Kagaku Gijutsu Kyōkai (1951), 272–311. 
26 Chūō Kyōwakai, “Naichi zaijū dōhō jūgo bidan” [Heartwarming stories at the home front 
  108 
 Moreover, there were affiliates of the Harmony Association who expressed 
their support of intermarriage. One was Takeda Yukio, the “ideologue of the Harmony 
Association” and an official in the Ministry of Welfare. Takeda recognized that 
intermarriage was still at its “trial stage,” referring to the slow growth in number of 
Japanese-Korean marriages. Yet he saw the increase, although small, in a positive light 
as a reflection of the success of assimilating Koreans, which he claimed was important 
in order for Japan to become the leader of Asia.27 This is not to claim that all affiliates 
of harmony work supported intermarriage, however, as there were opponents arguing 
against Japanese-Korean marriages, too. For example, Nagashima Keizō (née Kang 
Kyeong-ok), who was a member of the Osaka Kyōwa Kyōryokukai (Osaka Harmony 
Support Association), which consisted of Koreans who were supportive of the 
Harmony Association’s efforts, suggested not enforcing Japanese-Korean marriages 
even though there were positive outcomes reported.28 
 Although intermarriage may not have been discouraged, as evidenced by the 
promotion of intermarriage at the local level, existence of Korean members who 
intermarried, expression of support by the Central Harmony Association, and presence 
of Japanese supporters, there is no evidence of the Kyōwakai promoting Japanese-
Korean marriages as its official policy at the central, national level. This may be due to 
the Harmony Association being under the Ministry of Welfare and the government’s 
 
of compatriots living in Japan] (1944), in vol. 2 of Kyōwakai kankei shiryōshū [Harmony 
Association related documents collection], edited by Higuchi Yūichi (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 
1995), 477–481. 
27 Takeda (1940), 460–465.  
28 Tsukazaki (2010); Nagashima Keizō, “Kyōwa jigyō no konponteki kaikaku shian” 
[Proposal on fundamental reform of harmony work], July 1944, Japan Center for Asian 
Historical Records, B02031286800, A-5-0-0-1_1_002, 290. 
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stance to neither officially encourage nor discourage intermarriage. Yet the 
government also supported assimilation, which has been Harmony Association’s 
primary activity during the wartime. Harmony Association’s support of intermarriage 
was thus not entirely contradictory to the government’s decision to neither encourage 
nor discourage intermarriage in Japan: at the local level, members of the Harmony 
Association could promote intermarriage because it was part of government 
sanctioned assimilation efforts.  
District Commissioners 
 The second group that supported intermarriage was hōmen’iin, or district 
commissioners, some of whom were also part of the Harmony Association.29 District 
commissioners and members of the Harmony Association worked together on 
occasions, for example, in helping a poor Korean family return to Korea after the 
primary provider of the family passed away.30 In another example, Osaka’s Harmony 
Association introduced a Korean youth to a district commissioner in Osaka: the youth 
arrived in Japan to study, and the district commissioner took the student in and paid 
for his tuition.31 And at least in Osaka and Kyoto prefectures, both the Harmony 
Association and district commissioners were found under the same department within 
the prefectural government, which would explain their collaborative work. 
 
29 Mizuno Naoki, “Kaisetsu” [Commentary], Kyoto ni okeru Chōsenjin no rekishi, shiryōshū: 
“Shakai Jihō” kankei kiji [History and documents collection of Koreans in Kyoto: Shakai Jihō 
related articles] (Kyoto: Sekai Jinken Mondai Kenkyūjo Sentā, 1997), xxi. 
30 After the father passed away, the Korean family in Tokyo was sent to the Harmony 
Association in Osaka by the district commissioners in Tokyo, in order to find funding to return 
to Korea. Osaka-fu Shakaika, Osaka-fu hōmen’iin jigyō nenpō shōwa gonen [Osaka prefecture 
district commissioner work yearbook 1930] (Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1931), 121–123. 
31 Osaka-fu hōmen’iin jigyō nenpō (1928), 162–165. 
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 So who were the district commissioners? They were the precursors of the 
minsei’iin (welfare commissioners) in the postwar period, and constituted of Japanese 
men from middle to upper middle classes who helped people in need on a voluntary, 
philanthropic basis.32 The district commissioner system (hōmen’iin seido) first 
emerged in Okayama prefecture in 1917, then in Osaka in 1918. Influenced by the 
social work system in Germany, Britain, and the United States, as well as Japan’s 
goningumi system from the early modern period, the hōmen’iin system gradually 
developed across Japan after the rice riots and the post-WWI economic stagnation to 
act as a supporting organ of the government’s social work efforts.33  
 
32 Ito Yoshiko, “Social Work Development in Japan,” Social Policy & Administration 29.3 
(1995): 262. 
33 Kitaba Tsutomu, “Taishō-ki ni okeru hōmen’iin seido tanjō no shakaiteki haikei to imi ni 
kansuru ichi kōsatsu” [Social background and meaning of the homen’iin system born in the 
Taishō era], Study Report of Japan College of Social Work 55 (2009.2): 4–5; Nagaoka 
Masami, “Senjika hōmen’iin katsudō to seisaku, jissen kadai” [Wartime district commissioner 
activities and policies, issues in practice], Fukkoku, Senjika Osaka-fu hōmen jōmuiinkai giji 
sokkiroku [Reprinted, Wartime Osaka prefecture district standing committee conference 
proceedings record] (Osaka: Kinki Chiiki Fukushi Gakkai, Osaka-fu Hōmen’iin Katsudō 
Shiryō Kenkyūkai, 1999), 959.  
The hōmen’iin system was also implemented in Korea, Manchukuo, and Taiwan, analyzed to 
have been part of the assimilatory mechanism in the colonies, closely affiliated with the 
colonial governments. Hōmen’iin system was established in Taiwan in 1923, and in Korea, 
1927. For more information, see Nagaoka Masami, “Nihon tōchika Taiwan shakai jigyōshi 
kenkyū no igi to kadai” [Significance and challenges of research on Taiwan’s social work 
history under Japanese rule], Shokuminchi shakai jigyō kankei shiryōshū, Taiwanhen bessatsu 
[Colonial social work related documents collection, Taiwan edition, supplementary volume] 
(Tokyo: Kingendai Shiryō Kankōkai, 2001): 5–42; Shin Ketsu, “Shokuminchi Taiwan ni 
okeru hōmen’iin seido no tenkai oyobi sono tokushitsu” [Evolution and characteristics of 
district commissioner system in colonial Taiwan], Shokuminchi shakai jigyō kankei shiryōshū, 
Taiwanhen bessatsu [Colonial social work related documents collection, Taiwan edition, 
supplementary volume] (Tokyo: Kingendai Shiryō Kankōkai, 2001): 109–132; Ōtomo 
Masako, “Nihon tōchika Taiwan ni okeru shakai jigyō seisaku no tenkai” [Evolution of social 
work policies in Taiwan under Japanese rule], Shokuminchi shakai jigyō kankei shiryōshū, 
Taiwanhen bessatsu [Colonial social work related documents collection, Taiwan edition, 
supplementary volume] (Tokyo: Kingendai Shiryō Kankōkai, 2001): 43–108; Park 
Kwangjoon, “Hōmen’iin seido wa Kankoku ni oite naze shōgen shitanoka” [Why did the 
hōmen’iin system lapse in Korea], Bukkyo University Journal of the Faculty of Social Welfare 
11 (2015): 79–99.  
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 The system spread throughout Japan when the Home Ministry promoted the 
spread of the hōmen’iin system in Taishō 11 (1922), but it was not until 1928 that the 
system was established in all prefectures. The Relief Law passed in April 1929 and 
enforced since 1932, in which the government became responsible in providing relief 
to the poor, paved the path to the standardization of the system across Japan a few 
years later.34  
 What made the district commissioners unique compared to governmental 
social work, besides not having legal authority, was that district commissioners were 
focused on rescuing individuals in need.35 One of their main activities included 
surveying people’s living conditions, determining which category the people in need 
fell into: Type 1 or Type 2. Those grouped in Type 1 were in extreme poverty and 
determined by the district commissioners to be unable to live by themselves, while 
those identified as Type 2 were also in poverty, but a temporary poverty caused by 
illness and accidents. This information was then registered on a card to keep track of 
individuals needing help: when people recorded on the card changed their residence, 
the district commissioners updated the information on the card to determine who 
really needed help, in order to stop the abuse and misuse of social aid.36 Once one was 
 
34 Ogasawara Yūji, “Hara Taiichi cho Hōmen jigyō kaidai” [Bibliographical introduction to 
Hara Taiichi’s Hōmen jigyō], in vol. 11 of Senzenki shakai jigyō bunkenshū [Prewar social 
work document collection] (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Sentā, 1995), 4–5.  
35 Kitaba (2009): 27; Yoshida Kyūichi, Shōwa shakai jigyōshi [Shōwa social work history] 
(Kyoto: Mineruva Shobō, 1971), 97. 
36 Yoshida (1971), 96; Osaka-fu Shakaika, Osaka-fu hōmen’iin seido [Osaka prefecture 
district commissioner system] (Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 192?), 3. A sample of the card can 
be found in Kyoto-fu Shakaika [Kyoto Prefecture Society Department], Kyoto hōmen’iin seido 
nijūnenshi [Twenty years history of Kyoto’s district commissioner system] (Kyoto: Kyoto-fu 
Gakumubu Shakaika, 1941), 15. 
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determined to need help, district commissioners offered consultation, guidance, and 
assistance, such as on healthcare and childcare. They also promoted youths to study 
and attend schools, introducing those in need to appropriate institutions and facilities, 
in addition to arranging the household registration (koseki) if and when necessary.37 
Ultimately, their responsibilities included the following: 1) survey of living situations 
of the people living in the assigned district; 2) surveying the people in need of aid; and 
3) helping the needy be able to support themselves.38 
 On November 14, 1936, the hōmen’iin system was promulgated under the 
District Commissioner Ordinance (hōmen’iin-rei) and executed starting January 15 of 
the following year. This standardized the structure, instruction, and operation of the 
district commissioners across Japan, as they previously varied from region to region.39 
And since the promulgation of the ordinance, the hōmen’iin began to work more 
closely with the local/municipal government as a supporting organ, whereas they had 
been more of a private system before.40  
 But even before the national institutionalization of the district commissioner 
system, district commissioners have been involved in supporting intermarriage, at 
 
37 Cases needing management of the household registry included: not registering stillbirth, 
change of residency, unregistered marriage, unregistered birth, and koseki needing corrections. 
See Osaka-fu hōmen’iin seido (192?) and Kyoto hōmen’iin seido nijūnenshi (1941). 
38 Yoshida (1971), 157. 
39 Ibid., 98; Ogasawara (1995), 5; Shakai Jigyō Kenkyūjo [Social Work Research Center], 
Nihon shakai jigyō nenkan shōwa jūsannenban [Japan social work yearbook 1938 edition] 
(Tokyo: Chūō Shakai Jigyō Kyōkai, 1938), 3–4. 
40 Kyoto-fu Shakaika, Kyoto shakai jigyō yōran shōwa jūyonendoban [Kyoto social work 
directory 1939 edition] (Kyoto: Kyoto-shi Shiyakusho, 1940), 19–20. For more information, 
see Anna Maria Thränhardt, “Institutional Continuity and Functional Change: The 
Development of the System of Minsei-iin in the History of Social Welfare in Japan,” Japan’s 
Socio-Economic Evolution: Continuity and Change, edited by Sarah Metzger-Court and 
Werner Pascha (Sandgate, Folkestone, Kent: Japan Library, 1996), 91–108. 
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least between Japanese women and Korean men, as Koreans were also recipients of 
hōmen’iin’s support (although Japanese were prioritized as recipients of aid).41 For 
example, is a case from 1920: when a Japanese woman named KiXX (name partly 
censored in the original) eloped with a Korean man named Choi to Korea, she was 
forced to return to Japan by her family as a punishment. When she returned to Japan, 
she was pregnant and close to full term, so she gave birth to a baby in Osaka, where 
Choi also followed and worked. KiXX’s mother and brother tried to give away the 
baby because they considered the child Korean, so they visited the office of a district 
commissioner for instruction. This was when a male district commissioner in Osaka 
intervened, and worked to convince KiXX’s family that the child belonged to both 
KiXX and Choi. The district commissioner, contrary to the father of KiXX who had 
berated Koreans by likening them to “pigs and cows,” ultimately succeeded in 
persuading KiXX’s family to keep the child, and made Choi pledge to take care of 
KiXX and their child, now living together.42 It is unclear from the report when and 
 
41 Osaka-fu Shakaika (1928), 376. See Tsukazaki (2007): 23–52 on how the district 
commissioners prioritized Japanese over Koreans because of the presence of Harmony 
Association in Osaka.  
For the debate on whether to serve Koreans or not, see Osaka Prefecture District 
Commissioner Work Yearbook Taishō 13 (1925). For an example of district commissioners 
helping Koreans, see Osaka-fu Shakaika (1928), 162–165. The hōmen’iin appeared to have 
been deeply engaged with Koreans in areas with a high Korean population by the late 1930s 
(see Osaka-fu Shakaika, Osaka-fu hōmen’iin jigyō nenpō shōwa jūsannen [Osaka prefecture 
district commissioner work yearbook 1938] [Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1939]). District 
commissioners were not limited to helping Koreans only, as there is a report of a Chinese 
family receiving help from the district commissioners (a Chinese man was left with three 
children by a Japanese wife, and was facing a deportation order after being found consuming 
opium (see Osaka-fu Shakaika, Osaka-fu hōmen’iin jigyō nenpō shōwa hachinen [Osaka 
prefecture district commissioner work yearbook 1933] [Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1934], 
201–204).   
42 Osaka-fu Shakaika, Osaka-fu hōmen’iin jigyō nenpō taishō kyūnen [Osaka prefecture 
district commissioner work yearbook 1920] (Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1921), 215–216. 
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how they married, as KiXX and Choi were unmarried when they escaped to Korea, 
but when the district commissioner made Choi swear to take care of KiXX, she was 
called a “wife.” Thus it is difficult to determine whether the district commissioner was 
involved in encouraging the two to marry, but he was supportive of their co-habitation 
as a family unit.  
 Another case in which a hōmen’iin was directly involved in supporting 
intermarriage after the institutionalization of the district commissioner system, comes 
from the minutes from the district commissioners’ meeting in Osaka held in April of 
1942: one member reported helping a Korean man, working as a tailor, enter the 
household registry of a Japanese woman who worked as a housekeeper with nine 
children. She was previously with a Japanese man under a common-law marriage, but 
ran away with her seven children from him due to his drinking problem. Since the 
Japanese man passed away, she and the Korean man “married” and had two children, 
but their marriage was unregistered, thus the two children born to the couple were 
illegitimate. According to the report, not only was the Korean husband concerned 
about the children, but also concerned about the impact of him being Korean on the 
wife’s seven other children, which caused some difficulty at home between the family 
members. Praising the Korean man as an “admirable Japanese,” the district 
commissioner in the end helped the Korean husband enter his Japanese wife’s registry 
as part of “managing the household registry,” one of the responsibilities of the district 
commissioners.43 
 
43 See “Shigatsu hōmen jōmuiinkai giji sokkiroku” [April district standing committee 
conference proceedings record], Fukkoku, Senjika Osaka-fu hōmen jōmuiinkai giji sokkiroku 
(Osaka: Kinki Chiiki Fukushi Gakkai, Osaka-fu Hōmen’iin Katsudō Shiryō Kenkyūkai, 
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 These two cases first reveal that hōmen’iin were also taking a part in the 
assimilation efforts, to achieve naisen yūwa, or harmony between Japan and Korea, 
used to describe the second case in particular, but also evident from the first case in 
which the reporter claims “Koreans should not be held in contempt today.”44 Thus 
assimilation was one of the reasons why the district commissioners supported Korean 
men’s marriage to Japanese women. Secondly, the cases also reveal that the 
hōmen’iin’s support of intermarriage could be seen as an extension of their ordinary 
activities, which was to rescue the poor. There thus was an additional practical reason 
in supporting intermarriage. According to sociologist Suzuki Tomomichi, district 
commissioners’ registration of marriage was a way in which they worked to promote 
the ideals of the modern family and to standardize the family order, which was thought 
to solve the problems facing the needy: If people in need married and entered a 
registry, there would be a family member that the people in need could rely on and be 
taken care of, instead of the responsibility to care for such individuals falling on the 
government.45 Therefore the support of intermarriage from the district commissioners 
were due to ideological and practical reasons. Although the government did not 
encourage or discourage intermarriage, the district commissioners could have enabled 
it, because entering people into the household registration system to mitigate social 
problems was supported by the government.  
 In both of the above cases, it was the male district commissioners who 
supported the Korean-Japanese couples. Yet female district commissioners, although a 
 
1999), 44–59.  
44 Ibid., 51; Osaka-fu Shakaika (1921), 216.  
45 Kitaba (2009): 31. 
  116 
minority among the district commissioners, were also accepting of and further worked 
to promote Japanese-Korean marriages. I will introduce them separately below, as I 
examine the last group that supported intermarriage in the metropole: Japanese 
women.  
 
Female Supporters of Intermarriage in Japan  
  The members of the Harmony Association and the male district commissioners 
could support intermarriage because their primary activity of assimilating Koreans or 
providing aid to the needy, of which supporting intermarriage was a part, was backed 
by the government. Therefore although it differed from the government’s position to 
neither encourage nor discourage intermarriage, support of it was not necessarily 
contradictory to the government. Below, I introduce Japanese women who supported 
intermarriage in Japan and examine what led to their support and/or promotion of 
intermarriage in Japan. I first argue that Japanese women could support intermarriage 
because it was part of the larger effort to promote marriage that the government 
supported during the wartime. I then argue that Japanese women supported 
intermarriage because it offered a practical solution to a social issue during the 
wartime and also enabled them to fulfill their interests.  
  One group of Japanese women who expressed their support of marriage 
between Japanese women and Korean men, was the female district commissioners 
(fujin hōmen’iin), who were a minority among the district commissioners as social 
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work in Japan was a men’s sphere.46 There were no female district commissioners 
until 1927, approximately after a decade since the district commissioner system first 
emerged.47 Along with Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto were among the first prefectures to 
include women as district commissioners, yet their numbers were extremely low.48 
According to a survey of female district commissioners by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, women constituted only 1.7% out of the 19,515 district commissioners in 
Japan as of 1930.49 The number of women grew slowly over the 1930s, but even by 
1934, there were only 1089 female district commissioners Japan-wide (out of 
39,254).50 
  Women were not initially involved as district commissioners, because men saw 
women as unfit for social work for not being level-headed like men. Men regarded 
women as too pushy and self-assertive, and even in prefectures that relied on women’s 
participation in the district commissioner system, women were often limited to 
supplementary positions because of the assumed incompetency.51 Yet this changed in 
 
46 Imai Konomi, “Naze hōmen’iin wa ‘Female Professional’ toshite seiritsu shinakattanoka: 
Osaka-fu no Hōmen Fujin Hogo’iin sōsetsuan no shiryō o tōshite” [Why district 
commissioners failed to establish as a ‘Female Professional’: Through Osaka prefecture’s 
Hōmen Fujin Hogo’iin establishment plan documents], Shakai Jigyōshi Kenkyū 43 (2014): 5. 
47 Yamauchi Fukiko, “Nihon de saisho no fujin hōmen’iin” [Japan’s first female district 
commissioners], Fujin no Tomo 21.10 (1927): 85. 
48 Unno Yukinori, “Fujin hōmen’iin no kenkyū 1” [Research on female district 
commissioners 1], Shakai Jigyō 12.7 (1928): 67–68. 
49 Naimushō Shakaikyoku [Ministry of Internal Affairs Society Bureau], Fujin hōmen’iin ni 
kansuru chōsa [Survey concerning female district commissioners] (Tokyo: Naimushō 
Shakaikyoku Shakaibu, 1930), 4. 
According to this survey, the total number of female district commissioners surveyed as of 
1930 is tallied to be 322, the number is as low as 60 in Senda Chiyoko, “Onna hōmen’iin no 
shuki” [Notes of a woman district commissioner], Fujin Kōron (1931.10): 478–481. There is a 
discrepancy between the numbers, but the fact that women were a minority remains the same. 
50 Yoshida (1971), 98. 
51 Wakisaka Sakujirō, “Fujin hōmen’iin no shinshutsu” [Advancement of female district 
commissioners], Shakai Jigyō (1939.8): 40–47. 
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the 1930s, when women became responsible for protecting mothers and children, as 
well as in addressing matters related to the home. This was due to the promulgation of 
the Mother-Child Protection Law (boshi hogo-hō) in 1937 (implemented since 1938), 
aimed at rescuing mothers and children in need.52 The law targeted mothers with 
children under thirteen years old and unable to raise them due to poverty, as well as 
mothers without or lacking a spouse, which population the male district 
commissioners deemed female district commissioners more fit to address.53 Therefore 
by 1941, there were approximately 3000 female district commissioners across Japan.54 
Their work entailed offering advice to people in need so that they will not need any 
assistance in the future, especially on household matters, such as how to manage the 
household budget that women from poorer background may not know how to do.55  
 The work of female district commissioners, were not limited to helping 
mothers and children, and matters related to taking care of the physical home: similar 
to the male district commissioners, their responsibilities also included managing the 
household registry.56 The age group of the male and female district commissioners 
 
52 Nakamura Shūichi, “Josei minsei’iin, jidō’iin no rekishiteki yakuwari to tokusei” 
[Historical functions and characteristics of female welfare commissioners and child welfare 
volunteers], Kyūshū Ōtani Kenkyū Kiyō 32 (2006): 143. 
53 Wakisaka Sakujirō, “Boshi hogo no tettei to fujin hōmen’iin” [Thoroughness of mother-
child protection and female district commissioners], Shakai Jigyō 21.11.2 (1938): 51–53. 
54 “Chihō daihyō fujin hōmen’iin ni kiku” [Inquiring regional female district commissioner 
representatives], Fujin Kōron 26.10 (1941.10): 175. 
In Osaka, the proposal and the decision to include women as well as youth as part of the 
district commissioners was made in 1940. They were seen and to be treated as assistants to the 
male district commissioners, as women were thought to be not appropriate to take on the same 
roles that the men were required to fulfill in their districts. The decision to include women also 
came about because of the war and an increased interest in women to work. See Osaka-fu 
Shakaika, Osaka-fu hōmen’iin jigyō nenpō shōwa jūgonen [Osaka prefecture district 
commissioner work yearbook 1940] (Osaka: Osaka-fu Shakaika, 1941). 
55 “Chihō daihyō fujin hōmen’iin ni kiku,” 174–184.  
56 Ibid., 179–180. 
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were also the same, in that the ages of the district commissioners ranged from 51 to 60 
for both men and women.57 Furthermore, the female district commissioners, too, 
worked on a volunteer basis, also from middle to upper-middle class backgrounds: 
they consisted of midwives, members of women’s organizations, school teachers, and 
graduates of women’s schools, all educated and some with previous social work 
experience.58  
 During the wartime, both male and female district commissioners were 
involved in promoting marriage.59 While promotion of intermarriage was not an 
official part of “district work” (hōmen jigyō), female district commissioners expressed 
their support of intermarriage at the First National Women’s District Commissioner 
Conference, which was co-sponsored by the Ministry of Welfare and the All Japan 
League of District Commissioners (Zen Nihon Hōmen’iin Renmei).60 Held in Tokyo 
between October 28–29 in 1942 when the recipients of aid had been expanding due to 
the war—thus no longer unlimited to the poor—representatives of female district 
commissioners from prefectures around Japan participated in the Conference.61 The 
discussion topics ranged from reforming the citizens’ lives, edification of deceased 
 
57 Zen Nihon Hōmen’iin Renmei [All Japan League of District Commissioners], Hōmen jigyō 
nenkan shōwa jūnananendoban [District work yearbook 1942] (Tokyo: Zen Nihon Hōmen’iin 
Renmei, 1943), 193. 
58 Naimushō Shakaikyoku (1930), 4. 
59 “Senjika no kekkon mondai” [Wartime marriage problems], Shūhō 343 (1942.5.12): 21–24.  
60 All Japan League of District Commissioners (Zen Nihon Hōmen’iin Renmei), the central 
organ of the hōmen’iin (district commissioner) system, was established in 1932, which is the 
same year in which the Poor Relief Law was implemented to provide aid to those in need. The 
League became Zen Nihon Minsei’iin Renmei in 1946, and hōmen’iin also became minsei’iin, 
the welfare commissioners in the postwar period. 
61 Ichikawa Fusae, Ichikawa Fusae jiden [Autobiography of Ichikawa Fusae] (Tokyo: 
Shinjuku Shobō, 1974), 557. 
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soldiers’ families, to increasing and strengthening the population.62 The 
representatives also discussed ways to promote marriage, which they saw as a 
necessary step before having children, and raised the following tentative solutions: 1) 
popularization of marriage consultation centers; 2) research on providing social aid so 
that the youth would willingly marry; 3) offering thorough guidance and instruction on 
ways of living to prevent divorce; and 4) promoting marriage between Korean men 
and Japanese women.63 
 To what extent the promotion of Korean-Japanese marriages was put into 
effect is unclear, due to there being no detailed meeting minutes nor a follow-up 
conference after 1942. But what can be concluded from the female district 
commissioners’ support of intermarriage, is that the support came from women, who, 
like the men involved in harmony work and district work, were directly interacting 
and supporting people at the local level, and promotion of intermarriage would have 
been an extension of their regular activities that included registration of people into the 
household registration system and promotion of marriage.  
 Second group of women who supported intermarriage were those whom the 
secondary sources identify as “feminists” in modern Japanese history. One of these 
women is Yamada Waka, introduced briefly in Chapter 2. Yamada (1879–1957), was 
an ex-Ameyukisan turned feminist, who gained her reputation as a social critic, a 
 
62 “Busshi nadono hanashi hazumu fujin hōmen’iin, shushō fujin o tou” [Female district 
commissioners’ lively talk on resources and such, visit to the prime minister’s wife], Tokyo 
Asahi Newspaper, 29 October 1942: 3.  
63 Ikuta Hanayo, Kekkon zengo [Before and after marriage] (Osaka: Risseisha, 1944), 186. 
According to Ichikawa Fusae who attended the meeting, discussion on increasing and 
strengthening the population (which included discussion of promotion of marriage) was the 
liveliest (see Ichikawa [1974], 557). 
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journalist, and a female activist known for advocating for protection of motherhood.64 
The Tokyo Asahi Newspaper selected her to answer a Q&A column called Josei Sōdan 
(Advice for Women), which responded to a variety of questions, ranging from romance 
and marriage, to matters related to jobs, economics, and laws.65 The column started in 
1931, and in August of the same year, one of the featured questions was titled, “To be 
loved by a Korean man” (Chōsenjin kara ai sareru), which read: 
“I am a woman who is perplexed these days for being 
loved by a Korean man. I love him, but if I were to marry 
him, what would the society think? I would think it natural 
for me to give up [marrying him] if I were to be held in 
contempt [by the society] for the rest of my life. However, I 
cannot but be drawn to him because of his earnest attitude. I 
please ask sensei of your opinion.” 
 
And Yamada responded to the above advice-seeker as follows: 
 “If you marry a Korean man and you are held in contempt, 
those who hold you in contempt are in the wrong. If he loves 
you and you love him, it is a virtue to get married [to him]. 
You have to firmly keep in mind that you must not sacrifice 
virtue for vice.  
 I will certainly not say that it is acceptable to ignore what 
society thinks in all situations, but you may do so in your 
case. That is because [society’s opinion] is in the wrong. 
Continue to trample on the vices, and have courage in leading 
the general public to the right path.  
 His earnest love may be a treasure that you may not be 
able to obtain again. You should not lose that treasure just 
because of the society’s wrongful attitude.”66 [Emphasis in 
original.] 
 
 
64 Ameyukisan were Japanese women recruited to work as prostitutes in the United States. For 
biography of Yamada, see Yamazaki Tomoko, The Story of Yamada Waka: from Prostitute to 
Feminist Pioneer (Tokyo: Kōdansha International, 1985).   
65 Tokyo Asahi Shinbunsha, ed., Josei sōdan [Advice for women] (Tokyo: Kimura Shobō, 
1932), 4. 
66 “Josei sōdan: Chōsenjin kara ai sareru” [Advice for women: To be loved by a Korean man], 
Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, morning ed., 8 August 1931: 10. 
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 Not only was Yamada’s response contradictory to the attitudes of Japanese men 
who opposed intermarriage, but the response also disclosed that the society, too, was 
not supportive of Japanese-Korean marriages. By identifying the reactions of the 
people around the woman who asked the question (alias S-ko) as committing a “vice” 
for holding her in contempt if she married a Korean man, and further encouraging S-
ko to go ahead and marry him, her support may have been driven by assimilation 
goals, but aligned more closely with her advocacy of “free love,” as opposed to 
arranged marriages that were the norm.  
 Besides Yamada, another feminist who indirectly enabled intermarriage, was 
Tanaka Takako, who ran a marriage consultation center (kekkon sōdanjo) of Tokyo 
city, established in April 1933. Because it operated under the Tokyo city government, 
it was limited to the residents of Tokyo city, but its goal was to mediate matches 
between men and women looking for marriage partners, and staffed with women who 
took on the role of an official matchmaker, becoming the first of its kind in Japan.67   
  Tanaka (1886–1966), who was born Takanashi Takako, studied in the United 
States during the 1910s. She obtained a master’s degree in social work at University of 
Chicago, then introduced American social work in Japan after returning in 1918. In 
1919, she married philosopher Tanaka Ōdō (18??–1932), and also became an official 
 
67 “Tokyo-shi kekkon sōdanjo hanjōki” [Sketches of Tokyo city’s marriage consultation 
center], Fujokai 49.4 (1934): 80–81. There were other marriage consultation centers across 
Japan privately prior to Tokyo City’s Marriage Consultation Center. It was not until 1942 that 
a public marriage consultation was established in Osaka, which was the first in the Kansai 
region. See Osaka-shi Kita Kekkon Sōdanjo nijūgonen no ayumi [Twenty-five years of Osaka 
city’s Kita Marriage Consultation Center] (Osaka: Osaka Shiritsu Kita Shiminkan, 1967); 
Osaka-shi hōmen’iin minsei’iin seido gojūnenshi [Osaka city’s district commissioner and 
welfare commissioner system’s fifty-year history] (Osaka: Osaka-shi Minsei’iin Renmei, 
1973), 164. 
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delegate to the International Labor Conference to represent female workers. Along 
with Yamada Waka, Tanaka was also one of the ten officers selected in the New 
Women’s Association (Shin Fujin Kyōkai), the first women’s rights organization in 
Japan founded in 1919 by Oku Mumeo, Hiratsuka Raichō, and Ichikawa Fusae.68  
 Tanaka ran the marriage consultation center after her husband’s death with 
other female consultants who interviewed men and women individually. Those 
interested had to bring a family register (koseki tōhon), a form of identification (mibun 
shōmei), a résumé (rirekisho), and a photograph to the center. Then at the center, they 
filled out a form that asked for their and their family’s information, as well as what 
they looked for in a partner (Figure 3). Following a consultation, a house visit would 
be conducted by the center’s employee, who collected information from the 
applicants’ neighbors and co-workers. If and when an appropriate partner also 
registered at the center was found by the consultants, the photos were shared and an 
omiai (an arranged meeting to introduce the couples) were set up, accompanied by the 
applicants’ parents.69 The cost to sign-up was one yen, which allowed the applicants 
to find a partner over the course of one year. Although it closed down temporarily due 
to limited number of successful pairings after one year, the center re-opened due to 
high demand, pairing over one hundred couples in two years.70 
 
68 Ronald P. Loftus, Telling Lives: Women’s Self-Writing in Modern Japan (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2004), 45–51. 
69 Tanaka Takako, “Kekkon yori mitaru sesō” [Seeing Society through Marriage], Itoshiji 6.4 
(1934.4): 29–30. 
70 “Kekkon baicai no senmonka bakari no enmusubi no hōhō no zadankai” [Roundtable talk 
on ways to tie the knot with just the marriage mediation specialists], Shufu no Tomo 19.7 
(1935.7): 129. 
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Figure 3: Sample application forms for men (on the left) and for women (on the right). 
The columns are mostly the same, but the men’s form asks about military service and 
whether he smokes or drinks, while women’s form asks about special skills. The 
reverse side of the application (same for both men and women) asks for one’s honseki 
(legal domicile, or location of the family register) which would have revealed whether 
one was “Japanese” or not. (From Kekkon sōdan [Marriage consultation], edited by 
Tanaka Takako (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1943), 236–239). 
 
  There unfortunately is no statistical data on the numbers of intermarriage 
arranged at the center, because the records were burnt during the war (Tanaka in the 
postwar period wrote as though the records were burnt on purpose).71 Yet unlike the 
 
71 Tanaka Takako, “‘Kekkon sōdan’ nijūnen: Enmusubi issenkumi no kobore banashi” 
[Twenty years of marriage consultation: Episodes of 1000 married couples], Kingu 28.10 
(1952.11): 344–347. 
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Eugenic Marriage Counseling Center that was first established in 1927, staffed and 
sponsored by eugenicist Ikeda Shigenori’s Eugenic Exercise/Movement Association 
that discouraged marriage between Japanese women and Korean men recruited as 
laborers from Korea, the marriage consultation center headed by Tanaka did not have 
any rules against intermarriage.72 What mattered in finding a marriage partner for 
Tanaka were the following: 1) character; 2) physique; 3) education; 4) occupation; 5) 
income; 6) family; 7) hobbies; and 8) pedigree (i.e., good genes), not the origin of the 
individuals.73 And according to one observer of city of Tokyo’s marriage consultation 
center in 1935, at least one marriage between a Taiwanese man and a Japanese 
woman, and another between a Korean man and a Japanese woman were successfully 
paired, and reported to have been going well.74 Thus matching Japanese women to 
Korean and Taiwanese men was part of the matchmaking activities, the primary 
function of the kekkon sōdanjo.  
  Whether it be the female district commissioners during the wartime or 
Japanese feminists, what enabled Japanese women to consider promoting and/or 
supporting intermarriage between Japanese women and non-Japanese men when the 
government did not encourage nor discourage intermarriage, was the wartime 
 
72 According to Jennifer Robertson, the Eugenic Marriage Counseling Center staff attempted 
to “discourage marriages between Japanese women and Korean men” (in “Blood Talks: 
Eugenic Modernity and the Creation of New Japanese,” History and Anthropology 13.3 
(2002): 202, 205).  
73 Tanaka Takako, “Kekkon no aite o erabu ni wa” [On choosing a marriage partner], Fujo to 
Shūyō 5.5 (1936.5): 38–39. Interests and age were also factors, although a minor component 
(Tanaka Takako, “Oyomesan omukosan kouhosha hyōtenhō” [How to rate bride and gloom 
candidates], Fujin Kurabu 15.7 [1934]: 194). 
74 “Kekkon kaizen zadankai 2” [Roundtable talk on improving marriage 2], Chōsen Shakai 
Jigyō 13.6 (1935): 43. 
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population policy—the same policy that prevented Japanese male opponents against 
intermarriage from suppressing it.  
  In January 1941, the cabinet endorsed the Guidelines for Establishing 
Population Policy (Jinkō Seisaku Kakuritsu Yōkō), which aimed to increase the quality 
and quantity of the Japanese population to build a stronger military and labor force for 
the war. The goal of this policy was to reach a population of one hundred million 
people in the metropole by 1960, to be achieved by increasing the birth rate, 
decreasing the death rate, and lowering the age of marriage so that each family 
produced an average of five children, instead of the then average of four.75  
 When the slogan “umeyo fuyaseyo” (“give birth and multiply”) prevailed, 
marriage, seen as a necessary step before reproduction, thus became an important 
component of achieving the wartime population policy. To implement it, the Marriage 
Patriotism Council (Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai) developed within the Ministry of 
Welfare in 1942, one year after the cabinet endorsed the Guidelines.76 The executive 
board members consisted primarily of men from the Ministry of Welfare, but the 
Council also included women like Tanaka Takako and other feminists such as Oku 
Mumeo, Abe Shizue, and Muraoka Hanako. The purpose of the Council was also to 
promote facilities promoting marriage, such as the marriage consultation centers, and 
“enlightening” people with “correct thoughts” on marriage to achieve the goals of the 
 
75 The original document can be found on the National Institute of Population and Social 
Security Research website: www.ipss.go.jp/publication/j/shiryou/senzensiryou.asp. 
76 The Population Bureau was established within the Ministry of Welfare in August 1941, 
after the Guidelines for Establishing Population Policy was issued in January 1941 to 
implement the Guidelines. “Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai no setsuritsu” [Establishment of the 
Marriage Patriotism Council], Jinkō Mondai Kenkyū 3.2 (1942): 58; Yoshida (1971),164. 
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population policy outlined in 1941. To disseminate “correct thoughts” on marriage, 
meant eliminating the view of marriage as that between individuals with their own 
interests, and instead teaching how marriage was a crucial basis for the family state.77 
The Council also aimed to enforce the idea of marriage as the basis of the family (ie) 
and minzoku (race/ethnicity), but the ultimate goal was to strengthen and increase the 
population for the war efforts.78 
 When marriage became an interest of the state, state control over women 
increased. However, Japanese women were neither passive participants nor recipients 
of the control, since they actively participated in promoting marriage. For example, 
one of the planned activities of the Marriage Patriotism Council included publishing 
materials that promoted marriage, and since the Council’s founding, readers on 
marriage were published by and for women.79 One of such readers was Wartime 
Women’s Reader (Senji fujin dokuhon) published in 1943, which included a chapter on 
marriage patriotism by Tanaka Takako, who not only still headed Tokyo city’s 
marriage consultation center in 1943, but was a member of the Council. Prior to 
becoming a Council member, Tanaka has written an article that women would 
instinctively be against war: due to their maternal instincts, women would not want to 
give birth to and raise a child, only for that child to be killed in the war.80 Tanaka’s 
 
77 Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai [Marriage Patriotism Council], “Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai 
kaisoku” [Bylaws of Marriage Patriotism Council], July 1942, Tachi Collection (Tokyo: 
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research Library), PDFY0921647. 
78 Shakai Jigyō Kenkyūjo [Social Work Research Center], Nihon shakai jigyō nenkan shōwa 
jūhachinenban [Japan social work yearbook 1943 edition] (Tokyo: Chūō Shakai Jigyō 
Kyōkai, 1943), 130–131. 
79 Ibid., 61. 
80 Tanaka Takako, “Bosei no tachiba yori mitaru gunji kyōiku” [Military education from 
motherhood’s standpoint], Fujin no Tomo 19.2 (1925): 15–18. 
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earlier words on marriage also proposed a careful selection of a spouse, and the 
importance of romance for a marriage to be successful.81 Yet her stance changed in 
the 1940s, when she identified marriage not as a personal, private matter but a public 
matter, and how marriage was a duty for young people who needed to be willing to 
compromise when selecting a partner.82 This change is reflected in the Reader, as 
Tanaka sent a message to women, especially young women, to marry early and give 
birth to many children, through which they can serve the country.83 In a similar 
fashion, feminist Ichikawa Fusae, who was not a Council member but another 
contributor to and editor of the Reader, found it an honor for women to finally be 
recognized and acknowledged for their position as mothers of the nation. Ichikawa 
also exhorted other women to marry, then give birth to and raise children—roles that 
only women could fulfill.84 Marriage as what one does for the country is echoed by 
other Japanese women during the wartime, regardless of their membership in the 
Marriage Patriotism Council.85  
 Considering how the government was promoting marriage, Japanese women’s 
support of intermarriage was not incongruous to the government, similar to the 
members of the Harmony Association and the male district commissioners. Their 
 
81 Tanaka Takako, “Ai no kekkon seikatsu” [Marriage life of love], Fujin Gahō 1921.11.191 
(1921): 38–41. 
82 “Atarashiki kekkon no rinri o kataru” [Discussion on new marriage ethics], Hōsō 1.2 
(1941.11): 14–15. 
83 Tanaka Takako, “Kekkon hōkoku” [Marriage patriotism], Senji fujin dokuhon [Wartime 
women’s reader], edited by Ichikawa Fusae (Tokyo: Shōwa Shobō, 1943), 37–38. The change 
starts appearing in 1941 (see “Korekara no kekkon to yūsei o kataru” [To talk of marriage and 
eugenics to come], Ie no Hikari 17.1.3 [1941.1.3]: 124–131).  
84 Ichikawa Fusae, “Fujin to kokka [Women and the family state],” Senji fujin dokuhon 
[Wartime women’s reader], edited by Ichikawa Fusae (Tokyo: Shōwa Shobō, 1943), 9–10. 
85 For example, see Tanaka Takako, ed., Kekkon sōdan (1943).  
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support of intermarriage was possible because it was an extension of government-
supported activity of marriage promotion. But why was it that Japanese women 
supported intermarriage, contrary to the Japanese men who opposed it? I argued that 
there were ideological and/or practical reasons behind the support of intermarriage by 
the members of the Harmony Association and the male district commissioners. I 
would like to additionally argue that there was a practical reason for Japanese women, 
too: for female supporters, support of intermarriage (and marriage) provided a solution 
to the issue of “marriage difficulty” during the wartime. In addition, women’s support 
of intermarriage was part of their advocacy work in gaining rights for Japanese 
women. 
 Kekkon’nan, literally “marriage difficulty,” was an obstacle for women during 
the wartime: the difficulty for Japanese women to find a partner began after the 
Depression, when men chose not to marry because they were not financially stable to 
support a family. The problem exacerbated during the wartime with increasing 
financial hardships, in addition to Japanese men going away to war: marriage to 
Korean and/or Taiwanese men, then provided a solution to Japanese women who 
could not find a Japanese partner in wartime Japan.  
  Whether the partner was Japanese or not was a concern for Japanese men, such 
as Koya Yoshio, who happened to also be a member of the Marriage Patriotism 
Council.86 On the contrary, whether the partner was Japanese or not was never 
brought up by Japanese women. Yamada’s advice on finding a partner, for example, 
 
86 Matsumura Hiroyuki attributes the proposal to suppress intermarriage to Koya, in 
“‘Kokubō kokka’ no yūseigaku” [Eugenics in a “defense state”], Shirin 83.2 (2000): 125–127.  
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was to choose someone who is loving and caring. Her message remained constant 
from the 1920s, and her stance was reflected in her advice to S-ko on marrying a 
Korean man who loved her.87 Tanaka in Wartime Women’s Reader argued the 
importance of checking the partner’s kettō (pedigree, descent, or bloodline) to avoid 
marrying someone with hereditary diseases, and she further adamantly instructed 
women to avoid consanguineous marriage (ketsuzoku kekkon), but never interethnic 
marriage as did Koya. Neither warning nor dissuasion against intermarriage could be 
detected in writings by female district commissioners who considered promoting 
Korean-Japanese marriages. Instead, what was common in all of the marriage advice 
for women in finding a potential partner written by women in and out of the Marriage 
Patriotism Council, was the health of the partner. For example, in a discussion of what 
characteristics to look for in an ideal husband in a reader published in 1944, titled 
Before and After Marriage (Kekkon zengo) by Ikuta Hanayo, a friend of Tanaka 
Takako and one of the consultants at another marriage consultation center in Tokyo, 
good health was listed, but never the origin of the partner.88 Because marriage would 
have afforded security to the women in need, Japanese women supported 
intermarriage as long as there was someone healthy to whom women could marry. 
Japanese men’s reasons for not encouraging race mixing was connected with the larger 
context outside of Japan and how Japan as a country was seen by other countries, yet 
the concern for Japanese women involved in the discussion of intermarriage was more 
 
87 “Endōi musume no iku michi to michibikikata sōdankai” [Conference on the path of 
daughters with little prospect of marriage and how to guide them], Fujin Kurabu 15.2 (1934): 
164–177; Yamada Waka, Shōwa fujin dokuhon [Shōwa women’s reader] (Tokyo: Bunkyō 
Shoin, 1927). 
88 Ikuta (1944), 42. 
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connected with impact of inter/marriage to the people with whom they interacted on a 
daily basis at the local level. 
  If intermarriage provided a practical solution to address one of the social issues 
in wartime Japan, it also afforded female Japanese supporters of intermarriage to 
fulfill their own interests of advancing women’s rights, particularly, recognition of 
Japanese women as citizens. Citizenship for Japanese women, Elyssa Faison in 
“Gender and Korean Labour in Wartime Japan” writes, depended on recognition from 
the state, “according to their ability and willingness to comply with the ideal of good 
wife and wise mother, a decidedly middle-class notion of feminine roles.”89 Jennifer 
Robertson further frames “female citizenship” to have been defined “in terms of 
procreation and consumption.”90 Therefore by helping Japanese women find a 
marriage partner to be able to give birth and become a mother, the female Japanese 
supporters of intermarriage were helping Japanese women become female citizens, 
which was of interest to Japanese feminists. Their support of intermarriage was not 
necessary because their view of Korean and Taiwanese people differed from Japanese 
men. Japanese women’s primary concern and interest were Japanese women, for 
whom intermarriage provided one way to access privilege of becoming a citizen as a 
reproductive wife and mother—protection by the state.  
 
 
89 Japanese male citizenship “focused on men’s rights and obligations as household heads, 
rights of political participation including voting, and military conscription,” which Japanese 
women did not have. Elyssa Faison, “Gender and Korean Labour in Wartime Japan,” Gender 
and Labour in Korea and Japan: Sexing Class, edited by Ruth Barraclough and Elyssa Faison 
(London: Routledge, 2009): 28.  
90 Robertson (2002): 203.  
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Conclusion 
  The Japanese government’s stance on intermarriage was to neither encourage 
nor discourage it, thus there was no official, national promotion of Japanese-Korean 
and/or Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in the metropole. However, there were groups in 
the metropole that supported intermarriage, mostly Japanese-Korean marriages, which 
were the Harmony Association, the district commissioners, and Japanese women, who 
were all involved in activities that involved aiding people at the local level. These 
groups’ support of intermarriage could be attributed to ideological and/or practical 
reasons, and it was possible to support intermarriage because it was an extension of 
their regular activities that were sanctioned by the government—assimilation of 
people from the colonies, social work, and promotion of marriage. Because their 
promotion and/or support of intermarriage was not contradictory to the government, 
their view of Korean and Taiwanese people should not be considered entirely different 
from the view of Japanese men in/or working with the government that chose not to 
promote intermarriage. 
  In the case of Japanese women examined in the latter half of this chapter, 
reasons for supporting intermarriage included a practical reason to address the 
problem of kekkon’nan. They were able to express their support of intermarriage, 
because the government also promoted marriage as part of its population policy in 
wartime Japan. But as a result of their collaboration with the wartime government in 
fulfilling their own interests to advance their and other women’s rights and claim 
citizenship, their stories were forgotten in the postwar period. For example, scholars 
attribute the district commissioners’ collaboration with the government, willing or not, 
  133 
as the reason why many of the wartime records regarding district commissioners were 
discarded after the war.91 Among those who are forgotten includes Yamada Waka, 
whose participation as a feminist is being reappraised.92  
  Jun Uchida, in her study of Japanese settlers in colonial Korea that aimed to 
complicate their roles as more than a simple collaborator of the government, used the 
word “brokers of empire” to refer to those who acted to fulfill their interests, while 
functioning as intermediaries between the state and the people.93 I thus used the term 
in the title to not only show that Japanese women were not passive collaborators, 
which existing studies on Japanese women claim,94 but also to make a connection 
between Japanese women at home and the Japanese empire when it may not be 
explicit: I argue that although Japanese women may have been well-intentioned in 
their support of inter/marriage so that Japanese women could become wives and 
mothers, which determined Japanese women’s citizenship and privilege attached to 
being recognized as a citizen, their conformity to the definition of a female citizen as a 
 
91 Nakamura Shūichi concludes that the district commissioners were forced to collaborate 
([2006]: 144). But Nagaoka Masami points to the hōmen’iin’s invasion of human rights and 
privacy in the process of offering aid to those in need, thus not a passive collaborator ([1999], 
967). Herbert Liu also mentions the hōmen’iin’s collaboration with the war effort (in “Social 
Work in Japan,” Social Work in East Asia, edited by Christian Aspalter [Farnham, Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2014], 15–32), while Yamamoto Keitarō who identifies the hōmen’iin as unwilling 
collaborators similar to Nakamura, attribute the collaboration as reasons for the discarding of 
documents (in “Hōmen’iin seido, soshiki no henka ni tsuite” [On district commissioner policy 
and organization change], Fukkoku Senjika Osaka-fu hōmen jōmuiinkai giji sokkiroku [Osaka: 
Kinki Chiiki Fukushi Gakkai, Osaka-fu Hōmen’iin Katsudō Shiryō Kenkyūsha, 1999], 970). 
92 E.g., Yamazaki (1985) and Ayako Kano, Japanese Feminist Debates: A Century of 
Contention on Sex, Love, and Labour (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2016).   
93 Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), 5–8. 
94 For example, Japanese Women: New Feminist Perspectives on the Past, Present, and 
Future, edited by Kumiko Fujimura-Fanselow and Atsuko Kameda (The Feminist Press at 
City University of New York, 1995) and Gendering Japanese History, edited by Barbara 
Molony and Kathleen Uno (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005).    
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woman who became a reproductive wife and mother reinforced the social hierarchy in 
imperial Japan that discriminated against those who could not be citizens. 
  If the social hierarchy in wartime Japan was to be illustrated in a pyramid, then 
the emperor would be at the top, and all the imperial subjects under the emperor. 
Theoretically, Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese, as imperial subjects would be 
equidistant to the emperor at the top. Yet in reality, Japanese were above Koreans and 
Taiwanese: if broken down by gender, Japanese men would be at the top, and Korean 
and Taiwanese women at the bottom. The middle section, however, would not be 
clear-cut between Japanese women and Korean or Taiwanese men, because as Korean 
or Taiwanese, the men were treated as second-class citizens in Japan. Yet Korean and 
Taiwanese men could vote in Japan under universal male suffrage, while Japanese 
women could not.95 And within this middle section under Japanese men and above 
Korean and Taiwanese women, the stratum of Japanese women could further be 
stratified between reproductive and non-reproductive women, which determined 
Japanese women’s citizenship. Those who could bear children, and if not, advocate for 
it, could claim and be treated as a citizen, and move up the social hierarchy. Yet those 
who could not, for example, due to genetic illnesses or diseases thought to be genetic 
(e.g., Hansen’s disease and mental illnesses), were sterilized and faced forced 
 
95 Korean and Taiwanese men living and registered as residents in Japan could vote in 
Japanese elections after 1925. Voting rights, however, were not extended to the colonies. Vera 
Mackie, “Picturing political space in 1920s and 1930s Japan,” Nation and Nationalism in 
Japan, edited by Sandra Wilson (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 41; 
Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan, edited by Sonia Ryang and John Lie 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 5, 127, 197n9. 
  135 
abortion, hence deprived of their reproductive abilities.96 And those who could not 
reproduce and thus could not perform the roles expected of a female citizen—
motherhood for women advocated by Japanese feminists during the wartime—were 
not protected by the state and made disposable, such as the “comfort women.”  
  Thus by supporting inter/marriage that enabled Japanese women in Japan find 
partners, the Japanese women were inadvertently contributing to and perpetuating the 
system in which those who were not Japanese, not male, not in a heterosexual 
relationships, not abled, and/or lacking reproductive ability, were marginalized and 
discriminated in the imperial Japanese society. Even in the metropole, one could have 
contributed to imperialism, albeit indirectly, even if well-meaning and not involved in 
assimilation efforts such as the members of the Harmony Association and the male 
district commissioners.  
  Getting intermarried provided advantages to Japanese women who could then 
become wives and mothers, yet the female supporters of intermarriage were all in the 
position above helping those below, and they were not intermarried themselves. With 
the exception of a few members of the Harmony Association, who were the people 
who intermarried? The next chapter will distinguish those who promoted/supported 
intermarriage from people who intermarried to examine the latter group in-depth. 
Having examined the policies and promoters, the last two chapters will address the 
patterns of intermarriage in imperial Japan. 
 
96 1940’s National Eugenics Law (kokumin yūsei-hō) prohibited abortion and birth control, 
but sterilization and abortion on eugenic grounds were sanctioned. Andrea Germer, Vera 
Mackie, and Ulrike Wöhr, “Introduction: Gender, nation and state in modern Japan,” Gender, 
Nation, and State in Modern Japan (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 10.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Examining the Patterns of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese Marriages 
in Imperial Japan and Making a Case for Inclusive History 
 
  Chapters 2 and 3 explained why intermarriage was neither encouraged nor 
discouraged at the national level despite oppositions from Japanese men, while the 
previous chapter demonstrated that there were supporters of intermarriage who 
promoted and/or supported intermarriage as a part of their ordinary activities that 
involved providing aid to people in need at the local level. The lack of a large scale, 
Japan-wide promotion may explain the following low numbers of marriages recorded 
between Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese, from a compilation of reference materials 
that the Investigating Committee on Political Treatment of Koreans and Taiwanese 
Residents (Chōsen oyobi Taiwan Seiji Shogū Chōsakai) compiled in 1944 to 
determine how to treat Koreans and Taiwanese residing in Japan.1 
     
 Location Husband (Japanese) Wife (Japanese) Year 
Japan 
(Japanese-
Korean 
Marriages) 
183 (133 unregistered, 
50 registered) 
9760 (7214 unregistered, 
2363 registered) Shōwa 14 (1939) 
  
Korea 
(Japanese-
Korean 
Marriages) 
1009 (645 unregistered, 
364 registered) 
1606 (734 unregistered, 
872 registered) Shōwa 17 (1942) 
  
Taiwan 
(Japanese-
Taiwanese 
Marriages) 
187 (registered) 596 (registered) Shōwa 19 (1944) 
  
     
 
1 Numbers taken from Naimushō Kanrikyoku [Ministry of Internal Affairs Administrative 
Bureau], “Chōsen, Taiwanjin to naichijin to no tsūkonjōkyō” [Situation of intermarriage 
between Koreans, Taiwanese, and Japanese], 1944, Japan Center for Asian Historical 
Records, A15060174000, www.digital.archives.go.jp/das/image/M0000000000000325037. 
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Titled “Intermarriage situation of Koreans, Taiwanese, and Japanese,” this data is not 
comprehensive: there is no data on unregistered Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in 
Taiwan, nor any data of Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in Japan. But these numbers 
reveal that intermarriage was not a common occurrence in Japan. The numbers also 
reveal that there were more Japanese-Korean marriages, and how more Japanese 
women, Korean men, and Taiwanese men intermarried compared to Japanese men, 
Korean women, and Taiwanese women in all three locations.  
  Since the people who supported intermarriage were not necessarily the ones 
engaged in intermarriage—with the exceptions of Korean members of the Harmony 
Association with Japanese wives—who were the people who intermarried? Why did 
Japanese women, Korean men, and Taiwanese men intermarry more frequently than 
Japanese men, Korean women, and Taiwanese women? And for what reason did they 
intermarry? Were the people who intermarried less discriminatory? Were there any 
advantages to intermarriage, just as there were advantages to the Japanese feminist 
supporters of intermarriage, who could demonstrate their patriotism to the state while 
working in the interests of advancing women’s rights? And when Japanese-Korean 
and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages were a minor phenomenon in history, why study 
them? In what ways can their history be included into history?  
  This chapter is guided by three main questions. The first question, is “Why did 
people intermarry?” In this section, I introduce the three dominant narratives of 
intermarriage—intermarriage as a tragedy, romance, or hypergamy—to argue for 
consideration of other narratives, because existing ones exclude cases of Japanese-
Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriage that were not a result of force, love, or 
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marrying up, and cases that cannot be fully explained by the “colonizer” and 
“colonized” categories alone. My second question is again, “Why did people 
intermarry?” But this section aims to find similarities with the reasons why people 
married in general. Focusing on wartime Japan, I argue in favor of studying the history 
of intermarriage not in isolation and/or limited to colonial categories, to reveal factors 
beyond gender, race/ethnicity, and class that led people to intermarry: I propose 
studying minority and mainstream histories together and looking for similarities 
instead of differences, because it could be helpful in conceiving ways to de-
marginalize the history of minorities, such as the history of intermarriage, and also to 
locate assumptions made in historiography. Based on an assumption that I observed in 
examining intermarriages together with non-intermarriages in wartime Japan, I make a 
case for inclusion of asexuality in historical analyses to write a more inclusive history 
in the last and final section of this chapter, which asks “Why study people who 
intermarried?” Because expanding the framework of sexuality to include asexuality 
enables studying historical figures who are still unrepresented in history and 
challenging the deniers of history, and making this case was made possible by 
studying Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages, I further argue in favor 
of and seek to advocate studying the history of intermarriage and other histories of 
minorities.  
 
Why did people intermarry?—Part 1  
  The numbers of registered interethnic marriages have gradually increased over 
the twentieth century, yet even in the last years of the imperial period, the numbers 
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were significantly less than the total number of marriages recorded in Japan. To 
explain the low numbers and why the common pattern of intermarriage in Japan was 
not that between colonizing men and colonized women seen in other empires, scholars 
have attributed to people’s resistance and the failure of the intermarriage policy as an 
assimilationist policy.2 For example, Suzuki Yūko argues that the low number of 
Japanese-Korean marriages, especially between Japanese men and Korean women, 
was a sign of Korean women’s resistance to the assimilationist policy that aimed to 
“deprive Koreans’ ethnicity.”3 Lee Jeong-Seon attributes the low social standing of 
Korean women as one reason behind the low numbers, particularly of Korean women 
engaging in intermarriage.4 Whether Taiwanese women also resisted is unclear, but 
according to Miyazaki Seiko, they were not targeted to intermarry in colonial Taiwan, 
because they were viewed with skepticism by the Government General of Taiwan.5  
  Another reason attributed to the low numbers is the presence of Japanese 
discrimination against Koreans and Taiwanese.6 For example, Japanese women were 
 
2 Kim Yŏngdal, “Nihon no Chōsen tōchi-ka ni okeru ‘tsūkon’ to ‘konketsu’—iwayuru ‘naisen 
kekkon’ no hōsei, tōkei, seisaku ni tsuite” [Japan’s “intermarriage” and “blood mixing” in 
colonial Korea: on laws, statistics, and policies of the so-called “Japanese-Korean marriage”], 
Kansai Daigaku Jinken Mondai Kenkyūshitsu Kiyō 39 (1999): 1–46 
3 Suzuki Yūko, Jūgun ianfu, naisen kekkon [Comfort women, Japanese-Korean marriage] 
(Tokyo: Miraisha, 1992). 
4 Lee Jeong-Seon, “Chŏnshichejegi ilcheŭi chongdongwŏn jŏngchaekkwa 'naesŏnhonhyŏl' 
munje” [The Total Mobilization System during Wartime and the Policy for the Japanese-
Korean Hybrid Population], Yŏksamunjeyŏngu 29 (2013.4): 217–255; Lee Jeong-Seon, 
“‘Naisen Kekkon’ ni miru teikoku Nihon no Chōsen tōchi to koseki” [Imperial Japan’s rule 
over Korea and household registration as see in “Japanese-Korean marriage”], Chōsenshi 
Kenkyūkai Ronbunshū 52 (2014): 69–97. 
5 Miyazaki Seiko, “‘Naitai kyōkon’ to shokuminchi ni okeru Taiwan josei seinendan no 
ichizuke” [“Japanese-Taiwanese intermarriage” and the position of women’s organization in 
colonial Taiwan], Nantōshigaku 70 (2007): 83–97 
6 Nam Bujin, “‘Naisen kekkon’ no bungaku: Jang Hyeokju no Nihongo sakuhin o chūshin ni” 
[Literature of “Japanese-Korean marriage”: Focus on Japanese works of Jang Hyeokju], 
Jinbun Ronshū: Shizuoka Daigaku Jinbungakubu Shakaigakka, Gengogakka Kenkyū Hōkoku 
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discouraged from marrying Korean or Taiwanese men by their families, and at times 
cut off from the family due to the family’s prejudice against Korean or Taiwanese 
men.7 The oppositions from people surrounding the individuals who planned to 
intermarry due to discrimination were visible in the stories covered in the press 
(Chapter 2) and the cases reported by the district commissioners (Chapter 4).  
  Despite the discrimination and the lack of the Japanese government’s proactive 
promotion of intermarriage, however, there were still people who intermarried. Who 
were they, and why did they intermarry? There are three main narratives through 
which scholars explain the history of intermarriage: The first common narrative is that 
of intermarriage as a tragedy. Intermarriage is viewed as one of the assimilationist 
policies that was forced onto the people, particularly to the detriment of Koreans and 
Taiwanese. Suzuki’s work is representative of this, in that she views intermarriage 
policy as a way to eliminate Korean’s ethnicity by attempting to assimilate Koreans 
from the blood level. Thus the royal marriage between Korean prince Yi Ŭn and 
Japanese princess Nashimoto Masako, because the two did not have a say in their 
marriage, is given as an example of “tragedy.”8 Suzuki also sees Japanese-Korean 
marriages functioning as one way to forcefully keep Korean laborers in Japan from 
leaving through allocation of Japanese women, in which Korean men became victims 
of the Japanese state, and Japanese women became victims and victimizers.9 Cho 
 
55.1 (2004): 205; Sakaguchi Naoki, Senzen Dōshisha no Taiwan ryūgakusei: Kirisutokyō 
kokusai shugi no genryū o tadoru [Taiwanese study abroad students at prewar Dōshisha: 
Tracing the source of Christian internationalism] (Tokyo: Hakuteisha, 2002), 15.  
7 Miyazaki (2007).  
8 Suzuki (1992), 76, 88–93.  
9 Ibid., 85.  
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Kyŏngdal’s discussion of Japanese-Korean marriages in his book on colonial Korea 
and Japan that highlights the violence of colonialism, also echoes Suzuki’s view of 
Japanese-Korean marriages as a tragedy. Viewing intermarriage as Japanese 
colonizers’ assimilationist attempt to eliminate Korean ethnicity, Cho gives examples 
of how the rate of divorce was higher than the rate of marriage in Japanese-Korean 
marriages, to point out the unsuccessfulness, in addition to the tragic cases in which 
Japanese husbands sold their Korean wives to the pleasures quarters after divorce.10   
  The tragedy narrative is particularly prominent in the postwar period in Japan. 
For example, Morita Yoshio’s memoir of repatriation from Korea published in 1964 
includes a record of a Japanese woman who was coaxed into intermarriage and 
claimed to have been “sacrificed for naisen ittai” as one of the “tragedies” during the 
repatriation period. This woman and her Korean husband were praised as a “model 
couple” and featured in newspapers during the colonial period, but “abandoned by 
Japanese and Koreans” after the war ended even though they were forced to 
intermarry.11 Another example that follows the tragic narrative is from a magazine 
called Ushio, which in 1972 featured testimonies of people who intermarried during 
the imperial period and living in South Korea at the time, along with commentaries by 
social critics who criticized the Japanese government and called for recognition of its 
responsibilities to take care of people who intermarried and were forgotten.12 
 
10 Cho Kyŏngdal, Shokuminchi Chōsen to Nihon [Colonial Korea and Japan] (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 2013), 174–175.  
11 Morita Yoshio, Chōsen shūsen no kiroku: Beiso ryōgun no shinchū to Nihonjin no hikiage 
[A record of the end of war in Korea: Advance of American and Soviet troops and repatriation 
of the Japanese] (Tokyo: Gannandō Shoten, 1964), 820.  
12 Ōta Ryū, “Koumi-san o jisatsu saseta nowa dareka,” Lee Hoesung, “Dōhō kankaku ga 
towareru,” and Fujisaki Yasuo, “Kokuseki o kesareta zaikan Nihonjin,” in “Tokushū: ‘Kimin’ 
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Historian and non-fiction writer Yamazaki Tomoko in a more recent series of articles 
on history of Asian women from 2007, introduces the story of Japanese-Korean 
marriages as a “tragedy” that poses as a “deep, grievous problem” for both Japanese 
and Koreans. According to Yamazaki, it was a tragedy because Koreans had no option 
but to follow the Japanese government’s policy and promotion of intermarriage, and 
because of the poor postwar situation of Japanese women left in Korea.13 
  Framing the history of intermarriage as a tragedy brings attention to the 
discriminatory and the violent aspects of colonialism. It sheds light on Japanese 
government’s and people’s role as colonizers and victimizers during the imperial 
period, and cases of intermarriage that were forced.14 But the problem with viewing 
people who intermarried as victims, is that it assumes intermarriage was a national 
policy that was enforced by the government when it was not. Thus it overlooks the 
roles and presence of supporters of intermarriage at the local level, such as the district 
commissioners who helped Japanese and Koreans in Japan register their marriages. It 
also leaves out the stories of people who were not forced into intermarriage and may 
not see themselves as victims of the government. Kim Yŏngdal criticizes this 
 
ni sareta Kankoku no Nihonjinzuma” [Special feature: Japanese wives rendered “abandoned 
people” in South Korea], Ushio 153 (1972.5): 196–252. 
13 Yamazaki Tomoko, “Okisarareta Nihon josei tachi (jō) ‘naisen kekkon’ to ‘tairiku 
hanayome” [Japanese women left forgotten (part one) “Japanese-Korean marriage” and 
“continental brides], Sekai (2007.3): 277, 280.  
14 For example, Yamazaki Tomoko, who tells the history of intermarriage as a tragedy, 
explains her time spent living with a young Korean man in her early twenties during the 
1950s, during which time she experienced ethnic discrimination and realized her ignorance 
about Asia as a Japanese person, as what led to her research on Japan’s interactions with other 
Asian countries from women’s standpoint. Yamazaki Tomoko, “Ajia Josei Kōryūshi Kenkyū” 
[Research on Asian women’s history of exchange], Minato no Hito, 
www.minatonohito.jp/products/020_02.html. 
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narrative, too, as a “personal affront” to people who intermarried.15 Moreover, the 
tragedy narratives are based on postwar testimonies from people who intermarried 
before 1945, and “discovered” in a poor state in South Korea in the 1960s and the 
1970s. But what about people who intermarried and were living in Japan or Taiwan? 
Were all intermarriages in the Japanese empire forced? And did all intermarriages 
from the imperial period result in a tragic ending?  
  The second narrative is the romance narrative, in which those who intermarried 
are explained to have married out of love. For example, Yamazaki describes the story 
of a Japanese woman named Murakami Haru and her unregistered marriage to Seo 
Won-rok as a romance story, taken from Keishū Nazare’en (1982) by Kamisaka 
Fuyuko, which featured stories of Japanese women who intermarried during the 
imperial period, found in South Korea in the postwar period, and taken care of at the 
Gyeongju Nazareth Gardens. Murakami fell in love with Seo, whom she met in Japan. 
She ran away from home and lived with Seo for one year, until she was discovered a 
year later by the police because her parents reported her missing. At the time of her 
discovery, Murakami was already pregnant, and she escaped to Korea to be with Seo 
when her parents refused to allow her to marry Seo. Yet in Korea, Murakami found out 
that Seo was already married with a Korean wife, and she miscarried out of shock. 
This story is told as a romance story, because Seo chose to live with Murakami in a 
separate house from his Korean family.16 
  The romance narrative would also include the case of Tauchi Chizuko, a 
 
15 Kim (1999): 44.  
16 Yamazaki (2007): 285–286.  
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Japanese woman who married a Korean man, Yoon Chi-ho, known as the “leader of 
beggars,” in 1938. Her story of taking care of Korean orphans in an orphanage in 
Korea from the colonial period with her husband, and through the Korean War and 
beyond after her husband’s death, appears in books and articles about her life and 
lifework as “love that crossed borders” and as a sign of hope.17 For example, an 
article in Korea Times by Kim Mi-kyoung, professor at Hiroshima City University’s 
Hiroshima Peace Institute on remembering Tauchi Chizuko, frames the story as a 
“heartfelt inspiration” amidst political divisions over history between Japan and South 
Korea, in 2015.18 Other stories that would fall under this category would include that 
of S-ko who wrote to Yamada Waka to ask whether she should marry a Korean man 
whom she loves, as well as the district commissioner’s case of helping a Japanese 
woman KiXX, who eloped with a Korean man named Choi to Korea, but forcibly 
brought back to Japan by her family (Chapter 4). 
  The romance narrative addresses cases of intermarriage in which people were 
not forced into intermarriage, but may ignore the larger context. Kirsten Ziomek, in 
attempting to write the histories of subalterns in colonial history, demonstrates how 
Yayutz Bleyh, an Atayal woman, was taken advantage of by the Japanese colonial 
government, by examining Yayutz’s marriage to a Japanese man, Nakano Chūzō, in 
Taiwan as more than a “love story” as it was sensationalized.19 Kamoto Itsuko, in her 
 
17 For example, see Moriyama Satoshi, Shinju no uta: Kankoku koji no haha Tauchi Chizuko 
no shōgai [Song of a pearl: Life of Tauchi Chizuko, mother of Korean orphans] (Tokyo: 
Shinju no Uta Kankō Iinkai, 1983).  
18 Kim Mi-kyoung, “Remembering Tauchi Chizuko,” 30 July 2015, The Korea Times, 
www.koreatimes.co.kr:80/www/news/opinion/2015/09/197_183833.html. 
19 Kirsten Ziomek, “The Possibility of Liminal Colonial Subjecthood: Yayutz Bleyh and the 
Search for Subaltern Histories in the Japanese Empire,” Critical Asian Studies 47.1 (2015): 
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book on “international marriage” that contains a discussion of Japanese-Korean 
marriages, is also critical of students who romanticize “international marriage” for 
overlooking and ignoring history.20 There is an additional danger of the romance 
narrative in commodifying those who intermarry and their children as “emblems of 
multiculturalism.”21 Thus those who intermarried despite the unwelcoming 
environment may present an inspirational story and pose as signs of hope, but it cannot 
fully explain the pattern of why there were more pairs between Japanese women and 
Korean or Taiwanese men, versus pairs of Japanese men and Korean or Taiwanese 
women.  
  To better analyze why people intermarried—neither out of force nor 
romance—recent studies are examining the factors that led to the particular patterns of 
intermarriage in the Japanese empire, where more colonizing women married 
colonized men. The third common explanation for intermarriage in the Japanese 
empire is hypergamy, particularly for Korean and Taiwanese men. For example, Su 
Yun Kim examines Japanese-Korean marriages against the “archival grain”: instead of 
associating intermarriage solely with assimilation, she analyzes how male Korean 
intellectuals could climb the social hierarchy through control of Japanese women to 
reveal the precariousness of the colonial social hierarchy.22 Through marriage to 
 
125–130.  
20 Kamoto Itsuko, Kokusai kekkonron!?: Rekishihen [International marriage theory?!: History 
edition] (Kyoto: Hōritsu Bunkasha, 2008).  
21 Stephen Small and Rebecca C. King-O’Riain, “Global Mixed Race: An Introduction,” in 
Global Mixed Race, edited by Rebecca C. King-O’Riain, Stephen Small, Minelle Mahtani, 
Miri Song, and Paul Spickard (New York and London: New York University Press, 2014), 
viii. 
22 Su Yun Kim, “Racialization and Colonial Space: Intermarriage in Yi Hyosŏk’s Works,” 
Journal of Korean Studies 18.1 (Spring 2013): 29–59.  
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Japanese women, especially if they entered into the wife’s family, Korean and 
Taiwanese men could become Japanese, and move up from the position of second-
class citizens.23 And this is used to explain why many elite Korean and Taiwanese 
men, who were doctors and lawyers, married Japanese women, as marrying Japanese 
women meant marrying up. There were also economic benefits to Korean and 
Taiwanese men who married Japanese women, as they could earn a better salary 
compared to other Korean and Taiwanese men who did not intermarry.24 This further 
explains why Korean and Taiwanese men who married Japanese women were not 
limited to elite men and consisted of laborers from the colonies residing in Japan. 
  Intermarriage as a form of hypergamy for Korean and Taiwanese men could 
explain marriages that did not fall under the tragedy and the romance narratives, but it 
does not address the appeals of intermarriage for Japanese women in Japan, where 
most of the intermarriage took place, considering that their marriage to Korean or 
Taiwanese men were opposed by parents and the people surrounding them.25 The 
three existing narratives could also overlook other reasons why people married, such 
 
23 Huang Chiachi, “Dainiji Sekai Taisen zengo no Nihon ni okeru Taiwan shusshinsha no 
teijūka no ichikatei: Raifu kōsu no shiten kara” [A Process of the Taiwanese Resident’s 
settlement into Japan before and after the World War II from the viewpoint of their life 
courses], Kaikō Toshi Kenkyū 3 (March 2008): 134. 
24 Takeshita Shūko, Kokusai kekkon no shakaigaku [Sociology of international marriage] 
(Tokyo: Gakubunsha, 2000), 57; Takeshita Shūko, Kokusai kekkon no shosō [Various aspects 
of international marriage] (Tokyo: Gakubunsha, 2004), 14.  
25 In Korea and Taiwan, one explanation for why more Japanese women intermarried than 
Japanese men, is the unpopularity of Japanese women born in the colonies for Japanese men, 
who returned to Japan to find Japan-born Japanese wives. See Gaichi Bunka Kyōkai [Colonial 
Culture Association], Gaichi fujin seikatsu to kekkon [Lives of women in the colonies and 
marriage] (Tokyo: Fujin no Iesha,1942). Takenaka Nobuko also notes how Japanese men from 
the colonies returned to Japan to find Japanese wives, instead of marrying Japanese women 
born and raised in the colonies. See Shokuminchi Taiwan no Nihon josei seikatsushi: 
Shōwahen, jō [Japanese women’s life history in colonial Taiwan: Shōwa edition, part one] 
(Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 2001), 142, 219.  
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as religious and practical reasons:  
  For example, religion seems to have played a role in the case of a male 
Taiwanese Christian graduate of Dōshisha University, Reverend Chou Tsai-tz’u, the 
first student to study abroad from Taiwan in 1905. He married a Japanese woman 
named Katsumi Chiyo, who was a graduate of Dōshisha Women’s College, whose 
three brothers knew Chou from Dōshisha, a Christian institution.26 Religion also 
connected Tauchi and Yoon, who were both Christians. Yamada Waka, who supported 
a Japanese woman’s marriage to a Korean man and judged the Japanese society that 
discriminated Koreans as “wrong,” was also Christian.27 To what extent and how 
religion and/or religious figures were involved in intermarriage is unclear, but it is a 
factor that is overlooked when we focus only on race/ethnicity, gender, and class in 
analyzing colonizer-colonized relationships.  
  There were also cases of intermarriage in which people married for practical 
reasons. One example, is from Huang Chiachi’s interview with a Taiwanese man 
identified as A.M., who had an arranged marriage to a Japanese woman in 1944. The 
Japanese woman’s father, who made a living selling shoes, arranged his daughter’s 
marriage to A.M., because even though he was Taiwanese and considered a “second-
class citizen,” his income was higher and the Japanese father’s business was struggling 
 
26 Sakaguchi, in his study of the Taiwanese study abroad students, points out that Katsumi’s 
parents were progressive for allowing their daughter to access education, but they still had 
opposed her marriage to Chou. Sakaguchi (2002), 13–26. 
27 “Josei sōdan: Chōsenjin kara ai sareru” [Advice for women: To be loved by a Korean man], 
Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, 8 August 1931: 10. In biography of Yamada authored by Yamazaki 
Tomoko, she claims that Yamada’s opinions and moral positions were influenced partly by 
her Christianity (the other factors that influenced her were her life in America and her past as a 
sex worker). See The Story of Yamada Waka: from Prostitute to Feminist Pioneer (Tokyo: 
Kōdansha International, 1985), 142.  
  148 
during the wartime.28  
  Such practical and religious reasons may be overlooked in the dominant 
narratives, because the existing mainstream narratives are based on and limited to the 
context of colonial history, in which Japanese are strictly categorized into the position 
of the “colonizer,” assumed to have had more power, and Koreans and Taiwanese into 
the “colonized” category, in which they are seen to lack power and at a disadvantage. 
This leads to those who were “forced” into intermarriage as victims of Japanese 
colonialism and viewing of “love” stories as signs of hope that overcame 
discrimination. This is not surprising, because existing history of intermarriage 
focuses on intermarriage in colonial Korea and Taiwan. Association of colonizer as the 
powerful and colonized as powerless may work in explaining colonizer-colonized 
relationships, such as those in the modern Euro-American empires, where the common 
pattern was that between white, colonizing men and colonized women of color. Yet in 
the Japanese empire where the most frequent pattern of intermarriage was that 
between colonizing women and colonized men, in which race/ethnicity and gender 
power dynamics did not run parallel, there is a limit to what the “colonizer” and 
“colonized” categories can explain. The hypergamy narrative begins to address the 
pattern of intermarriage in the Japanese empire, and it explains why more Korean and 
Taiwanese men intermarried. To further explore the appeals of intermarriage, 
particularly for Japanese women in the metropole who were not forced into marriage 
nor married out of love, and also those who are excluded from the existing narratives, 
 
28 Huang (2008): 134–135. 
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I propose studying the history of intermarriage in the context of modern and imperial 
Japanese history, focusing on the similarities instead of the differences with 
endogamous (Japanese-Japanese) marriages. While race/ethnicity, gender, and class 
are primary categories used in analyzing interracial/interethnic relationships in 
imperial and colonial studies, I believe that there were other factors that could explain 
the patterns of intermarriage in imperial Japan.  
 
Why did people intermarry?—Part 2 
  This section will compare exogamous (Japanese-Korean and Japanese-
Taiwanese) marriages and endogamous (Japanese-Japanese) marriages, particularly 
during the wartime in Japan when the number of intermarriages increased. Because 
existing studies focus on intermarriage in Korea and Taiwan as a form of assimilation 
in colonial history, I place it in Japan as part of modern and imperial Japanese history, 
to attempt to write a more comprehensive history of intermarriage beyond those told in 
the tragedy, romance, and hypergamy narratives. Following the warning Rosemary 
Breger and Rosanna Hill make in Cross-Cultural Marriage, that “preoccupation with 
race, ethnicity, Other—that is, with difference—blurs the fact that there are so many 
other facets affecting cross-cultural encounters,”29 I focus on similarities between 
Japanese-Japanese marriages and Japanese-Korean/Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in 
Japan. I believe that exploring the similarities rather than examining the history of 
intermarriage in isolation, can reveal factors besides race/ethnicity, gender, and class 
 
29 Rosemary Breger and Rosanna Hill, “Introducing Mixed Marriages,” Cross-Cultural 
Marriage: Identity and Choice, edited by Rosemary Anne Breger and Rosanna Hill (Oxford: 
Berg, 1998), 11. 
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that led to intermarriage, so that the people who intermarried but are excluded from 
the existing narratives can be included. I also argue in favor of examining similarities 
to conceive ways to write a more inclusive history and to reveal assumptions in 
historiography that remain unquestioned. 
  One of the similarities that I propose be considered, is the context in which 
interethnic and non-interethnic marriages took place: in wartime Japan, men and 
women of marriageable age were subject to the state’s promotion of marriage. Since 
the Ministry of Welfare issued the Guidelines for Establishing Population Policy 
(Jinkō Seisaku Kakuritsu Yōkō) in January 1941, it established the Marriage Patriotism 
Council (Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai) as a way to promote marriage to achieve the goal 
of increasing the Japanese population to 100 million by 1960, because marriage was 
seen as a prerequisite to giving birth to increase the population.30 The Ministry of 
Welfare also issued the “Ten Maxims on Marriage” (kekkon jikkun) found in various 
outlets. For example, one of the places that introduced the “Ten Maxims,” was in an 
article titled “From now on marriage should be like this,” in Shashin Shūhō (Weekly 
Photographical Journal), a weekly pictorial journal that functioned as “part of the 
government’s publicity policy.”31 Published in April 1942, the piece called for 
healthy marriages in order to increase the number of healthy people for the 
construction of Greater East Asia, and included the “Ten Maxims”: 1) Pick someone 
you can trust as life’s significant other; 2) Pick someone who is both physically and 
 
30 Ichikawa Fusae, ed., Fujinkai no dōkō [Trends in women’s world] (Tokyo: Bunmatsudō 
Shuppan, 1944), 90–97.  
31 “A Window into the Early Shōwa Period—Shashin Shūhō: Weekly Photographical Journal, 
1938–1945,” Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, www.jacar.go.jp/english/shuhou-
english/home.html. 
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mentally healthy; 3) Exchange each other’s health information; 4) Pick someone 
without bad heredity; 5) Avoid consanguineous marriages; 6) Marry as early as 
possible; 7) Do not be bound by superstitions and conventions; 8) Respect the opinion 
of parents and elders; 9) Keep the ceremonies simple and register immediately; and 
10) Give birth and raise them for the country.32 Health was important, but there were 
no instructions against choosing a non-Japanese spouse.  
  Promotion of marriage as a means of achieving the population policy goals 
also became known as the “new system of marriage” (kekkon shintaisei), in which 
marriage was increasingly seen to be tied to and for the state, and the state gave 
instructions on marriage.33 This was also the time when umeyo fuyaseyo (“give birth 
and multiply”) campaign prevailed, during which time those who gave birth to many 
children were awarded for their patriotism and efforts for the country.34 Consideration 
of how the government nationally promoted marriages and awarded people who 
married to have children, especially when there were no instructions against marrying 
non-Japanese in the marriage guides, would allow for the demonstration of patriotism 
to be one reason why people intermarried, if they did not marry out of force or love.  
 
32 “Korekara no kekkon wa kono yōni” [From now on marriage should be like this], Shashin 
Shūhō 218 (April 29, 1942): 18–19. Also found in Aoki Nobuharu’s Yūsei kekkon no hanashi 
[Stories about eugenic marriage] (Tokyo: Ryūginsha, 1942). According to Yoshida Kyūichi, 
the “Ten Maxims on Marriage” was created at the Ministry of Welfare’s Eugenic Marriage 
Consultation Center (Kōseishō Yūsei Kekkon Sōdanjo) to instruct an ideal marriage (see 
Shōwa shakai jigyōshi [Shōwa social work history] [Kyoto: Mineruva Shobō, 1971], 165).  
33 Kekkon shintaisei [New system of marriage] (Tokyo: Seijisha, 1941); Kekkon shintaisei 
danwashū [Conversations on new marriage system] (Tokyo: Asahi Shobō, 1941); Nakamura 
Miyuki, “Jinkō seisaku no shosō: Kekkon hōkoku o megutte” [Various aspects of the 
population policy: Concerning marriage patriotism], Sensō to josei zasshi: 1931–1945 [War 
and women’s magazines: 1931–1945], edited by Kindai Josei Bunkashi Kenkyūkai (Tokyo: 
Domesu Shuppan, 2001), 126.  
34 “Kodakara hōkoku” [Childbearing patriotism], Shashin Shūhō 152 (1941): 20–21. 
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  There were similarities in the exogamous and endogamous marriages 
themselves. One was the practice of not registering marriages. Because people did not 
register their marriages, which would have resulted in illegitimate children who could 
not be tracked by the government and require the government to provide unnecessary 
aid when there were family members to take care of, activities of the members of the 
Marriage Patriotism Council included registration of marriages. For example, to 
prompt people to register their marriages, one of the suggestions included registering 
marriage on the day of the wedding ceremony, so that the registration would not be 
forgotten.35 If we only followed the tragedy narrative, we may see the district 
commissioners’ registration of Japanese-Korean marriages solely as an enforcement of 
assimilation, but taking into consideration of the government attempt to register 
marriages would open to non-assimilationist explanation for the registration of 
intermarriages in Japan.  
  Another similarity is the arranged and love marriages. Prior to 1945, arranged 
marriage was the norm in Japan: according to Satoshi Ota, seventy percent of the 
couples had an arranged marriage in 1940.36 The marriage partner would be chosen 
by their parents, their workplace supervisors, neighbors, and/or through the marriage 
consultation centers, which were not limited to the one ran by Tanaka Takako in 
Tokyo (marriage consultation centers were built around Japan to alleviate the 
 
35 “Korekara no kekkon wa kono yōni”; “Atarashiki kekkon no rinri o kataru” [Discussion on 
new marriage ethics], Hōsō 1.2 (1941.11): 14–21. 
36 Ninety percent of couples married out of love by 1996. See “Herbivorous Boys and 
Predatory Girls: Gender, Consumerism, and Low Birthrate in Japan,” Japan’s Demographic 
Revival: Rethinking Migration, Identity and Sociocultural Norms, edited by Stephen Robert 
Nagy (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2016), 224.  
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difficulty of finding a partner).37 Thus entering an arranged marriage and being forced 
into marriage without choice, was not unique to cases of intermarriage.  
  Although arranged marriages were in the majority, “love marriages” also 
existed. Since arranged marriage was the norm, selecting one’s partner out of one’s 
choice could be seen as a positive example of women exercising their agency or 
subverting figures of authority. Yet the reason why “love marriages” could coexist 
with arranged marriages, was because as long as they were “public,” they could be 
counted and contribute to the goal of increasing the human resources.38 Thus both the 
people who intermarried out of love and force were still within the confines of state-
approved marriages: love marriages were not necessarily free from established 
boundaries and thus require careful examination before celebrating or tokenizing 
them. 
  There are also shared reasons behind intermarriages and non-intermarriages, in 
that marriage afforded economic stability. During the wartime when Japanese men 
were conscripted, there was a gender imbalance that led to kekkon’nan, difficulty in 
finding a marriage partner, for Japanese women in the metropole.39 This gender 
imbalance, combined with the factor that most Koreans and Taiwanese laboring in 
 
37 For a list of marriage consultation centers in Japan, see “Zenkoku kekkon sōdanjo 
ichiranhyō” [A list of marriage consultation centers across the nation], Fujin Kōron 28.7 
(1943.7): 77–79. Also see Tanaka Takako’s Kekkon sōdan [Marriage consultation] (Tokyo: 
Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 1943), 240–278.  
38 Sakai Yūichirō, “Senzenki ‘baikaikon shugi’ no shisō to ronri” [The ideology and 
normative logic on marital mediation in prewar Japan], Keiō Gijuku Daigaku Daigakuin 
Shakaigaku Kenkyūka Kiyō: Shakaigaku Shinrigaku Kyōikugaku, Ningen to Shakai no Tankyū 
70 (2010): 105–107.  
39 Kekkon Hōkoku Konwakai [Marriage Patriotism Council], “Jigyōjō ni okeru kekkon 
shōrei” [Promotion of marriage at the workplace], 1942, Tachi Collection (Tokyo: National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research Library), PDFY09121648, 1.  
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Japan were men who could socially and financially benefit from marrying Japanese 
women, is one explanation for the pattern of intermarriage in which more women of 
the colonizing group married men of the colonized group.40 While the hypergamy 
narrative focuses on benefits for Korean and Taiwanese men, it does not fully explain 
the benefits for Japanese women—but the economic stability afforded by marriage 
offers one explanation. For example, in marriage advices for women featured in 
women’s magazines during the wartime, including ones by Tanaka Takako and others 
working at the marriage consultation centers, income was considered one of the 
greatest factors in spouse selection for women. So much so, that marriage advisors 
observed how men of lower class felt pressured and were hesitant to marry because of 
their low income.41 The importance of economic security can also be read from 
Tanaka Takako who stated that women who had the economic means to take care of 
themselves did not have to marry, even when Tanaka was one of the proactive 
promoters of marriage as the director of the marriage consultation center and a 
member of the Marriage Patriotism Council.42 The benefits of economic security 
during the wartime would be able to explain why there were cases in which Japanese 
parents arranged an intermarriage for their daughters, as seen in the case introduced by 
 
40 For example, see Koshō Yukiko, “Ōita ni okeru Chōsenjin: Omoni, harumoni no hanashi o 
rikai surutameni” [Koreans in Ōita: To understand the stories of mothers and grandmothers], 
Kindai minshū no kiroku: Zainichi Chōsenjin [Modern people’s memory: Zainichi Koreans], 
edited by Ozawa Yūsaku (Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 1978), 654; Lee (2014): 90; Huang 
(2008): 134–135. 
41 Those who gave advice instructed women to not solely rely on income as a factor, and men 
to not delay their marriage because they felt they did not have enough, because both were 
considered factors that led to people marrying later than the ideal government set age (by 
twenty-five for men, by twenty-one for women).  
42 Tanaka Takako, “Shokugyō fujin no katei seikatsu” [Working women’s family life], Haha 
to Ko 19.1 (1938.1): 29–37.  
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Huang.  
  Marriage also allowed Japanese women to be politically active through 
participation in an organization created under government initiatives, such as the Dai 
Nihon Fujinkai (Greater Japan Women’s Association), formed in 1942 as a 
combination of Aikoku Fujinkai (Patriotic Women’s Association), Dai Nihon Kokubō 
Fujinkai (Greater Japan National Defense Women’s Association), and Dai Nihon 
Rengō Fujinkai (Greater Japan Federated Women’s Association). But according to 
Ueno Chizuko, membership in the Dai Nihon Fujinkai were limited to “all Japanese 
women above the age of 20 except unmarried women” (emphasis added).43 If 
Japanese women had the means to support themselves, they did not have to 
necessarily marry, but it would have deprived them of membership in the Dai Nihon 
Fujinkai. Thus marriage enabled Japanese women to not only demonstrate their 
patriotism through reproductive labor which contributed to achieving the state’s 
population policy goals, but also strive to be recognized as a citizen by taking 
advantage of the opportunities to be politically active and reproduce. 
  Historicizing intermarriage in wartime Japan and looking for similarities with 
endogamous Japanese-Japanese marriages reveal that there were factors unlimited to 
force and romance for Japanese women who intermarried. Japanese women may have 
selected or been in an arranged marriage with Korean or Taiwanese men, as an 
alternative to remaining single, in which case they would not be able to join the 
political activities as married women. Furthermore, intermarriage also may have been 
 
43 Ueno Chizuko, Nashonarizum to jendā [Engendering nationalism] (Tokyo: Seidosha, 
1998), 32.  
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inevitable for Japanese women who needed financial means to survive. When 
Japanese men were away at war, and Japanese women needed to marry as a form of 
economic stability, then marriage to Korean or Taiwanese men, in which men married 
into the family, would also have enabled Japanese women to demonstrate their 
patriotism to the nation through giving birth to Japanese children. By expanding the 
framework to analyze intermarriage, unlimited to reliance on colonial categories and 
not solely as an assimilationist policy that view people who intermarried as victims 
and/or inspirational figures who overcame the obstacles of colonialism, I believe that 
it would be possible to write a more comprehensive history that would include and be 
open to the experiences of people who are currently excluded from the tragedy, 
romance, and the hypergamy narratives—especially when the stories of people who 
intermarried and remained in Japan are limited (reasons behind the silences will be 
examined in the next chapter). I do not mean to deny the history of colonialism and the 
discrimination that were present. But for minorities to come forward with their stories 
and write a more comprehensive history, historians need to provide a space for them to 
be listened to, instead of forcefully allotting them into already-existing categories.44 
  Besides opening up spaces for those who are currently not represented in the 
 
44 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Marxism and the Interpretation 
of Culture (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313. This has also been 
influenced by stories of Japanese women who have not come forward about their experience 
of having been victims of sexual violence fearing reproach. For example, a woman who had to 
“sexually entertain” Soviet soldiers in Manchuria after Japan’s surrender felt that she could 
not talk about her experience when her daughter condemned the Korean “comfort women” in 
the news (Hirai Miho, “Sorenhei no ‘sei settai’ o meijirareta otometachi no, nanajūnengo no 
kokuhaku” [Confessions of maidens who were ordered to “sexually entertain” Soviet soldiers, 
seventy years later], 23 August 2017, Gendai Bijinesu, https://gendai.ismedia.jp/articles/-
/52608). 
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existing narratives for a more comprehensive history of intermarriage, I also posit that 
finding similarities between marginalized and mainstream histories could 
subsequently indicate the presence of non-Japanese in Japan, instead of limiting 
modern Japanese history to Japanese people. By including history of intermarriage in 
modern Japanese history and/or as a part of history of marriage in Japan, for example, 
the implication of Japanese people in the metropole in imperialism and colonialism, 
even when that connection may not be clear, could also be addressed. Inclusive 
history, then could make history relevant and teachable to the skeptics of history 
and/or the humanities, by teaching how people are connected to and could be 
implicated in the larger structure unknowingly.    
  In addition to the potentials for a more comprehensive and inclusive history, I 
also would like to argue in favor of looking for similarities between marginalized and 
mainstream histories, to uncover and address assumptions that remain unquestioned: 
namely, the assumption of marriage as the “norm” or “natural” part of a course of a 
human life. Whether it be scholarship on intermarriage in colonial history unlimited to 
the Japanese context, or marriage in Japanese history, there is an assumption that 
historical figures were all heterosexual, or homosexual at most. In the following 
section, I propose the inclusion of asexuality in historical analyses, and argue the 
importance of studying marginalized histories by showing how they could lead to 
opening up spaces for additional figures who remain unacknowledged in history.   
 
Why study people who intermarried? 
  One of the observations I made in existing scholarship on intermarriage and 
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non-intermarriage when comparing intermarriage in the Japanese empire and other 
empires, as well as exogamous and endogamous marriages in Japan, is the assumption 
that all individuals are/were heterosexual. The government promotion of marriage is 
examined in studies of population policy which led to campaigns to urge Japanese 
women to have more children in wartime Japan.45 But marriage is seen as a “normal” 
part of one’s life and the institution of marriage is unquestioned, so that everyone is 
assumed to have married. In this framework in which people are assumed to be 
heterosexual and marriage is unquestioned and thought to be the norm, Japanese 
women are either analyzed as “wives and/or mothers” who participated in the 
institution of marriage, or those who were excluded from the institution as 
“prostitutes.”46 The state protected the former but not the latter, who were treated as 
easily disposable, because of their lack of contribution to the state through 
reproduction, which determined women’s citizenship and their protection from the 
state. This made me question about the whereabouts in history of those who did not 
belong in either of these categories that were based on an assumption of 
heterosexuality.  
  Discussions of sexuality in modern Japanese history address how the modern 
period limited people’s sexual desires, especially of men who had more options in 
terms of sexual relationships in the premodern period, prior to the institutionalization 
 
45 For example, Miho Ogino in “From Natalism to Family Planning: Population Policy in 
Wartime and the Post-War Period,” translated by Leonie Stickland, in Gender, Nation, and 
State in Modern Japan, edited by Andrea Germer, Vera Mackie, and Ulrike Wöhr (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2014): 198–210.  
46 Other roles that could be filled by women were “laborers” and “soldiers.” Sasaki Yōko, 
Sōryokusen to josei heishi [Total war and female soldiers] (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2001), 36–37.  
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of family that curtailed men into heterosexual relationships. Women’s sexuality, too, 
was heterosexualized, as their sexuality was increasingly tied to reproduction, a 
determining factor of value of women.47  
  The heterosexualization of individuals in the modern period, however, did not 
reflect the actual sexuality of the people, because there were individuals who would be 
categorized as homosexual, even if people would not have identified themselves as 
such in the past.48 Yet even when the categories of sexuality are expanded to include 
homosexuality, this leaves out people who did not fall within the heterosexual–
homosexual spectrum. For example, the previous sections in this chapter revealed how 
Japanese women who married, regardless of their partners’ origin, could participate in 
demonstrating their patriotism and economically secure their lives. But what about 
those who did not marry?  
  Because the assumption of heterosexuality limits the categories of women to 
potentially reproductive and heterosexual “wives/mothers” or “prostitutes” who were 
sexualized as objects of heterosexual men, and the heterosexual–homosexual spectrum 
also assumes that all individuals were sexual, I propose expanding the categories of 
sexuality in historical analyses to include asexuality—sexual orientation to describe 
people who do not experience sexual attraction—as one option of sexuality (Figure 4). 
Instead of working on the assumption that all individuals were (allo)sexual, I propose 
approaching sexuality (not just heterosexuality) as a “historical construct” similar to 
 
47 Mark McLelland, Queer Japan from the Pacific War to the Internet Age (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).  
48 For example, see Gregory M. Pflugelder, Cartographies of Desire: Male-Male Sexuality in 
Japanese Discourse, 1600–1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).  
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race and gender,49 to write about the history of individuals who are still marginalized, 
as well as to reveal the larger structure to challenge the history deniers and address the 
consequences of heteronormativity.   
  Inclusion of 
asexuality would allow for 
writing of a more inclusive 
history: one group that can be 
included, is the 
asexualized—group of 
individuals who were denied 
sexuality, which in the case 
of modern Japanese history 
would include the disabled and others deemed unfit to reproduce, thus marginalized or 
segregated in society, and/or sterilized without consent. With sexuality being closely 
tied to reproduction, we can also consider the elderly as part of the asexualized group. 
Inclusion of asexualized people into history can further bring to attention ableism and 
ageism in mainstream histories, currently dominated by the (hetero)sexual, the abled, 
and non-elderly adults.  
  By including asexuality when studying history, there is also a possibility to be 
able to write the history of those who today would be identified or would identify as 
asexual, estimated to constitute at least one percent of the human population.50 People 
 
49 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1990), 105.  
50 One percent is the common, standard number, but some sources say up to five percent. 
Figure 4: Including Asexuality 
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in the past would not identify themselves as asexual when such term was not available, 
and simply locating asexual people in history to justify recognition of people who 
identify as asexual today is also problematic, because this could backfire and be used 
to disavow the existence of people who cannot be found in history. But the assumption 
that all human beings are sexual has excluded those who did not fall within the 
heterosexual–homosexual spectrum and treated those who fell outside of this spectrum 
as an anomaly. Thus recognizing asexuality in historical studies would not only allow 
historians to write about asexual people, but also do so in a non-pathologizing 
narrative.  
  In addition, writing a more inclusive history through the inclusion of asexuality 
in historical analyses, I propose, can further confront the history deniers, particularly 
the right-wing, conservative, and the neonationalists who deny imperial and colonial 
history—in the case of Japan, those who disavow the history of “comfort women.” 
The deniers refuse to admit direct state involvement, because this would require the 
Japanese state to apologize, which they believe has already been done.51 The deniers 
also refuse to admit coercion and violence that were involved, because they view all 
the “comfort women” as prostitutes who entered the situation voluntarily, and now 
demanding money because they are being greedy. Furthermore, the deniers believe 
 
Anthony F. Bogaert, Understanding Asexuality (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2012); Asexualities: Feminist and Queer Perspectives, edited by Karli June 
Cerankowski and Megan Milks (New York: Routledge, 2014).  
51 The deniers claim that there is a disagreement among scholars regarding state involvement, 
but this is simply not true. Historians in Japan have issued a statement criticizing government 
officials and the media for denying and ignoring the “comfort women” issue. See “Joint 
Statement by Associations of History Scholars and Educators in Japan on the ‘Comfort 
Women’ Issue,” 25 May 2015, Tokyo Rekishi Kagaku Kenkyūkai, 
www.torekiken.org/trk/blog/oshirase/20150525e.html. 
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that Japan is being unfairly accused, because rape during the wartime occurs in other 
countries, and it is “inevitable.” And this claim of inevitability, is made on the 
assumption that all human beings are sexual, and that sex is natural and necessary.   
  The above-mentioned deniers can be quite vocal and make news,52 but there 
are historians and other scholars who are and have been challenging them in and out of 
Japan. One group of scholars challenging the deniers, is the feminist and gender 
studies scholars, who exposed how the treatment of women as property of men in a 
patriarchal society is one of the factors that enabled the “comfort women” system to 
exist.53 Moreover, discrimination against prostitutes (who could not become 
wives/mothers) is also given as one of the factors that made the “comfort women” 
system possible, and difficult for the survivors to come forward.54 
  Besides revealing the gendered power dynamics in society that sanctioned the 
“comfort women” system, feminist and gender studies scholars demonstrated the 
intersection of discriminations based on class, race/ethnicity, and gender. Those who 
became prostitutes were from the lower economic classes, who were sold by their 
families or were more prone to be forced into prostitution. This was not limited to 
women in Japan, but also in Japan’s colonies, where people were ranked low within 
 
52 For example, in 2018, a mayor of Osaka city sent a letter to San Francisco’s mayor to cut 
the sister city ties between Osaka and San Francisco after the installment of a statue of 
“comfort women” in the latter. During the same year, a Japanese man kicked the “comfort 
women” statue in Taiwan, and the “comfort women” statue in the Philippines was removed 
due to pressure from the Japanese government.  
53 For example, see Ueno (1998). 
54 Japanese “comfort women” are still silent (see Seiya Morita, “Overcoming Double Erasure: 
Japanese ‘comfort women’, nationalism, and trafficking,” translated by Caroline Norma, The 
Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 15.21.3 (November 1, 2017): 
apjjf.org/2017/21/Morita.html.  
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the imperial hierarchy, thus given less or no protection from the state. And it was these 
women of lower socio-economic status who were exploited as “comfort women,” to 
protect Japanese women of middle class or above, categorized into wives/mothers and 
expected to bear children for the state. By revealing a combination of state-sanctioned 
sexism, classism, and racism at play in enabling the “comfort women” system to exist 
and run on a large scale that makes the “comfort women” issue significant from other 
wartime sexual violence, feminist scholars are making a case of why an apology 
admitting state involvement is necessary. 
  However, these challengers to the deniers are also working on the assumption 
that all human beings are heterosexual, in that women were either reproductive and 
heterosexual wives/mothers, or prostitutes who were sexual objects of men who were 
heterosexual. This is the same assumption as the deniers, and on which basis they 
refuse to take responsibility over the history of “comfort women.” Thus to challenge 
the deniers’ claim of “inevitability” of sex at the warfront, I argue that the assumption 
that all human beings are sexual needs to be questioned.    
  The assumption that all human beings are heterosexual is being questioned by 
scholars who work on sexuality and queer studies. Their analyses of “comfort women” 
system see it as an extension of the structure that came to be in place in modern Japan 
from the late nineteenth century, in which women who were not expected to reproduce 
(i.e., women who would be categorized as prostitutes) were exploited to manage 
men’s heterosexuality and to protect women (i.e., wives/mothers) who were expected 
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to reproduce through heterosexual acts.55 Sexuality and queer studies scholars, 
however, are working on the assumption that all human beings fall within the 
heterosexual–homosexual spectrum of sexuality—thus humans are sexual, but not 
necessarily heterosexual. This expansion of human sexuality can challenge the deniers 
who refuse to admit state involvement, because it was the state that channeled people 
into heterosexual behaviors and sanctioned them in the modern period. 
  But working with an understanding that all human beings are not necessarily 
heterosexual, still cannot challenge the deniers who refuse to take responsibility by 
claiming that sex at the warfront was inevitable because for humans to be sexual was 
innate and natural, even though studies on wartime rape have shown it was not about 
sex, but about violence and power. I thus I propose inclusion of asexuality in historical 
analyses. By no means am I denying or attacking individuals who are sexual and fall 
within the heterosexual–homosexual spectrum. What I am trying to suggest, is that 
instead of assuming that all human beings have sexuality that is naturally geared 
toward another, to consider that any sexuality toward another had to be instructed 
through socialization, to reveal the “structure” that made (hetero)sexuality “normal.”56 
By demonstrating that any sexuality towards another was not necessarily inherent, 
then the deniers’ unfounded claim that it was “inevitable” to have “comfort women” at 
the warfront because men needed to relieve their sex drive using another, can be 
undermined: this was not inevitable, because such behaviors, in which another is 
 
55 For example, see McLelland (2005).  
56 Inspired by Sara Ahmed’s Living a Feminist Life (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017): 
“An individual man who violates you is given permission: that is structure. His violence is 
justified as natural and inevitable: that is structure. A girl is made responsible for his violence: 
that is structure” (30).  
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involved in relief of one’s sex drive had to be taught and sanctioned over time, most 
notably, by the state, but also perpetuated by the people who did not question and also 
working under the same assumptions. 
  I believe that it is important to view sexuality, not just heterosexuality and 
homosexuality, as a sociohistorical construct, because the assumption that all human 
beings are/were sexual continues today with consequences for people beyond those 
whose existence are denied by the history deniers. For example, because of the 
assumption that everyone is sexual, tied to the expectation that all will be married, 
those who do not or cannot marry and/or reproduce are stigmatized.57 Same-sex 
marriage is not legalized in Japan, because of the continued value placed on 
reproduction, as is evident in the arguments against same-sex marriage tied to the 
declining population. There is the government promotion of marriage today, 
reminiscent of the wartime in reducing women as tools for reproduction. The 
innateness of (hetero)sexuality is furthermore used in arguments supporting the sex 
industry that takes advantage of sex workers and in victim-blaming that hurts women 
and men. Recognition of these problem that are tied to assumptions about sexuality, is 
the first step in making a change, as will be discussed further in Chapter 6.  
  Therefore by proposing the inclusion of asexuality in historical analyses, based 
on finding that there was an assumption being made about (hetero)sexuality of 
 
57 Recently (when this chapter was being written), a right-wing politician in Japan made news 
for claiming that LGBT people are not tax-money worthy because they were not reproductive. 
Tomohiro Osaki, “LDP lawmaker Mio Sugita faces backlash after describing LGBT people as 
‘unproductive’,” 24 July 2018, The Japan Times, 
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/07/24/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-lawmaker-mio-
sugita-faces-backlash-describing-lgbt-people-unproductive/#.W62NvhNKgdU. 
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historical subjects after examining the similarities between intermarriages and non-
intermarriages, I seek to challenge the history deniers who argue that sexuality was 
innate and uncontrollable, and eventually write a history of asexual people. Thus in 
response to historians who ask, “why bother studying such a minor phenomenon in 
history,” referring to the history of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese 
marriages, my answer would be that it can expand the subjects of what historians 
study: studying marginalized history enables locating the still marginalized, forgotten, 
and/or unrepresented figures in history, especially when taking the approach of 
looking for similarities with the mainstream histories. I call for the inclusion, if not at 
least a recognition, of minorities in history to historians who do not find the need to do 
inclusive history, because in addition to accommodating diversity in the classrooms, 
making a change requires reaching to and change from people who are perpetuating 
the system that disadvantages minorities, not the people who are already 
disadvantaged.  
 
Conclusion 
  This chapter began by introducing the tragedy, romance, and hypergamy 
narratives employed to tell the history of intermarriage, to first point out how they 
exclude individuals who did not marry out of force and love, and cannot fully explain 
the pattern in which more Japanese women intermarried than Japanese men. As a way 
to include into history those who are not accounted for by the three dominant 
narratives that heavily rely on the categories of “colonizer” and “colonized,” I argued 
for historicizing intermarriage not only in the context of colonial history, but also as 
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part of “mainstream” histories such as modern Japanese history. I then argued that 
exploring the similarities between Japanese-Korean/Japanese-Taiwanese marriages 
and Japanese-Japanese marriages, instead of highlighting the differences, could create 
space for stories that do not fit the existing narratives and find assumptions that remain 
unquestioned, such as the assumption of (hetero)sexuality. And by showing how 
challenging this assumption—via inclusion of asexuality in historical analyses—could 
include into history subjects who are still unaccounted for in history and explain the 
consequential impact of such assumption to undermine the history deniers, I hope to 
have shown why marginalized histories, like the history of intermarriage, need to be 
studied. Moreover, since assumption of heterosexuality is not unique to studies on 
marriage and intermarriage in Japan, questioning hetero(sexual)normativity in studies 
of inter/marriage in the (former) imperial Western countries may also enable writing a 
more inclusive history.  
  Calling for an expansion of the framework to better understand a historical 
phenomenon, such as examining exogamous marriages in the same field as 
endogamous marriages, is not a denial of the existing framework and its importance. 
Rather, it builds on the existing framework to allow for a more comprehensive story, 
just as Sarah Soh studied the “comfort women” beyond the “familiar master narrative, 
or the feminist humanitarian paradigmatic story,” for a more broad understanding of 
Korea’s “comfort women.”58 Marginalized histories and minorities gaining 
recognition also does not deprive and take away recognition from existing histories 
 
58 Sarah C. Soh, The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea 
and Japan (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008), xiv.  
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and majorities. If anything, recognition of minorities reveals structures that enable 
discrimination against and marginalization of minorities, and crucial in teaching non-
Western history classes, such as modern Japanese history, to not be co-opted into 
nationalistic, xenophobic, anti-immigration arguments that fantasize Japan as a 
monoethnic society. 
  In the next, final chapter of this dissertation, I will address some of the 
questions that were raised in this chapter: what happened to people who intermarried 
and stayed in Japan after 1945? And why is it that the history of Japanese-Korean and 
Japanese-Taiwanese marriages is marginalized in mainstream history? It will explore 
the reception of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in postwar Japan 
and how they have been forgotten and remembered, to further address the deniers of 
history and the connections between people in former imperial countries and colonial 
responsibilities, unlimited to those in Japan. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Selective Remembering and Forgetting of Japanese-Korean and  
Japanese-Taiwanese Marriages in Postwar Japan 
 
 This dissertation has been an attempt to de-marginalize marginalized histories 
and histories of minorities for a more inclusive history. The previous chapters were 
written on the basis of understanding that the history of Japanese-Korean and 
Japanese-Taiwanese marriages was marginalized, partially because of its numerical 
insignificance—prior to 1945, marriage between Japanese and Koreans or Taiwanese 
constituted less than 1% of the total number of Japanese-Japanese marriages recorded 
in Japan. In the twenty-first century, kokusai kekkon, literally “international marriage,” 
referring to marriage between Japanese and non-Japanese in Japan, constitute a 
slightly higher percentage: the percentage peaked in 2006 at 8%, and reduced to 3.3% 
in 2013. And of the recorded number of intermarriages in contemporary Japan, the 
most common foreign partner of Japanese men were Chinese nationals (38.7%), 
followed by those from the Philippines (20.7%) and then Koreas (15.3%). The most 
common foreign partner of Japanese women were men from North and South Korea 
(25.4%), followed by those from the US (18.3%) and China (12.1%).1 The image 
associated with kokusai kekkon, however, is marriage between Japanese and white 
people.2 Why is this the case?  
 
1 Kōsei Rōdōshō [Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare], “Heisei nijūhachinendo jinkō 
dōtai tōkei tokushu hōkoku, ‘kon’in ni kansuru tōkei’ no gaikyō” [2016 specified report of 
vital statistics, overview of “statistics concerning marriage”], 2017, 
www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/tokusyu/konin16/dl/gaikyo.pdf, 11–12.  
2 Kamoto Itsuko, Kokusai kekkonron!?: Rekishihen [International marriate theory!?: History 
edition] (Kyoto: Hōritsu Bunkasha, 2008); Karen Kelsky, Women on the Verge: Japanese 
Women, Western Dreams (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001).  
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 One reason besides the numerical insignificance that explains the lack of 
awareness about the higher rate of intermarriages between Japanese and non-Japanese 
Asians in contemporary Japan, is the ability of the non-Japanese Asian spouses to 
physically blend into Japanese society and “pass” as Japanese. But does this explain 
the reason why the history of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages is 
and came to be marginalized, not only in general history of intermarriage between 
colonizers and colonized, but also in modern Japanese history? Chapter 5 briefly 
mentioned that the tragedy narrative of Japanese-Korean marriages were based on 
Japanese wives who were found in South Korea decades after the fall of the Japanese 
empire—but what about the couples who remained in Japan? Why is so little known 
about their whereabouts?  
 This chapter aims to address why Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese 
marriages “disappeared” in postwar Japan and marginalized in modern Japanese 
history. The first section will begin by tracing how the cases of intermarriage were 
“re-discovered” in postwar Japan. By subsequently locating couples who intermarried 
and remained in Japan but not covered in the popular press, I argue that there was a 
selective remembrance at work. In the following section, I then demonstrate that the 
shift in the population policy, change in the nationality and household registration 
laws, and the presence of the United States, enabled Japan and its people to forget the 
history of intermarriage and the existence of Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese who 
intermarried and remained in postwar Japan, in order to foster the “myth of Japanese 
homogeneity” and a sense of victim consciousness around which guilt and taking 
responsibility could be avoided.  
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One of the main questions of this dissertation has been to explore the reticence 
over racism in Japan—pretending or believing that racism does not (or no longer) 
exist. By arguing that the history of intermarriage on the margins of national history 
was selectively remembered and forgotten, I explain in the epilogue the importance of 
studying histories of minorities that have been forgotten in similar ways, to challenge 
the majority-public to acknowledge their privilege in being able to forget history. I 
believe that using history to learn about one’s complicity, even if unintentional, in 
perpetuating the current structure that sanctions racism, sexism, ableism, classism, 
etc., and how one’s participation in that structure is hurting the participants 
themselves, could potentially allow for a move toward making a positive social 
change. 
 
Selective Remembering of Intermarriage in Postwar Japan 
 When one searches “The Complete Database for Japanese Magazine and 
Periodicals from Meiji Era to the Present” (http://zassaku-plus.com), the first mention 
of naisen kekkon (Japanese-Korean marriage) in the postwar period appears in 1969, 
and it is not until the 2000s that Japanese-Taiwanese marriages (naitai kyōkon) appear 
in the results. The results, however, do not mean that Japanese-Korean marriages and 
Japanese-Taiwanese marriages were forgotten in Japan until then, nor that the people 
who intermarried disappeared from postwar Japan. Although most stories may focus 
on people who intermarried and left Japan in the postwar period, there were people 
who intermarried pre-1945 and remained in Japan post-1945. This section first traces 
how intermarriages have been remembered in the public in Japan after 1945, then 
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demonstrate the existence of intermarried couples not accounted for in the popular 
narratives but found in legal journals and American occupation documents, to argue 
that intermarriage has been selectively remembered in postwar Japan.  
 Stories of Japanese-Korean marriages did not begin to emerge in the public 
until the late 1950s. One of the first stories was of Japanese women who married 
Korean men, both before and after 1945, who planned to leave and left for North 
Korea as part of the “return” of over 90,000 people from Japan to North Korea from 
1959 onward.3 There were two articles in Fujin Kurabu (Women’s Club), one of the 
four major women’s magazines in the prewar and the postwar period: both described 
the discrimination that the Japanese women married to Korean men and their families 
faced living in Japan, such as being denied housing and facing ethnic discrimination. 
Describing North Korea as a “country of hope,” Japanese wives hoped to find a better 
environment for their family, who were discriminated for being Korean. Both of the 
articles ended on a positive note, in which the Japanese wives who married their 
Korean husbands out of love could expect to find a brighter future, yet there was a 
tone of pity for these women who did not imagine themselves leaving Japan and 
worried about leaving their Japanese families behind.4 
 It was also during the 1960s that the stories of the two most well-known cases 
of Japanese women who married Korean men began appearing in newspapers and 
 
3 For information on “return” of ethnic Koreans to North Korea, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s 
Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan’s Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2007). 
4 Kin Tatsuju, “Sabetsu no kuni kara kibō no kuni e” [From the land of discrimination to a 
land of hope,” Fujin Kurabu 40.5 (1959): 104–107; Motokawa Tamayo, “Kokokuyo, mata 
itsunohika” [Dear homeland, one day again], Fujin Kurabu 41.2 (1960): 112–115.  
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magazine articles. One of the women was Japanese princess Nashimoto Masako (aka 
Ri Masako or Yi Bangja), whose royal marriage to Yi Ŭn gained coverage in the 
newspapers since their engagement in the 1910s. Their relationship was upheld for 
representing the spirit of naisen ittai (“Japan and Korea as one”). Yet there was more 
than a decade of silence in the media between 1945 and the 1960s, even though the 
two remained in Japan in the immediate postwar period, when they struggled 
financially as the annual allowance stopped for royal families reduced to commoner 
status. In 1960, Fujin Kurabu published a series of memoir written by Ri Masako, in 
which she recollected her memories from the time she was born to her recent 
experiences visiting her son studying in the United States, describing her life as living 
amidst the “storm.”5 Fujin Kurabu published her story again in 1962 during Ri 
Masako’s visit to South Korea, with the cooperation from the South Korean 
government: in 1963, under Park Chunghee’s regime, the couple returned to Korea—
for the first time in fifty-six years for Yi Ŭn who was initially taken as a hostage.6 
After moving to South Korea, Fujin Kurabu published a follow-up story on Ri 
Masako, who dedicated her life to help disabled children in South Korea after her 
husband passed away.7 In addition to publishing her life story in the magazines, Ri 
 
5 Ri Masako, “Dōran no nakano ōhi 1” [Princess amidst the storm 1], Fujin Kurabu 41.1 
(1960): 133–144; “Dōran no nakano ōhi 2” [Princess amidst the storm 2], Fujin Kurabu 41.2 
(1960): 122–128; “Dōran no nakano ōhi 3” [Princess amidst the storm 3], Fujin Kurabu 41.3 
(1960): 178–184; “Dōran no nakano ōhi 4” [Princess amidst the storm 4], Fujin Kurabu 41.4 
(1960): 122–128. 
6 Ri Masako, “Kankoku ni wagako no haka o tazunete” [Visiting our child’s grave in Korea] 
Fujin Kurabu 43.10 (1962): 134–137; Osodo Masako, “Nashimotomiya Masako,” Rekishi to 
Tabi 23.18 (1996): 252–259. 
7 “Nikkan no kakehashi to shite dōran no naka ni ikita Ri Masako-san” [Ri Masako, who has 
lived amidst the storm as a bridge between Japan and Korea], Fujin Kurabu 50.2 (1969): 222–
224. 
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Masako also published several autobiographies, such as Dōran no naka no ōhi 
(Princess amidst the storm), which was published in 1968 from Kōdansha, the same 
publishing company that released the magazine Fujin Kurabu. Although Ri visited 
Japan at least once in 1966 and in 1984 as part of her fundraising campaigns, she 
chose to remain in South Korea permanently to support Korean children in need, and it 
was her charity work that gained the most attention in the postwar period. When she 
passed away in 1989, the same year as the death of the Shōwa emperor, her death was 
reported with pity.8 Postwar stories of Ri Masako would fall under the tragedy 
narrative as a victim of Japanese imperialism, with commemoration of her efforts in 
the postwar period despite hardships.    
 The second well-known case of Japanese-Korean marriage, is that between 
Tauchi Chizuko (aka Yun Hak-ja) and Yun Chi-ho. Although Tauchi was not a 
member of the royal family, her life shared many similarities with that of Ri Masako. 
Tauchi was a daughter of a Japanese bureaucrat in the Government General of Korea, 
originally born in Kōchi prefecture in Japan. A Christian, Tauchi married Yun, also a 
Christian and of an aristocratic origin who ran an orphanage, in 1939. They managed 
the orphanage in Mokpo together until Yun’s disappearance during the Korean War, 
after which Tauchi ran the orphanage herself.9 Her work was then recognized by the 
South Korean government in 1963, also under Park Chunghee’s regime, when she 
 
8 Hosaka Masayasu, “Ri Masako-san no shi” [The death of Ri Masako], Ushio 366 (1989): 
248–267. 
9 Yun Chi-ho was initially kidnapped and persecuted by the North Korean side for helping 
refugees escaping from North Korea, but subsequently accused of collaborating with the 
Communists from the South Korean side after he worked with the North Korean side in order 
to secure food for the orphans. 
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became an honorary Korean citizen.10 In the following year, Tauchi also visited Japan 
as part of her efforts to raise awareness about the orphans in South Korea and raise 
money for the orphanage, because the then-Korean government did not have enough 
funds to support the orphans.11 The Japanese media covered her visit in 1964, and 
subsequently during her re-visit to Japan in 1966 and 1967, until she passed away in 
1968.12 Tauchi did not publish an autobiography of her own, but her biography was 
published in 1983, titled Shinju no uta: Kankoku koji no haha, Tauchi Chizuko no 
shōgai (Song of a pearl: Life of Tauchi Chizuko, mother of Korean orphans) written 
by Reverend Moriyama Satoshi, commissioned by Tauchi’s son, Tauchi Motoi. 
According to Moriyama, the biography was initially going to be published by Shufu no 
Tomo company, but switched to be personally published by Moriyama, so that the 
proceeds could be used to support the orphanage in Mokpo.13 Similar to how Ri 
Masako’s work in South Korea was commemorated, Tauchi’s dedication to help 
 
10 According to her son, Tauchi Motoi, who took after the orphanage, Yun Chi-ho married 
into Tauchi’s family upon Tauchi’s family’s request, so Tauchi would still have been Japanese 
in terms of citizenship. Tauchi Motoi, “Haha, Tauchi Chizuko” [Mother, Tauchi Chizuko], 
Tosashidan 208 (1998): 58–70.   
11 Tauchi’s son claims that her visit to Japan in 1964 during Tokyo Olympics was 
instrumental in leading to the amicable relationship between Japan and Korea in 1965, 
meeting the then prime minister Ikeda and other important figures in political, financial, and 
cultural spheres.  
12 Takamura Chōji, “Kankoku no koji ni ai o sasageta Nihonzuma” [A Japanese wife who 
dedicated her love to Korea’s orpans], Fujin Kurabu 45.9 (1964): 218–222. It was in the 
1990s, however, that she gained further and wider attention, after her interview was aired on 
television in 1992. And in 1993, there was a collaboration between Japan and Korea to make a 
film of Tauchi’s life story (titled Ai no mokushiroku [Love’s apocalypse]), and presented to 
the public in Japan in 1995, and in Korea in 1999. Her life story received additional coverage 
before and after the film. For example, see Kobayashi Keiji, “Tauchi Chizuko,” Rekishi to 
Tabi 23.18 (1996): 245–251. 
13 Moriyama Satoshi, Shinju no uta: Kankoku koji no haha Tauchi Chizuko no shōgai [Song 
of a pearl: Life of Tauchi Chizuko, mother of Korean orphans] (Tokyo: Shinju no Uta Kankō 
Iinkai, 1983), 397. 
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Korean children by remaining in South Korea even after the husband’s death and 
when Koreans did not view Japanese favorably in the postwar period, was praised.  
 The stories of Japanese-Korean marriages, however, were not limited to the 
Japanese wives leaving for North Korea and stories of Ri Masako and Tauchi 
Chizuko. In 1961, the Japanese and South Korean governments made an agreement to 
allow Japanese who were married to Koreans and living in South Korea to return to 
Japan for one year. The return of the Japanese wives was reported in major Japanese 
newspapers, such as Tokyo Asahi Newspaper and Mainichi Newspaper.14 And since 
then, Japanese women who intermarried and were living in South Korea post-1945 
slowly started to emerge in the Japanese media in the 1960s, coinciding with the 
establishment of the Fuyōkai (Puyonghae) and the opening of the Japanese embassy in 
South Korea in 1965, which, although little, provided financial aid to Japanese women 
struggling to survive in South Korea.15  
 The stories of Japanese wives who were found in the 1960s were told in a 
tragedy narrative. Reporter-critic, historian, and a repatriate from Korea, Fujisaki 
Yasuo, was one figure who has repeatedly wrote about the state of Japanese wives 
living in South Korea. In 1969, he published an article titled “Naisen kekkon 
 
14 “Kankoku no Nihonjinzuma ga satogaeri” [Japanese wives in Korea return], Tokyo Asahi 
Newspaper, evening ed., 15 July 1961: 7; “Saikai o machiwabiru Kankoku no 
‘Nihonjinzuma’” [“Japanese wives” in Korea who eagerly wait for reunion,” Tokyo Asahi 
Newspaper, evening ed., 17 July 1961: 7; “‘Nihonjinzuma’ ni ichiji kikoku yurusu Kankoku 
gaimubu happyō” [Temporary return home approved for “Japanese wives,” Korea’s foreign 
office announces], Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, evening ed., 1 August 1961: 7. In addition to 
Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, Mainichi Newspaper also covered the stories of Japanese women 
who were able to temporarily return to Japan, and others who could not return. 
15 Makita Kiyoshi, “Souru no zaikan Nihonjinzuma no kai ‘Fuyōkai’ o tazuneru” [Visiting 
Seoul’s “Fuyōkai,” an organization of Japanese wives residing in Korea], Asahi Journal 30.18 
(1988): 52–54. 
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nijūsannen no higeki” (Japanese-Korean Marriages, twenty-three years of tragedy), in 
another one of the major women’s magazines, Fujin Kōron (Women’s Review). In this 
article, Fujisaki explained the “tragedy” faced by both Japanese and Koreans in South 
Korea, who intermarried when the government “promoted” naisen kekkon before 
1945. He focused on families that were separated at the end of World War II and have 
been living in South Korea since then.16 Introducing Japanese wives “thrown away by 
their husbands, lost their children because they could not obtain food, old couples who 
lived in caves, Japanese wives struggling to live with an ill husband,” Fujisaki called 
for the Japanese government to take action and also for the Japanese people in Japan 
to offer help, both of whom seemed to have forgotten about the promotion of 
Japanese-Korean marriages when Japan ruled over Korea as its colony.17 
 The tragedy narrative, in which people who intermarried are viewed as victims, 
continued in the 1970s. In 1972, Fujisaki also contributed to a special feature on 
Japanese wives in Korea, who were described as “kimin” (abandoned people) in the 
journal Ushio, which featured commentaries critiquing the Japanese government and 
its imperial past by zainichi Korean author Lee Hoesung (Ri Kaisei) and social critic 
Ōta Ryū along with testimonies, mostly of Japanese wives who intermarried and were 
struggling to survive in Korea after 1945. Those giving the testimonies also viewed 
themselves as victims, forgotten by the Japanese government after being forced into 
 
16 Fujisaki Yasuo, “Naisen kekkon nijūsannen no higeki” [Japanese-Korean marriages, 
twenty-three years of tragedy], Fujin Kōron 54.2 (1969.2): 130–139. In the article, Fujisaki 
also introduces the Fuyōkai (Puyonghae), which was established eight years ago (1961), 
described to have been a social organization for Japanese wives in Korea, where at that time, 
there was not enough to rescue those in poverty (137). 
17 Ibid., 136, 138–139. 
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intermarriage.18 A year later, Ushio featured another article by journalist-producer 
Okamoto Yoshihiko, who introduced the stories of Japanese wives in Korea who 
married Korean men because the government used to “promote” Japanese-Korean 
marriages, but then “abandoned” and “forgotten” by the same government in the 
postwar period.19 What these stories that call for Japanese government and people to 
recognize the existence of Japanese women reveal, was that by the 1960s, the 
government and Japanese people in Japan had largely forgotten about Japanese-
Korean marriages that took place prior to 1945.  
 In the 1970s, there was a slight addition to the tragedy narrative. In 1972, some 
of the Japanese wives who wished to return and were able to do so, “fought” with the 
Japanese government to accept repatriation of Japanese wives and their families.20 
Articles by journalists, reporters, and academics featured Japanese wives once they 
returned to Japan: because not all women had families or relatives to accept them in 
Japan, this resulted in some to rely on welfare benefits. With their children being 
unable to speak Japanese, and Korean husbands being unable to join the women and 
their children in Japan, the theme of Japanese women as objects of pity continued. 
However, one can also find an increasing call for the need of the Japanese government 
to acknowledge them and take responsibility—not only for the women, but also for 
 
18 “‘Kimin’ ni sareta Kankoku no Nihonjinzuma no shōgen” [Testimonies of Japanese wives 
abandoned in Korea], Ushio 153 (1972.5): 253–275.  
19 Okamoto Yoshihiko, “Naze Nihon no hata ga tatanaino” [Why isn’t a Japanese flag put up], 
Ushio 172 (1973.10): 282–295. 
20 Koyama Takeshi, “Zaikan Nihonjinzuma no ikizuku sakebi” [Desperate calls of Japanese 
wives residing in Korea], Gendai no Me 13.10 (1972): 126–135; Nishiyama Umeko, “Hō no 
kabe wa atsukutomo” [Though the legal wall may be impenetrable], Asahi Journal 14.50 
(1972): 16–21. 
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the general consequences of Japanese imperialism and colonization of Korea falling 
onto the people, such as the Japanese wives found in South Korea. For example, on 
August 13, 1973, Fujisaki published a newspaper article in Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, 
addressing naisen kekkon and introducing the stories of nameless Japanese women he 
encountered in South Korea while writing his book, Kimin (Abandoned people), 
published in 1972. Fujisaki discussed the problem of abandoned Japanese wives in 
Korea, along with stories of Koreans who were persecuted for war crimes, because 
they were considered Japanese during the wartime. Fujisaki also drew parallels with 
the Korean hibakusha, victims of the atomic bombs. Here, Fujisaki took readers’ 
attention to other victims besides Japanese wives, who were affected by the Japanese 
government and the San Francisco Peace Treaty that caused changes in people’s 
nationalities in the postwar period.21 
 The tragedy narrative of Japanese-Korean marriages focused on Japanese 
wives further continued in the 1980s, when scholarly research on Japanese wives 
emerged.22 Similar to the coverage of Japanese wives in the popular press, academic 
studies of Japanese wives aimed to recover them from becoming buried and forgotten 
in history.23 It was also in 1982 that nonfiction writer Kamisaka Fuyuko’s book, 
 
21 Fujisaki Yasuo, “Nihon to Kankoku ‘kokuseki’ no hazama de” [In the loophole of 
“nationality” between Japan and Korea], Tokyo Asahi Newspaper, evening ed., 31 August 
1973: 5. 
22 For example, Kin Ōretsu’s “Zakikan Nihonjinzuma no hinkon to seikatsu fuan” [Poverty 
and life insecurity of Japanese wives residing in Korea], Shakai Rōnengaku 17 (1983): 67–82; 
Kobayashi Takayuki’s “Sengo no zaikan Nihon fujin ni tsuite no kisoteki kenkyū” [Basic 
research on Japanese women residing in Korea in the postwar period] Fukuoka Kyōiku 
Daigaku Kiyō 36 (1986): 21–36. The research on Japanese wives do not end at 1980s and can 
also be found in the 1990s. 
23 Cameraman Makita Kiyoshi phrased it as women who would “eternally be buried in 
history” unless people pay attention to them right now (Makita (1988): 54). Similar sentiment 
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Keishū Nazare’en: Wasurerareta Nihonjinzumatachi (Gyeongju Nazareth Gardens: 
Forgotten Japanese wives)24 further raised awareness about the existence of Japanese 
women living in South Korea post-1945.25 The continuation of the efforts to raise 
awareness since the 1960s reveals that there was still a lack of awareness and 
knowledge in the 1980s about the history of Japanese-Korean marriages. Yet what 
differed from the 1960s, was an increased scrutiny of Japanese government’s 
responsibility and neglect in the tragic life experiences of Japanese wives in and from 
South Korea.  
 The tragedy narrative of Japanese wives as victims, not only of their neglect in 
South Korea but also by the Japanese government, perpetuated into the 1990s, when 
the stories of “comfort women” and others forgotten in imperial Japanese history 
began to emerge in the public, and the word “naisen kekkon” appeared slightly more 
frequently in archival and library databases. There developed a closer examination of 
the role of Japanese women as victims and victimizers who were co-opted by the state, 
 
voiced by Kasetani Tomo’o in “Zaikan Nihonjinzuma no seikatsu sekai: Esunishitī no henka 
to iji” [Lifeworld of Japanese wives residing in Korea: Change and preservation of ethnicity], 
Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū 10 (1998): 33–47, as research on Japanese wives in Korea from an 
academic perspective continued into the 1990s. The 1988 Seoul Olympics also appeared to 
have peaked attention according to Konno of Yomiuri Newspaper, who featured stories of 
Japanese wives in Korea and worked with Fuyōkai in finding them, then raised enough funds 
with the cooperation of the Korean government and Japanese civilians in helping the Japanese 
wives return to Japan (e.g., Konno Keisuke, “Bōkyō no nen tsuzuru ittsū no tegami kara” 
[From a letter inditing homesickness], Shinbun Kenkyū 423 (1986): 15–17.) 
24 Kamisaka Fuyuko. Keishū Nazare’en: Wasurerareta Nihonjinzumatachi [Gyeongju 
Nazareth Gardens: Forgotten Japanese wives] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1982).  
25 Makita (1988); Utakawa Reizō, “Keishū ni Nazare’en o tazuneru: Koto ni ikiru 
Nihonjinzuma” [Visiting the Nazareth Gardens in Gyeongju: Japanese wives living in an 
ancient city], Zaikai 48.12 (2000): 162–164. Narita also brings attention to this book as an 
example of a book that included victimizers into the narrative of the past. Narita Ryūichi, 
“Sensō keiken” no sengoshi: katarareta taiken, shōgen, kioku [Postwar history of “war 
experience”: Of experiences, testimonies, and memories told] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
2010), 164. 
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for example, in Suzuki Yūko’s Jūgun ianfu, naisen kekkon (1992).26 Kim Yŏngdal’s 
research from 1999 further challenged the view of people who intermarried as victims 
of the intermarriage policy.27    
 Compared to Japanese-Korean marriages, stories of and related to Japanese-
Taiwanese marriages were extremely limited and difficult to find in postwar Japan: 
whereas Japanese wives in Korea gained the most attention in the discussion of 
Japanese-Korean marriages, stories of Japanese wives in Taiwan could not be found in 
newspapers, journals, nor magazines in Japan. One story that I was able to locate, is an 
article in Mainichi Newspaper from 1960, in which a youth in Taiwan with a Japanese 
nationality born to a Taiwanese mother who passed away, wished to see his Japanese 
father who repatriated back to Japan.28 Another is from a book on Taiwan written by 
Tomisawa Shigeru, who was a soldier stationed in Taiwan during 1944. Reliability of 
Tomisawa’s information is somewhat questionable—as Tomisawa says only Japanese 
men could intermarry in Taiwan, which was untrue—but Tomisawa’s book included a 
story of a man born to a Japanese mother and a Taiwanese father, whom Tomisawa 
met in Taiwan post-1945.29 He additionally introduced a romance story, supposedly 
 
26 Suzuki Yūko, Jūgun ianfu, naisen kekkon [Comfort women, Japanese-Korean marriage] 
(Tokyo: Miraisha, 1992). 
27 Kim Yŏngdal, “Nihon no Chōsen tōchi-ka ni okeru ‘tsūkon’ to ‘konketsu’—iwayuru 
‘naisen kekkon’ no hōsei, tōkei, seisaku ni tsuite” [Japan’s “intermarriage” and “blood 
mixing” in colonial Korea: on laws, statistics, and policies of the so-called “Japanese-Korean 
marriage”], Kansai Daigaku Jinken Mondai Kenkyūshitsu Kiyō 39 (1999): 44.  
28 “Byōshō kara chichikoishi: Taiwan ni naku Nihonjin seinen” [Yearning his father from a 
sickbed: Japanese youth crying in Taiwan], Mainichi Newspaper, morning ed., 15 February 
1960: 9. 
29 Tomisawa Shigeru, Taiwan shūsen hishi: Nihon shokuminchi jidai to sono shūen [Hidden 
history Taiwan’s end of war: Japanese colonial period and its end] (Tokyo: Izumi Shuppan, 
1984), 19, 138–139. 
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based on a true story, of a Japanese woman who threw herself off the boat after being 
forcibly repatriated back to Japan, because she was separated from her Taiwanese 
lover, who also later died by suicide.30 Although it is difficult to find a running theme 
with the limited stories, both of these stories follow the main themes in narrating the 
history of Japanese-Korean marriages, as either a tragedy or a romance. The studies on 
Japanese-Taiwanese marriages from the pre-1945 period that developed in the 2000s 
also share similarities with the studies on Japanese-Korean marriages, in that 
intermarriage policy is viewed as a part of the Japanese assimilationist efforts in the 
colonies. 
 The postwar coverage of intermarriage that occurred during the imperial period 
have focused on Japanese wives who married Korean men and remained in South 
Korea after the fall of the Japanese empire, with a mix of tragic and romantic stories. 
This, however, does not mean that all the couples who intermarried left Japan after 
1945: there are evidences of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples who 
remained in Japan, found in the American occupation documents from the immediate 
postwar period and in legal discussions of nationality and household registration from 
the mid-1950s onward.  
 The existence of couples who intermarried and remained in Japan, at least the 
Japanese-Korean couples, can be found in the petitions sent to the American 
occupation authorities in the immediate postwar period. For example, a Korean 
woman named Gen Go Kichi and her two children were arrested for illegally entering 
 
30 Ibid., 139–140. 
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Japan in 1949, after she left Japan to take care of her sick grandfather in Korea. She 
applied to enter and remain in Japan, so that she could take care of her husband, Kio 
Yoshihiko, who became ill during Gen’s trip to Korea. Fortunately, her application 
was accepted on the grounds that she “has proven to be a good citizen…there is no 
apprehension of her disturbing public safety…if she is compulsorily deported, her 
family life must be materially broken, husband and wife, parent and children having to 
live apart from one another.”31  
 The others were not so fortunate: for example, a Korean man named Kyo Yu 
Sei was indicted for leaving Japan without returning the Alien Registration Certificate, 
then attempting illegal entry into Japan along with stowaways. He thus filed a 
permission to stay in Japan in 1950, which included information on his marital status 
indicating his marriage to a Japanese woman named Mori Toshie. The application also 
listed their one-year-old daughter named Junko. His application, however, was denied 
and Kyo was ultimately deported, because his offense, which included charging the 
stowaways to be taken into Japan, was considered to be “of pretty bad nature.”32 
Another petition also denied, was a petition by a Japanese woman Hayashi Kuniko. 
Hayashi petitioned on behalf of her husband, Cho Gaku Rai in 1950, so that he could 
remain in Japan when Cho was imprisoned in Nagasaki for illegally entering into 
 
31 “Results of Investigation concerning Person filing Application for Permission to Stay in 
Japan: Gen Ko Kichi,” 1950, GHQ/SCAP Records, Box 1418, Folder title/number: 091C, 
Korean (13). 
32 “Results of Investigation concerning Person filing Application for Permission to Stay in 
Japan: Kyo Yu Sei,” 1950, GHQ/SCAP Records, Box 1418, Folder title/number: 091C, 
Korean (13). 
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Japan after he left to take care of his sick mother in Korea.33 Her petition was also 
denied, however, for “security reasons…Cho Gaku Rai [was] a known member of the 
Japan Communist Party and was a member of the leftist Korean Democratic Youth 
League in Japan until its dissolution as a terroristic organizations.”34 Therefore 
although not all petitions and permissions to stay in Japan submitted by the spouses of 
couples who intermarried prior to 1945 were accepted, these documents from the 
American occupation period demonstrate that even though some may have been 
forcibly separated, there were people who intermarried before 1945 and remained in 
Japan after 1945. And those who remained were not restricted to the pairings between 
Japanese women and Korean men, but also between Korean women and Japanese 
men.  
 Evidences of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples remaining in 
postwar Japan are also in legal discussions regarding nationality and the household 
registration system from the mid-1950s. For example, one of the earliest discussions 
of intermarriage from the pre-1945 period appeared in Hanrei Jihō (Legal Precedent 
Times), which featured legal precedents and cases along with descriptions of why the 
cases were ruled in a particular way, intended for legal professionals as well as to 
interested non-professional persons.35 Between 1955 and 1956, there was a 
correspondence between Hiraga Kenta of the Ministry of Justice and judge Yabuta 
 
33 “A Written Petition,” 1950, GHQ/SCAP Records, Box 1418, Folder title/number: 091C, 
Korean (13). 
34 “Transmittal of Petition for Stay of Deportation,” 1950, GHQ/SCAP Records, Box 1418, 
Folder title/number: 091C, Korean (13). 
35 “Hanrei Jihō towa” [About Hanrei Jihō], Hanrei Jihōsha, 
www.hanreijiho.co.jp/about.html. 
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Yasuo, who argued over a ruling concerning a Japanese woman who married a 
Taiwanese man prior to 1945, and whether her nationality should be Japanese or not.36 
Also in 1956, there was an introduction of a case in which a Japanese woman who 
married a Taiwanese man in 1943 and sought divorce in 1947.37 Within Hanrei Jihō, 
articles on the nationality of Japanese women who married Korean or Taiwanese men 
continued into the 1960s. Similar to the stories covered in the popular presses, the 
focus was on Japanese women—although the cases concerned women in Japan, not in 
Korea or Taiwan.38 The focus on Japanese women comes as no surprise considering 
that there were more Japanese women who intermarried than Japanese men during the 
imperial period. But what these legal discussions concerning Japanese women’s 
nationality reveal, is that many intermarriages were not so successful, leading people 
 
36 Hiraga Kenta, “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni Taiwanjin matawa Chōsenjin to kon’in shita 
naichijin onna no kokuseki” [Nationality of Japanese women who married Taiwanese or 
Koreans before the enactment of the peace treaty], Hanrei Jihō 61 (1955.11.1): 1–2; Yabuta 
Yasuo, “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni Taiwanjin to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki ni 
tsuite” [Regarding nationality of Japanese women who married Taiwanese before the 
enactment of the peace treaty], Hanrei Jihō 68 (1956.2.1): 1–2; Hiraga Kenta, “Futatabi heiwa 
jōyaku hakkō maeni Taiwanjin to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki ni tsuite” 
[Regarding nationality of Japanese women who married Taiwanese before the enactment of 
the peace treaty again], Hanrei Jihō 71 (1956.3.15): 1–2. 
37 “Taiwanjin ni kashita Nihon zaijū no Nihonjin no rikon no uttae to saiban kankatsu” 
[Divorce suit and jurisdiction of Japanese who married Taiwanese living in Japan], Hanrei 
Jihō 71 (1956.3.15): 21–22. 
38 “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni Chōsenjin to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki” 
[Nationality of Japanese women who married Koreans before the enactment of the peace 
treaty], Hanrei Jihō 208 (1960.1.1): 41–44; “Nihonkoku to no heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni 
Chōsenjin danshi to kon’in shita naichijin joshi wa gaikokujin to ieruka” [Whether Japanese 
women who married Korean men before the enactment of the peace treaty with Japan can be 
considered foreigners], Hanrei Jihō 227 (1960.7.11): 34–36; “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni 
Chōsenjin otoko to kon’in shita naichijin onna no kokuseki” [Nationality of Japanese women 
who married Korean men before the enactment of the peace treaty], Hanrei Jihō 257 
(1961.5.11): 7–13; “Chōsenjin danshi to kon’in shita naichijin joshi no heiwa jōyaku hakkōgo 
no kokuseki” [Nationality of Japanese women who married Korean men after the enactment of 
the peace treaty], Hanrei Jihō 414 (1965.8.11): 19–20. 
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to divorce—hence the debate over whether Japanese women who intermarried 
remained Korean or Taiwanese after the divorce, when they have entered the 
household registries of their husbands when they married. 
 Besides Hanrei Jihō, another legal journal that discussed both Japanese-
Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages was Koseki (Household Registry), which 
began running from 1949.39 One of the first articles that addressed intermarriage in 
Koseki, was an introduction of several cases that concerned the nationality of Japanese 
women who married Korean men prior to the issuance of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty.40 Then in 1969, there was a series of five articles that introduced the cases of 
intermarriage between naichijin (Japanese) and gaichijin (Koreans, Taiwanese, and 
people from the outer territories of the Japanese empire). This series particularly 
focused on marriages between Japanese women and Korean men, but also described 
what happened to the nationality of former colonized people in general.41 Then in the 
1980s, between 1983 and 1988, there was a series of “lectures” on former gaichi-hō, 
laws that governed the colonies and those in and from the colonies. According to the 
 
39 “Koseki,” Teihan, www.teihan.co.jp/contents/koseki.htm. 
40 Yokoyama Minoru, “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō mae Chōsenjin otoko to kon’in shita naichijin 
onna no kokuseki ni tsuite” [Regarding nationality of Japanese women who married Korean 
men before the enactment of the peace treaty], Koseki 120 (1958): 7–11. 
41 Kōzuma Arata, “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no 
hendō 1” [Change in “registry” between Japanese and colonial people before the enactment of 
the peace treaty 1], Koseki 271 (1969): 17–26; “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to 
gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no hendō 2” [Change in “registry” between Japanese and colonial 
people before the enactment of the peace treaty 2], Koseki 272 (1969): 27–32; “Heiwa jōyaku 
hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no hendō 3” [Change in “registry” 
between Japanese and colonial people before the enactment of the peace treaty 3], Koseki 273 
(1969): 10–15; “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no 
hendō 4” [Change in “registry” between Japanese and colonial people before the enactment of 
the peace treaty 4], Koseki 274: 22–26; “Heiwa jōyaku hakkō maeni okeru naichijin to 
gaichijin kan no ‘seki’ no hendō 5” [Change in “registry” between Japanese and colonial 
people before the enactment of the peace treaty 5], Koseki 275 (1969): 13–19.  
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lecturer, Mukai Hidehiro of the Ministry of Justice, he intended these lectures to 
provide information on laws related to Korea and Taiwan, and their relationship to 
Japanese nationality and household registration system and laws, because people 
tended to avoid learning about them when trying to educate themselves. The reason 
why people avoided learning about the gaichi laws, was due to the difficulty of 
understanding the laws, but Mukai argued that individuals involved in the 
management of nationality and household registries needed to learn the past laws, 
since matters related to the household registry of Koreans and Taiwanese “still [took] 
up considerable weight” in the 1980s.42  
 While Koseki focused more on Japanese women who married Korean men in 
their introduction of legal cases involving intermarriage, Koseki Jihō (Household 
Registry Times) featured cases concerning nationality of Japanese women who 
married Taiwanese men both pre- and post-1945.43 And similar to Koseki that featured 
a series of lectures on colonial laws in the 1980s, Koseki Jihō, too, ran a series of 
eighteen articles on gaichi-hō beginning from 1984, and ending in 1988, accompanied 
by a detailed timeline intended to better inform individuals who were responsible for 
managing the household registries. The articles also pointed to the “general difficulty 
 
42 Mukai Hidehiro, “Kȳu gaichi-hō kōgi” [Former colonial law lecture], Koseki 472 (1983): 
30–44. 
43 For example, see Tokunaga Hideo, “Shūsengo Taiwanjin to kon’in shita naichijin onna no 
kokuseki” [Nationality of Japanese women who married Taiwanese after the war], Koseki Jihō 
56 (1963.1): 40–45; Tokunaga Hideo, “Shūsenmae Nihonjin onna to nyūfu kon’inshi 
shūsengo rikon shita Taiwanjin otoko to heiwa jōyaku hakkōmae dōjin to kon’inshita naichijin 
onna no Nihon kokuseki no umu” [Whether or not a Taiwanese man who married a Japanese 
woman before the end of war but divorced after the war and a Japanese woman who married 
the said person before the enactment of the peace treaty have a Japanese nationality], Koseki 
Jihō 64 (1963.9): 30–36. 
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in comprehending” the gaichi-hō, and aimed to ease the process of understanding how 
laws that governed Korea and Taiwan and people from the former colonies worked.44 
Koseki Jihō in the 1990s additionally published a separate series of lectures on the 
former gaichi-hō, because according to the lectures, cases concerning how to manage 
the household registration and nationality of Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese who 
intermarried before the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect “appear[ed] 
frequently.”45 
Making a change to koseki occurs when there is a marriage or a divorce, as 
well as when there is a birth of a child, adoption, and recognition of an illegitimate 
child. The continued relevance of colonial laws in Japan, even in the 1980s and the 
1990s, thus reflect the presence of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples 
who married before 1945, remained in Japan, then had children and/or divorced since 
1945. Combined with the documents from the American occupation period, articles on 
legal matters demonstrate the existence of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese 
couples living in Japan post-1945, besides Japanese wives found in South Korea since 
the 1960s: it thus becomes difficult to argue that the history of intermarriage during 
the imperial period was forgotten in postwar Japan, simply because they left Japan. 
Then what led to the selective remembering of intermarriage that spotlighted Japanese 
wives in South Korea, and erasure of the presence of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-
 
44 Konno Kiyoyuki, “Kyū gaichi-hōshi gaisetsu 1” [A survey of former colonial law history 
1], Koseki Jihō 312 (1984.3): 8–13. There is a total of eighteen articles in this series published 
between 1984 and 1988.  
45 Yoshioka Seiichi, “Kyū gaichi-hō kōgiroku 1” [Lecture transcripts on former colonial law 
1], Koseki Jihō 417 (1992.11): 55–64. This series consists of four articles that was published 
between 1992 and 1993.  
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Taiwanese couples in postwar Japan?  
 
Selective Remembering and Forgetting 
 The absence of Koreans and Taiwanese from Japanese memory of the imperial 
period in postwar Japan is not limited to the cases concerning Japanese-Korean and 
Japanese Taiwanese marriages. According to Japan historian Carol Gluck, one of the 
“custodians” and an “agent of public memory” are “individual memories, the life 
stories, the personal pasts of people whose lives were ineluctably intertwined with the 
events of history with a capital H.”46 I thus searched for stories of intermarriage in the 
memory of others when I could not find stories from individuals who intermarried. 
But as Gluck points out how individual memories of people in Japan in the postwar 
period focus on the Japanese people, the presence of Koreans and Taiwanese, in 
general, was absent. For example, while at Kyoto University, I explored the writings 
by Japanese women in the postwar period during the seikatsu kiroku/tsuzurikata undō 
(life recording movement), led by sociologist and one of the prominent postwar 
intellectuals, Tsurumi Kazuko, who worked on collecting women’s wartime 
experiences in the 1950s by urging them to write. One of such collections is Enpitsu o 
nigiru shufu (Pencil-holding housewife) published in 1954, which included essays by 
women from various backgrounds—factory and office workers, elite intellectuals, 
teachers, housewives, and students—who wrote about their wartime and immediate 
postwar experiences. In this collection, one woman recollected her memory of meeting 
 
46 The other “custodians” are progressive intellectuals, conservative intellectuals, and popular 
media. Carol Gluck, “The Past in the Present,” Postwar Japan as History, edited by Andrew 
Gordon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993): 64–95. 
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a Korean man from a “Chōsenjin apāto” (Korean apartment), which was subject to 
discrimination from Japanese neighbors. The woman, Serigawa Kakuko, recalled 
meeting a Korean man, who informed her that the propaganda leaflets she picked up 
calling for surrender during the wartime were true. She feared being stopped by the 
police for reading the pamphlets and speaking to a Korean man, so she left, but after 
hearing celebrations from the “Korean apartment” at the end of war, Serigawa 
reflected that the pamphlets and the man were true.47 Another woman recounted her 
recent encounter with a neighbor, who observed and was concerned about the 
increasing number of “konketsuji” (mixed blood children) while children of “yūshū 
minzoku” (“superior ethnicity,” referring to the Japanese) were increasingly having 
abortions.48 
 These essays exposed Japanese discrimination against non-Japanese before and 
after 1945, as well as the absence of Koreans and Taiwanese in postwar Japan and 
Japanese memory. Finding the absence of Koreans and Taiwanese in the immediate 
postwar records of the wartime led to the question of why they were forgotten, as were 
the Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese who intermarried and remained in Japan.49 
 
47 Serigawa Kakuko, “Hanayome ishō” [Bridal costume], Enpitsu o nigiru shufu [Pencil-
holding housewife], edited by Tsurumi Kazuko (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1954): 104–
121. 
48 Nakamoto Atsuko, “Akachan” [Baby], Enpitsu o nigiru shufu [Pencil-holding housewife], 
edited by Tsurumi Kazuko (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1954): 194–204. 
49 Disclaimer: By mentioning that Koreans or Taiwanese were absent from Japanese women’s 
memoirs, I am not critiquing people for forgetting to mention them, especially considering the 
facts that Japanese colonization of Korea and Taiwan were not included in the postwar 
Japanese history textbooks in the immediate postwar period, and depending on where one 
lived in Japan, the chance of encountering Koreans and Taiwanese would have been 
remarkably different, with higher chances in the cities. I am also not discrediting the 
experience of Japanese people in the postwar period either—I understand that they had to 
struggle to survive, too. Moreover, the number of intermarriages was small—even if the actual 
numbers may have been higher than recorded, the chance of knowing someone who 
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Considering the selective remembering of intermarriage that focused on Japanese 
wives in South Korea, treated as victims in a tragedy narrative, this section explores 
why recognition of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages in Japan 
“disappeared” in the postwar period. I argue that the factors that contributed to their 
disappearance in the postwar period were the shift in the population policy, changes to 
the nationality and household registration laws, and the increased visibility of 
Americans. 
 One reason behind the erasure of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese 
couples in the postwar period, could be attributed to the change in the population 
policy. The earlier chapters explained that imperial Japan continued to sanction 
intermarriages despite oppositions from Japanese men involved in policymaking, 
because of concerns over the quality and quantity of the Japanese population during 
the wartime. With research on mixed children revealing no biological problems with 
“race” mixing, intermarriage could not be banned—especially when Japan was taking 
into consideration of intermarriage policies in other imperial countries and how the 
other countries were looking at Japan that claimed itself different from the Western 
powers. When Japan claimed to liberate colonized countries in Asia from white 
colonial rule, condemnation of intermarriages would have undermined its propaganda 
efforts. Just as the population policy was one of the reasons why intermarriage was 
sanctioned in Japan but never promoted, it was also the reason why intermarriage 
 
intermarried was limited. The lack of mentions about the colonies and people from the 
colonies in the postwar period has been noted by other scholars. For example, see Narita 
(2010). 
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could be ignored in the postwar period. 
 The shift in the postwar population policy is evident in the writings of Koya 
Yoshio, the medical doctor who was instrumental in drafting the wartime population 
policy and made a proposal to suppress intermarriage in its drafts. During the wartime 
period, Koya was appointed as an expert in the Ministry of Welfare in 1939, and 
subsequently became the head of the Ministry of Welfare’s Research Center in 1942. 
This Research Center (Kōseishō Kenkyūjo) became the National Institute of Public 
Health (Kokuritsu Kōshū Eisei’in) in 1946.50 According to Koya’s memoir, he was 
appointed to head the National Institute of Public Health, which was in charge of 
researching matters related to public health and to develop leaders of public health, 
until he resigned in 1956 when Koya then became the leader of the Family Planning 
Federation of Japan (Nihon Kazoku Keikaku Renmei).51 In the immediate postwar 
period, Koya was also a member of the Population Problem Council (Jinkō Mondai 
Shingikai), where members submitted proposals on matters related to the population to 
the government.52 The Population Problem Council formed because after 1945, the 
 
50 “Jinkō, kazoku keikaku bunya no rīdā, Joisefu shodai rijichō: Koya Yoshio (1890–1974)” 
[Leader in the field of population and family planning, JOICFP’s first chief director: Koya 
Yoshio (1890–1974)], 30 June 2016, JOICFP [Japanese Organization for International 
Cooperation in Family Planning], www.joicfp.or.jp/jpn/2016/06/30/33774/. He later became 
the head of the Family Planning Federation of Japan (Nihon Kazoku Keikaku Renmei), 
publishing a memoir in 1970, having been a major figure in the Family Planning Movement 
(kazoku keikaku undō) in the postwar period [e.g., contribution to the IPPF (Kokusai Kazoku 
Keikaku Renmei)]. Koya did not mention his involvement in the wartime population policy in-
depth, but he did complain about the research center’s lack of funding from the Ministry of 
Welfare (see chapter 3 of Koya Yoshio’s Rōgakkyū no techō kara [From the notebook of an 
old scholar] [Tokyo: Nihon Kazoku Keikaku Kyōkai, 1970], 40–51). Parts of the book were 
published earlier in Nihon Iji Shinpō [Japan Medical News] between 1967 and 1968 under the 
same title. 
51 Ibid., chapters 3 (40–51) and 5 (65–77). 
52 Ibid., chapter 5 (65–77). 
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birth rate became too high, and with the decreasing death rate, led to a natural 
population increase in Japan: whereas this was the population policy goal during the 
wartime, increasing population became a problem in the postwar period.53  
To address the growing population, Koya studied ways to address the issue in 
the United States: American occupation authorities initially scrutinized Koya for 
collaborating with the wartime government, but after escaping accusations, sent Koya 
along with other experts of the Ministry of Welfare in 1951 to observe the American 
public health administration (eisei gyōsei), because the Japanese public health 
administration was in a poor state after the war.54 In Koya’s memoir, the US 
occupation authorities’ take on administration of public health in Japan was to keep 
things the same as they previously were.55 Likewise, Koya’s view on minzoku, 
concern over possible decrease in population, and abortion remained the same, 
revealing the continuity between the wartime and the postwar period. Koya, for 
example, believed that there were particular characteristics that were unique to 
different minzoku, such as identifying Japanese as a peace-loving minzoku with a 
weed-like survival spirit.56 He remained concerned about the possible decrease in the 
 
53 Koya Yoshio, “Kazoku keikaku to sekai no jinkō mondai” [Family planning and the 
world’s population problem], Nihon Ishikai Zasshi 42.5 (1959.9): 284–285. 
54 Rōgakkyū no techō kara, chapter 6 (78–94). Interestingly, Koya explained his interest in 
observing the “black people problem,” which he has been interested in for a long time and 
wanted to see the situation from the inside (in the US). It may have been that he was interested 
in studying American policy on black people, which aimed to reduce the living disparity 
between white and black Americans and to improve the health and hygiene of black people 
through modernization of their living. Koya judged this as a good policy, because it could help 
reduce the population’s growth rate. Perhaps he was thinking about applying a similar policy 
in Japan, experiencing an increase in birthrate. 
55 There were changes to the personnel. Ibid., chapter 5 (65–77).   
56 Ibid., chapters 9 (132–147) and 11 (163–178).  
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Japanese population, the same concern from the interwar period.57 Moreover, even 
though abortion was no longer illegal, Koya still opposed it as he had from the prewar 
period.58 Other things that remained unchanged included his opposition to 
consanguineous marriages and the disregard of the lower classes: Koya worried about 
the use of birth control and the spread of venereal diseases among women of upper, 
intellectual classes, but never the lower classes.59 Furthermore, Koya switched from 
eiseigaku (hygiene studies) and jinshu eiseigaku (racial hygiene studies, or eugenics)60 
to kōshū eisei (public health), which he differentiated on the basis of the former 
focusing only on biological perspective and preventive medicine that ignored the 
social perspective, and the latter combining preventive medicine and care/treatment 
medicine.61 Yet his perspective did not change completely, as he still valued the 
quality and quantity of the Japanese population—hence his aim to reduce the high 
death rate for the future of Japanese minzoku’s development.62  
 
57 Koya Yoshio, “Taishitsu to tōta” [Physical constitution and selection], vol. 1 of Kōshū 
eiseigaku [Public health] (Tokyo and Osaka: Nihon Rinshōsha, 1950), 149.  
58 Rōgakkyū no techō kara, chapter 11 (163–178).  
59 Ibid., 252–260. Koya cared little about venereal diseases among working women, movie 
actresses, dancers, and female waitresses, because these people having less children would not 
have a negative and bad effects on a minzoku’s selection process. Koya Yoshio, “Seidōtoku to 
yūseigaku” [Sexual morality and eugenics], Sei to seimei [Sex and life], edited by Numanoi 
Haruo (Tokyo: Aoyama Shoin, 1948), 250. 
60 Ibid., 242. 
61 Koya Yoshio, Kōshū eisei gairon [Introduction to public health] (Tokyo: Nihon Isho 
Shuppan, 1947). 
62 Koya Yoshio, “Nōson kekkaku no genjō” [Present state of tuberculosis in rural 
communities], vol. 1 of Nōkō mondai kenkyū [Agricultural and industrial problem research], 
edited by Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkōkai (Tokyo: Keiei Hyōronsha, 1947), 213–237. As the head 
of the Family Planning Federation of Japan established in 1952, Koya was involved in 
supporting the work of the government, which included: 1) protecting maternality (bosei) from 
the harmful effects of abortion; 2) making [women] give birth to appropriate number of 
children in an appropriate time and spacing between the births; and 3) making [women] give 
birth to children of good qualities (and addressing the problem of juvenile delinquents). Thus 
we can see that his focus on improving the quality of the Japanese minzoku remained 
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Despite the continuities, there were things that changed besides the natural 
population growth: the baby boom was compounded by people repatriating from the 
former Japanese colonies and territories.63 This led to the concern of how to feed the 
increasing population, when production facilities have been damaged during the war, 
because if the majority of the population was starving, then rebuilding the Japanese 
economy was expected to be difficult. To address the population growth, also as a 
result of scientific and medical advances, access to abortion expanded by 
decriminalizing it for safer access to women,64 even though the original purpose may 
not have been to curve or control the Japanese population, as Koya insisted he was 
against population policies with goals aiming to limit and control the population.65 If a 
pregnancy could harm the mother physically or economically, she could access 
abortion under the Eugenic Protection Act (yūsei hogo-hō) of 1948, the year when the 
population increase was identified to be a major problem. This was a significant 
change from the wartime, when the government put effort into promoting marriage so 
 
unchanged. See Koya Yoshio, “Korekara no kazoku keikaku” [Family planning from now on], 
Rinshō Fujinka Sanka 19.2 (1965): 129–130.  
63 Koya Yoshio, “Nihon no jinkō mondai” [Japan’s population problem], Nihon Ishikai Zasshi 
23.11 (1949.11): 738. 
64 Koya, who took pride in Japan being the first country to take up family planning as a 
national policy, argues that although other countries critiqued Japan for population control 
through legalization of abortion, what Japan did was “family planning” and not “population 
control.” Abortion did not cause the decrease in the growth rate; instead, abortion rate actually 
decreased at the same time the growth rate decreased (see Rōgakkyū no techō kara, chapter 11 
[163–178]). The purpose of family planning was not to control the population (Rōgakkyū no 
Techō kara, chapter 13 [192–207]).  
He also frequently critiqued the Ministry of Welfare’s decision to allow uncontrolled abortion, 
claiming that despite arguing against it, the Ministry did not listen. Koya Yoshio, “Jinkō kaigi 
no omoide” [Recollections of the population conference], Kōsei 11.12 (1956.12): 23. 
65 The “birth control movement” (jutai chōsetsu undō) became “family planning movement” 
(kazoku keikaku undō) in the 1950s. Koya Yoshio, “Seikatsu sekkei wa kazoku keikaku kara” 
[Life planning from family planning], Shufu to Seikatsu 10.11 (1955.11): 177; Koya Yoshio, 
“Watashi ga kōsei daijin ni nattara” [If I become a welfare minister], Kōsei 8.1 (1953.1): 3. 
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that more children would be born.66 
With the shift from the wartime promotion of marriage that aimed to increase 
the population, to the postwar sanctioning of abortion that sought to address the 
population growth,67 there was no longer a need to promote marriage, and along with 
it, a need to debate whether to encourage or discourage intermarriage between 
Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese in Japan. I thus attribute the shift in the population 
policy as one reason why Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples 
“disappeared” in the postwar period.68   
The second reason for the “disappearance” of couples who intermarried and 
remained in Japan in the postwar period, could be attributed to the erasure of Koreans 
and Taiwanese in terms of nationality and citizenship. During the imperial period, 
Koreans and Taiwanese, regardless of their location in the metropole or the colonies, 
 
66 Family planning became part of national policy in Japan since 1951. Koya Yoshio, 
“Keikaku shussan moderu mura no hanashi” [A story of a model planned parenthood village], 
Katei Iji Shinpō 23.471 (1952.11): 5; Koya Yoshio, “Kazoku keikaku to sekai no jinkō 
mondai,” 285. 
67 Rōgakkyū no techō kara, chapter 6 (78–94). There were criticisms about this change. For 
example, Koya encountered a labor leader who called out the change in the government policy 
that previously enforced the umeyo fuyaseyo campaign to use humans in place of bullets, but 
now said babies should not be born, placing responsibilities on reducing the population to the 
same people who were expected to reproduce only a few years earlier (Koya Yoshio, 
“Kigyōtai no kazoku keikaku” [Family planning in corporate entity], Sangyō Eisei Kango 1 
(1957.1): 22). 
68 Side note about Koya and Christianity: To those who ask if Japanese Christians were less 
discriminatory than Japanese who were non-Christians, my answer is no. Although there may 
have been intermarriages through church, Koya Yoshio, who opposed race mixing and 
intermarriage, was also Christian. We do not know if he discriminated against Koreans and 
Taiwanese in daily interactions, but because he saw them potentially lowering the quality of 
the Japanese minzoku, it is difficult to claim that Japanese Christians were less discriminatory 
just because of their religious beliefs. Furthermore, if Christians were less discriminatory than 
non-Christian Japanese, then that cannot explain why anti-miscegenation laws existed in 
places like the US.  
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were considered Japanese subjects (Nihon shinmin) and had Japanese nationality.69 
Thus Koreans and Taiwanese were technically Japanese, although they were 
differentiated by honseki (domicile, or place of registry) in their family registration 
records, which system was first created in 1871, and implemented since 1872.70 
Intermarriage became one way for Koreans and Taiwanese to change their honseki, by 
entering the registry of their Japanese spouse after legalization of Japanese-Korean 
and Japanese-Taiwanese marriages. Alternatively, Koreans or Taiwanese could 
become “Japanese” through adoption and/or recognition as a child by a Japanese 
parent/family.71   
 According to one GHQ/SCAP document, there were approximately 1,500,000 
Koreans and 30,000 Taiwanese (Formosans) residing in Japan as of August 1945.72 
All of these individuals were “Japanese” before August 1945. After the fall of the 
Japanese empire and liberation of Korea and Taiwan, many repatriated to their 
countries of origin, but those who remained in Japan and not registered in the Japanese 
 
69 Having Japanese nationality did not make one a citizen—thus possession of nationality did 
not guarantee equal rights as citizens to all imperial subjects. See Tessa Morris-Suzuki, 
“Beyond Racism: Semi-Citizenship and Marginality in Modern Japan,” Japanese Studies 35.1 
(2015): 67–84. 
70 Endō Masataka, “Shokuminchi shihai no nakano kokuseki to koseki” [Nationality and 
family register in colonial rule], Waseda Seiji Kōhō Kenkyū 68 (2001): 294–296. Mizuno 
Naoki explains that the difference between naichi-seki, Chōsen-seki, and Taiwan-seki is what 
differentiated naichijin from colonized peoples (see Mizuno Naoki, “Kaisetsu” [Commentary], 
Senjiki shokuminchi tōchi shiryō [Wartime colonial rule documents] (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 
1998), 7–29. 
71 Endō (2001): 295. If Japanese who married Koreans and Taiwanese entered the registries of 
their non-Japanese partner, then they became Korean or Taiwanese (only limited to Japanese 
women, because Japanese men subject to conscription could not enter the registries of their 
Korean or Taiwanese spouses). 
72 Foreign Office, Japanese Government, “Japanese Nationals in Detached Territories and the 
Peoples of Those Territories Residing in Japan,” February 1948, GHQ/SCAP Records, Box 
1404, Folder title/number: Japanese Nationals in Detached Territories and the Peoples of 
Those Territories Residing in Japan (2), 6, 9. 
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household registration system through marriage or adoption lost their Japanese 
nationality. If Koreans and Taiwanese wanted to keep their Japanese nationality, they 
had to naturalize as a result of the changes made to the Nationality Law (kokuseki-hō) 
and the Household Registration Law (koseki-hō) in the immediate postwar period, 
when Japanese nationality came to be determined on the basis of one’s household 
registry.73  
Because the new Nationality Law, promulgated on May 4, 1950 and enforced 
from July 1, 1950 did not permit dual citizenship, if one wanted to naturalize as 
Japanese, then Koreans or Taiwanese had to give up their Korean or Taiwanese 
(Chinese) nationality.74 Taiwanese who remained in Japan and chose not to naturalize 
as Japanese in the postwar period could have claimed Chinese (ROC) nationality, 
under the Chinese Government that declared “all Formosans living abroad, including 
those in Japan, should recover their Chinese nationality as from the 25th of the month” 
in October 1945.75 Some Taiwanese remaining in Japan chose to obtain Chinese 
nationality, because there were benefits for the Taiwanese, such as being treated the 
same as Allied nationals and gaining access to the same food rations, exemption from 
the obligation to pay capital tax, and exclusion from the Japanese criminal 
 
73 Endō (2001): 303. For conditions of naturalization, see Section of Special Records, Foreign 
Office, Japanese Government, “Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of 
Japan, Volume VI, On Aliens (March 1951),” in vol. 6 of Nihon senryō jūyō bunsho 
[Important documents from the occupation of Japan] (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Sentā, 1989), 246. 
74 Ibid., 247. 
75 “Japanese Nationals in Detached Territories and the Peoples of Those Territories Residing 
in Japan,” 9. The adoption of Chinese nationality, however, was not mandatory. Also see 
“Treatment of Formosans,” December 1945–September 1950, GHQ/SCAP Records, Box 
1419, Folder title/number: 091K: Formosan-Chinese (Status in Japan) (10). 
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jurisdiction.76 Koreans remaining in Japan, on the other hand, did not gain the same 
benefits as the Taiwanese if they chose Korean nationality, because they were not 
considered United Nations nationals nor exempted from Japanese criminal jurisdiction 
like their Taiwanese counterparts.77 Yet if they chose a non-Japanese nationality, they 
became “foreigners.” 
Despite the benefits of obtaining Chinese nationality, some Taiwanese did not 
choose Chinese nationality as a political protest against the Republican rule of Taiwan. 
Similarly, Koreans opted out of Korean nationality as a form of protest against the 
division of Korea into the North and the South. Rejection to naturalize as Japanese 
also functioned as a form of protest. Yet those who did not choose any nationality 
became stateless and “aliens” under Japanese law once the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
came into effect on April 28, 1952.78 Thus the stateless individuals were neither 
Korean nor Taiwanese in legal terms. 
Furthermore, according to The Korean Minority Report from 1951 written by 
Edward W. Wagner, who reported the status of Koreans in Japan for the American 
audience, “Legally in the eyes of the SCAP, there were no longer any Koreans in 
 
76 “Japanese Nationals in Detached Territories and the Peoples of Those Territories Residing 
in Japan,” 9–10. Also see Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ed., Shoki tainichi senryō 
seisaku (jō), Asakai Kōichirō hōkokusho [Early occupation policy towards Japan (part one): 
Asakai Kōichirō report] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1978), 182, in which confusion of how 
to treat Taiwanese in the immediate postwar period is evident. 
77 “Jurisdiction of Japanese Police Over Koreans and Formosans,” December 1945–
September 1950, GHQ/SCAP Records, Box 1419, Folder title/number: 091K: Formosan-
Chinese (Status in Japan) (10). 
78 Common Law which enabled the transfers between Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese 
registries were thought to be in effect until the implementation of the SF Peace Treaty. Thus 
Koreans and Taiwanese who married Japanese could have entered a Japanese registry, and 
become a Japanese national to keep their Japanese nationality from the imperial period. See 
Yoshioka, “Kyū gaichi-hō kōgiroku 4”: 59–63. 
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Japan,” when they became Japanese nationals.79 His report did not address the status 
of Taiwanese in Japan, but the same could also be said for the Taiwanese who chose 
Japanese nationality, when dual nationality was not possible. I argue that this legal 
disappearance of Koreans and Taiwanese through naturalization or exclusion from the 
category of “Japanese” as foreigners or stateless persons in postwar Japan after 
changes were made to the kokuseki and koseki laws contributed to the disappearance 
of Koreans and Taiwanese, as well as Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese 
couples in postwar memory of the imperial period, especially when one could no 
longer enter a Japanese household registry simply via marriage, and be both Japanese 
and Korean or Taiwanese.  
The third explanation for the “disappearance” of Japanese-Korean and 
Japanese-Taiwanese couples in the postwar period, would be the American occupation 
of Japan between 1945 and 1952: if external presence during the imperial period is 
what led Japan to sanction intermarriage before 1945, then it was also the external 
presence that led Japan to forget interethnic marriages after 1945.  
 With the American occupation, the target of concern over race/ethnic mixing 
shifted to “GI babies” and konketsuji (“mixed blood children”) in postwar Japan and in 
the secondary sources.80 For example, in revealing the “the problem of 
 
79 Edward W. Wagner, The Korean Minority in Japan, 1904–1950 (New York: International 
Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), 58–59. This reveals more about the American 
attitudes toward the Korean minority as much as the situation of Korean minorities in Japan, 
there appears to have been a pity for Koreans for having being colonized and discriminated 
within Japan. Yet they are also framed as a nuisance, likened to black Americans in the US, 
with a tendency to be involved in crimes and causing disruption in society (perhaps a Japanese 
influence). 
80 Yukiko Koshiro, Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), 164.  
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miscegenation” that exposed the “mutual abandonment” of Japanese-American mixed 
children by Japan and the United States, Yukiko Koshiro cites the publicized lecture 
by “Furuya Yoshio” (Koya Yoshio) from 1953, in which he warned the dangers of 
miscegenation between Japanese and Americans, because compared to Japanese-
Chinese and Japanese-Korean children, descendants would appear non-Japanese and 
potentially cause sociopolitical problems.81 Koya additionally warned about the 
potential consequences of miscegenation, as konketsuji could become social and 
political malcontents, based on observations of the “mulatto problem” in Haiti, the 
United States, and Indonesia.82 The argument about the dangers of mixing in 
decreasing the quality of the Japanese and mixed children as potential sociopolitical 
disrupters in Japanese society remained the same from the prewar and wartime period, 
but the discussion shifted from interethnic to interracial mixing, as postwar “konketsuji 
crisis” excluded children born to Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese 
parentage.83  
 The similar shift also occurred in postwar Germany. According to historian 
Heide Fehrenbach in “Afro-German Children and the Social Politics of Race after 
 
81 Koya Yoshio, “Konketsuji wa dō kaiketsu subeki ka” [How mixed blood children should be 
resolved], Nihon Keizai Shinbun, February 2, 1953: 6. Cited in Koshiro (1999), 165  
82 Koya Yoshio, “Konketsu monogatari: sekaiteki ni mita konketsuji mondai” [The story of 
blood mixing: The problem of mixed blood children seen globally], Fuin Kōron 39.4 (1953): 
164–169. Cited in Kristin Roebuck, “Orphans by Design: ‘Mixed-Blood’ Children, Child 
Welfare, and Racial Nationalism in Postwar Japan,” Japanese Studies (2016): 6–7.  
83 Also see Roebuck (2016): 3, footnote 12. It is interesting to note that according to Koshiro, 
“a special committee on the problems of mixed blood children in Japanese society was formed 
under the direction of Furuya Yoshio,” on May 5, 1952 (Koshiro [1999], 168). However, 
Koya does not mention anything about this committee in his postwar memoir. In 1959, Koya 
came to identify attempts to strength the power of a country through increasing the population 
with imperialism (see Koya, “Kazoku keikaku to sekai no jinkō mondai”: 286). Perhaps his 
views on intermarriage and mixed children changed. 
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1945,” the preoccupation with “blackness” and mischlinge (“mixed-bloods”) born to 
white German women and African American men, led to the erasure and replacement 
of Jews who were racialized under the Nazi regime in postwar Germany. Thus the 
difference came to be defined with focus on “Negro/Colored” rather than Jewish 
heredity.84 In the case of postwar Japan, it was the erasure and replacement of Koreans 
and Taiwanese who were racialized under the imperial Japanese regime, to the 
preoccupation with both “whiteness” and “blackness” and konketsuji born between 
Japanese women and American men affiliated with the bases. Therefore, in addition to 
the disappearance in terms of nationality, the Japanese-Korean and Japanese-
Taiwanese couples who intermarried prior to 1945 and children born to them also 
disappeared in terms of visibility post-1945.  
In summary, the existence of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples 
from the imperial period could be forgotten in postwar Japan due to the changes in the 
population policy, nationality and household registration laws, and visibility of 
Koreans and Taiwanese. I argue that Japan and its people took advantage of this 
situation to ignore the history and existence of intermarriage post-1945—intentionally 
and unintentionally—because recognizing the presence of Koreans and Taiwanese in 
Japan, would have intervened in the development of victim consciousness and the 
myth of Japan as a homogeneous country, which contributed to the rebuilding of Japan 
in the postwar period. Stories of Japanese wives found in South Korea could be 
 
84 Heide Fehrenbach, “Afro-German Children and the Social Politics of Race after 1945,” in 
German History from the Margins, edited by Neil Gregor, Nils Roemer, and Mark Roseman 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 226–251. For Nazi Germany’s policy on 
intermarriage, see Evan Burr Bukey’s Jews and Intermarriage in Nazi Austria (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
  203 
remembered, because it enabled framing Japan and the Japanese as victims of the war. 
The history and existence of intermarriage in Japan, however, would have been an 
inconvenient truth, in which Japan and the Japanese people would have been forced to 
recognize their position as a victimizer during the Second World War. 
 
Epilogue: Forgetting History as a Privilege  
 This chapter traced the stories of Japanese-Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese 
marriages in postwar Japan because the existing studies often end at 1945, and also to 
answer the question of why racism in Japan is not recognized by Japanese people 
today. I connect the question about racism to selective remembering and forgetting of 
history, because remembering Japanese wives as victims while erasing Japanese-
Korean and Japanese-Taiwanese couples in postwar Japan, in which racism, among 
other factors, was at play, reflect the refusal and/or the inability to recognize racism 
and other forms of discrimination (sexism, ableism, classism, etc.) against minorities, 
including, but not limited to, resident Koreans and Taiwanese, as well as children of 
mixed heritage in Japan. 
 I thus aim to employ history in order to prompt those who cannot or do not 
acknowledge racism to recognize that they are being discriminatory: Being able to 
forget or ignore history, especially the history of individuals who are marginalized, 
excluded, and/or forgotten from history, is a privilege that one has, not earns, as a 
result of being associated with a particular group, such as “Japanese” and other 
dominant, majority groups with power in society. Just because one is responsible does 
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not mean that one is guilty,85 yet what one observes in contemporary Japan, even at 
the end of the Heisei period, is the inability to separate the two. Whenever Japan’s 
neighboring countries ask that Japan take its historical responsibilities, these are seen 
as personal attacks. And as a result of being unable to come to terms with one’s 
privilege of being Japanese in Japan, relations with the neighboring countries never 
seem to improve, because the anger and frustration are misdirected outward instead of 
inward and facing historical responsibility. Since the current government already 
receives plenty of flak for contributing to this, I write to the “ordinary” Japanese 
people, regardless of political leanings, who are being complicit in the system that 
disadvantages minorities by not challenging the status quo, ignoring history, and being 
unaware of one’s privilege. The lack of personal and familial connection to history 
may provide one explanation for the lack of interest in Japanese imperial/colonial past, 
but if one could become conscious of the privilege in forgetting the past, then I think it 
can lead to “introspection, education, and consciousness raising,” which are the first 
steps of making a social change as illustrated in Bobbie Harro’s Cycle of Liberation 
(Figure 5).86  
 For example, Japan currently ranks 110th among 149 countries in terms of 
gender equity according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap 
 
85 Naoki Sakai, “Nihonshi to kokuminteki sekinin” [Japanese history and national 
responsibility], Nashonaru historī o manabisteru [Unlearning national history] (Tokyo: Tokyo 
Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006), 178.  
86 Bobbie Harro, “The Cycle of Liberation,” Readings for Diversity and Social Justice, edited 
by Maurianne Adams, et al., fourth edition (New York: Routledge, 2018), 629. 
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Figure 5: Cycle of Liberation 
Report.87 There are Japanese women who voice their frustration and anger at the 
gender inequity and sexism in Japan, particularly when men refuse to recognize 
 
87 The Global Gender Gap Report 2018, December 17, 2018, World Economic Forum, 
www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf. 
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sexism as sexism. Women are also able to call out the victim blaming when it occurs, 
for example, in cases of sexual harassment. Yet when it comes to racism, ableism, 
classism, and other forms of discrimination, women participate in perpetuating the 
discrimination by victim blaming, too. Why can they not recognize that they are  
behaving in the same way as the men they critique are behaving, when viewing 
countries asking for reparations as “parasitic”? Why cannot Japanese women who 
think that Korean “comfort women” are “prostitutes” conspiring against Japan, 
understand that they are suffering under the same system from the imperial period, in 
which the Japanese women today are also suffering—the expectation to get married, 
bear children, work in and out of home, and take care of elderly parents and parents-
in-law?  
 One would expect (at least I have naively expected) that if one was oppressed 
and/or a minority, one would be cognizant of one’s own privilege and be empathetic to 
the plight of others who are oppressed. Yet this is not the case and also not unique to 
Japanese people’s disregard of history. To give some examples: there is gatekeeping 
by gays and lesbians in the queer community that excludes people of other non-
heterosexual and non-homosexual orientations, as well as people of low 
socioeconomic status who conform to the ableist rhetoric. They may not necessarily be 
doing so out of evil intent, but the lack of understanding not only between majority 
and minority groups, but also between minority groups, creates a competition to see 
who is more oppressed and lead to disavowal of others’ experiences, which then 
inhibit change.  
 In the “Cycle of Liberation,” the next major step after “getting ready” by 
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recognizing one’s privilege and role in perpetuating systems that negatively affect 
society, is “building community.” And I believe that it is here that history—inclusive 
history in particular—plays a role: by focusing on history of Japanese-Korean and 
Japanese-Taiwanese marriages that has been marginalized in modern Japanese history 
and history of the Japanese empire, one of the things that this project revealed was the 
structure that rewarded and recognized those who were Japanese, heterosexual, abled, 
(re)productive, and middle class or above, but punished or disregarded those who 
could not conform to the structure—non-Japanese, non-(hetero)sexual, disabled, non-
(re)productive, and lower class—in the case of Japan. By revealing how different 
oppressed groups are oppressed under the same structure, then there is a potential for 
the various minority groups to build a coalition against the structure, rather than 
compete against each other, to move toward the next step in making a change.  
 The majority groups’ denial of privilege, ignoring of history, and refusal to 
take responsibility of the past, is not unique to Japan: it is also seen in the United 
States, and other former imperial countries, where the dominant racial groups deny 
colonial and imperial responsibilities when pointed out by minorities within their 
countries and people from the former (and still) colonized and occupied countries. 
This dissertation therefore argued against viewing Japan as unique and an anomaly, so 
that the call for inclusive history could be applicable to other countries, their exclusive 
histories, and people who deny history, in hopes of “building community” across 
various boundaries and “creating change.” 
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